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all the damage possible to Lee's depots, and the railroads on which he depended for supplies. Stoneman, with the cavalry, reached the Upper Rappahannock, met with a rain-storm, and some opposition fk, and along the Orange and Alexandria railroad. The river was past fording for some time, and Stoneman was allowed to waste two weeks in looking at it, when a day's march would have placed him high Here they crossed on the 29th, and proceeded towards Germanna and Ely's fords, on the Rapidan. Stoneman, with the mass of his cavalry, set out on the same day from Kelly's, on his way to the Confederer forty thousand under Sedgwick, while Hooker was gathering seventy thousand on his flank, and Stoneman with ten thousand cavalry was in his rear. To oppose this last force, he had only eight or nin. He retreated under cover of the night and the storm, across the Rappahannock. The raid of Stoneman's cavalry was a failure. It accomplished, if possible, less in proportion than the main army.
izes the rashness of the manoeurvre, but no Captain ever won victories against great odds without exposing himself to criticism of this kind. Jackson executed the movement, and too much praise cannot be given for the splendid manner of its execution. No breath of rivalry or jealousy ever came between Lee and Jackson. Said Jackson of Lee, He is the only man I would follow blindfold. Said Lee, on hearing of Jackson's wound, He has lost his left arm, but I have lost my right. These two Virginians, worthy representatives of the two stocks that have built up that State, Lee of the English Cavaliers, Jackson of the Scotch Irish, had for each other only feelings of the most generous confidence and affection. Their lives, grand, noble, unselfish; their deaths, such as became soldiers and Christians; their graves within sight of each other in the very heart of the Virginia of their love; their memories, a priceless legacy to future generations; the fame of neither requires enhancement a
pickets and scouts had informed Howard in the middle of the afternoon that the Confederates were in force on the Orange Plank-road, entirely on his flank, yet, at 6 P. M., in broad daylight, Howard is completely surprised, his lines taken in flank and rear, while his men are for the most part at supper, with arms stacked. The first division met with (Devon's) is quickly routed. Colonel Dodge says he lost 1,600 out of 4,000 men, and nearly all his superior officers, in a brief ten minutes. Schutz's division is next overwhelmed, and adds to the fearful panic. Bushbeck's brigade, of Steinwher's division, attempts to stay the rout, but is soon carried away. In an hour Howard's 10,000 men have been scattered in disgraceful flight, and without the semblance of organization, are carrying dismay in every direction through the Federal army. Colonel Dodge seems to think that Hooker was chiefly responsible for this disaster, and but mildly blames Howard. Surely history affords few instance
Tuesday Anderson (search for this): chapter 11.99
composed of a few batteries and two small brigades (subsequently replaced by two brigades from Anderson's division) was sufficient to keep this large force in check; and the only result of the whole hold in check Hooker's seventy-five or eighty thousand, while he concentrated the divisions of Anderson, McLaws and Early, of twenty-two or twenty-three thousand, against Sedgwick. This plan was carried out on Monday. Early came up behind Sedgwick; Anderson and McLaws pressed him from the Chancellorsville side. Much time was occupied in getting the troops into position. McLaws's movements were very slow. But at 6 P. M. Monday Early and Anderson attacked Sedgwick, and by nightfall the Sixth Federal corps had been forced back, with heavy loss, to Bank's Ford, under cover of the batteries oChancellorsville, with the intention of throwing his whole available force upon Hooker. On Tuesday Anderson's and McLaws's divisions, which had been marching and fighting since Friday morning, return
General Lee followed close upon the Federal retreat, and during the afternoon felt Hooker's lines in his front, to see if they presented any favorable point of attack. He found the Federal centre and left flank too strongly posted to invite assault, and on Friday night directed Jackson to move the next day around the Federal army, and attack its right flank and rear. Jackson began this manoeuvre in the early morning, taking some 26,000 infantry, while General Lee retained Anderson's and McLaw's divisions, amounting to 16,000 or 17,000 men, opposite Hooker's center and left wing. All day was consumed by Jackson in moving around the front of the Federal army, and in getting into position beyond and to the rear of its right flank. The distance was twelve or fifteen miles, and the route a narrow defile through a dense wilderness. Though conducted with all possible rapidity, secrecy and skill, this movement was discovered early in the day by Sickles, whose corps (Third) was next to
Second, had been left at Fredericksburg under Sedgwick, to make demonstrations and distract the enemen, he had in front over forty thousand under Sedgwick, while Hooker was gathering seventy thousand he lines in front of Fredericksburg, and keep Sedgwick in check, he decided to move out at once withyed troops at hand, Hooker was depending upon Sedgwick to advance from Fredericksburg and strike the Confederate rear. Sedgwick, who had with him over twenty thousand men, had been ordered to push Eaand now put a stop to all further progress on Sedgwick's part, repulsing him with severe loss. Hooker complains bitterly of Sedgwick's slowness, and certainly his whole movement showed, at the least,ooker. Audacity had so far been successful. Sedgwick's position invited another bold attack. Lee while Lee with half his army was overwhelming Sedgwick but five or six miles off. This great strofurther success reasonably certain. Now that Sedgwick was disposed of, he again ordered a concentra[11 more...]
e Rappahannock, during Saturday night and Sunday morning, so as to reach the rear of McLaws, who held the right of Lee's lines. Early, with less than half the force of Sedgwick, a force, too, scattered over a line of several miles in length, succeeded in delaying the latter's march so much that the battle was already raging at Chancellorsville before Sedgwick was ready to move out from Fredericksburg. It was 11 A. M. before Sedgwick was able, by repeated attacks and at heavy loss, to carry Marye's heights, and thus open his way to go to Hooker's assistance, and at this hour Hooker had already been beaten and driven from Chancellorsville to the position which he took up in rear of it. Sedgwick, now opposed by Wilcox with a single brigade, advanced very cautiously up the plank road towards Chancellorsville. At Salem Church, half way between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, Wilcox held him in check until McLaws arrived with four brigades, about the middle of the afternoon. These
trations to make it satisfactory. His taste, too, was as faulty as his judgment. For his proclamations were as bombastic as his performance was impotent. General Hooker makes an altogether higher and more reputable figure in history than General John Pope, but his orders and despatches during the Chancellorsville campaign often recall the rare series with which Pope illustrated his too brief career in Virginia the preceding summer. This, however, was a small matter, compared with selfish anPope illustrated his too brief career in Virginia the preceding summer. This, however, was a small matter, compared with selfish and ungenerous efforts that Hooker always made to throw the blame of his failure on any shoulders other than his own, and which have properly provoked severe treatment from many of his comrades. But if Colonel Dodge has criticised General Hooker not more severely than he deserved, he has been very kind, to say the least, towards General Sedgwick, and far too lenient, in view of the facts, to General Howard. The manner in which Sedgwick's slowness is explained, and the hesitation with which he
Everard B. Meade (search for this): chapter 11.99
nst the Federal left and centre. Sickles bears the brunt of Stuart's attack, and most gallantly holds the ground for a a time, but is finally driven from his position, as is Slocum, who joins him on the left. Hooker permits the centre of his army to be beaten, while the wings are practically unengaged. Reynolds, with the First corps, had been brought up from Fredericksburg on Saturday, thus making over 90,000 troops in all that had been concentrated at Chancel-lorsville. But Reynolds and Meade, with the First and Fifth corps, are allowed to remain idle on Sickles's right while he is being defeated; and on the left wing of the army, the Eleventh and part of the Second corps have no enemy in front. Thus more than half of the force that Hooker had at hand did little or nothing towards resisting Lee's onset. Meantime, with all these unemployed troops at hand, Hooker was depending upon Sedgwick to advance from Fredericksburg and strike the Confederate rear. Sedgwick, who had with hi
divisions, amounting to 16,000 or 17,000 men, opposite Hooker's center and left wing. All day was consumed by Jackson in moving around the front of the Federal army, and in getting into position beyond and to the rear of its right flank. The distance was twelve or fifteen miles, and the route a narrow defile through a dense wilderness. Though conducted with all possible rapidity, secrecy and skill, this movement was discovered early in the day by Sickles, whose corps (Third) was next to Howards (Eleventh), the latter constituting the extreme Federal right flank. Soon after 8 A. M., Sickles was aware of the movement of a strong column across his front. At half-past 9 Hooker ordered Slocum and Howard to look well to the right flank, as the enemy was moving in that direction. Sickles was authorized to push two divisions of his corps to the front, and cut the Confederate column. He did so, captured part of a regiment, and knew with certainty, at 2 P. M., that Jackson, with a large
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