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, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this purpose the Sixth Corps was taken from the armies operating against Richmond, to which was added the Nineteenth Corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the the Gulf Department under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River Expedition. After describing the garrisons in Baltimore and Washington and my movement across the Potomac, he proceeds: On the 6th the enemy occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column toward Frederick City. General Wallace, with Ricketts's division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby
oon. The main body of my command did not get up until some two or three hours later. If any of my men were observed in front of the defenses on the morning of the 10th, it was only in the imagination of men whose vision was distorted by fright. On the morning of that day I moved from the Monocacy, the scene of the fight of the dtion too absurd to deserve serious consideration. According to General Barnard's report, besides the 3,716 men on duty in the defenses north of the Potomac on the 10th, the 4,400 veteran reserves were moved to the trenches on that day; the 800 cavalry, under Lowell, were sent to the front before day on the 11th, the 1,200 dismounted cavalry were also sent to the front, and to report to McCook on the 10th and 11th. Quartermaster-General Meigs reported with 2,000 men on the night of the 10th, and Colonel Rice, with 2,800 convalescents and artillerymen reported to the same officer on Monday, thus giving a force of 14,916 effectives for duty on the front agai
the day previous --that is, on the morning of the 10th. My advance, a small body of cavalry, arrived for the first time in front of the defenses about noon of the 11th, and I followed this advance in person, arriving in sight of the defenses a little after noon. The main body of my command did not get up until some two or three hthe Potomac on the 10th, the 4,400 veteran reserves were moved to the trenches on that day; the 800 cavalry, under Lowell, were sent to the front before day on the 11th, the 1,200 dismounted cavalry were also sent to the front, and to report to McCook on the 10th and 11th. Quartermaster-General Meigs reported with 2,000 men on they own conception, that of undertaking the capture, but the feasibility of that depended upon my finding the city very insufficiently defended. On the night of the 11th, being unwilling to surrender the idea of capturing the Federal Capital, I gave an order for the assault at dawn on the 12th; but a dispatch received during the ni
facts which characterizes his production. After describing an imaginary state of things existing on the afternoon of the 12th, when Washington is represented as being in extreme danger, he says: Meanwhile a certain quiet individual, while smoking hth, being unwilling to surrender the idea of capturing the Federal Capital, I gave an order for the assault at dawn on the 12th; but a dispatch received during the night, stating the arrival of two corps from Grant's army, caused me to examine the works at the earliest dawn of the 12th, when I found them so strongly manned as to preclude all hope of carrying them, and I therefore countermanded the order for the assault. I remained in front of the works, however, during the 12th, with the purpos wounded men were found in it they were men who had been wounded in the affair which occurred late in the afternoon of the 12th, between some troops sent out from the works and a portion of the troops on my front line, who could not be transported, a
pied from the returns in the Archive Office at Washington by Col. Walter H. Taylor, and given in his Four years with Gen. Lee, page 176. That corps had been engaged in the heaviest of the fighting from the Wilderness to James river, and on the 12th of May nearly one entire division (Johnson's) had been captured. The other divisions had suffered very heavy losses, and there had been no accessions to the corps, except in the return of a small brigade of my own division and two regiments of Rodesur, and in this I am credited with some commands that were not with me. In Gordon's division, which was formed by taking two of the brigades from my division and uniting them with the remnant of Johnson's division, after the disaster of the 12th of May, to form a division for Gordon, there were thirty regiments. Giving 180 to each regiment would make an aggregate of 5,400 for the division. In one of the brigades in his division there were the remnants of thirteen regiments, being all that
e kind of evidence he gives me sixty pieces of artillery, and in a note says that this number was actually counted in passing the South Mountain. As my forces passed through two gaps in the South Mountain, a part of the artillery accompanying each column, I should like to know who. made the count. If it was a citizen, he was not unlikely to count a caisson as a piece of artillery. As General Barnard says that the name, rank, and regiment of the prisoners captured from my command between the 3d and 18th of July were carefully ascertained and recorded, and thus it was ascertained that I had ninety-nine regiments of infantry and thirty-six of cavalry, I defy the production of any such record. If such record exists, then it shows at least twenty-five more regiments of infantry, and twelve of cavalry, than I had. It is possible that men claiming to belong to so many regiments, may have been captured, as I afterward ascertained that there were a very large number of deserters from our ar
ance of the Nineteenth Corps before him. The italics in the last part of this quotation are mine, and are given to call attention to the statement that General Wright was enabled to reach Washington before I did. General Barnard, after stating the inability of Hunter to move up the Ohio and over the Baltimore and Ohio railroad in time to oppose me, says: Hence it became necessary to find other troops to oppose Early. One division (Ricketts's) was, as has been seen, detached on the 5th of July from the lines before Petersburg and sent to Baltimore, where it arrived in time to bear the brunt of the battle at the Monocacy. The other two divisions did not receive their orders till the 9th, and did not reach Washington till two P. M. the 11th, barely in time. A part of the Nineteenth Corps, just arrived at Fort Monroe from Louisiana, were likewise dispatched to Washington and arrived at the same time. (Page 113.) He further says, on page 116: Major-General H. G. Wright, United
mounted, were sent during the 10th and 11th in the direction of Rockville, Laurel, Bladensburg, and Fort Mahan to observe the enemy. The rest (dismounted) were sent, with their cavalry arms, to General McCook for service in the lines. By effectives, it must be understood, are meant only enlisted men for duty who bear arms, and the term does not include commissioned officers. The foregoing statement shows that there were within the defenses and in adjacent camps 20,530 effectives on the 10th of July, while I was on the march from Monocacy, the authorities in Washington being fully apprised of my approach. Besides these troops there was a force of quartermaster's men organized into a brigade by Quartermaster-General Meigs, over 6,000 strong, and reported for duty on Sunday (the 10th). (See same report, pp. 115-116). That, with all these troops at hand, and with full knowledge of my advance, there should have been assembled only five thousand men of the character described by the writ
ough the Shenandoah Valley to threaten the National Capital. It is a little singular that it did not occur to this writer that if General Lee was being so steadily and surely hemmed in as he supposes, he could have spared from his army so large a detachment as I am represented to have carried across the Potomac to the front of Washington. This writer further says: As already stated, the enemy appeared in force in close proximity to the northern defenses of Washington upon the morning of July 11; but small bodies of the invaders had been observed as early as the morning of the day previous --that is, on the morning of the 10th. My advance, a small body of cavalry, arrived for the first time in front of the defenses about noon of the 11th, and I followed this advance in person, arriving in sight of the defenses a little after noon. The main body of my command did not get up until some two or three hours later. If any of my men were observed in front of the defenses on the morning
the front of Washington just in the nick of time — none too soon, but not a minute too late. Up the street they marched as only veterans can march, beyond the line of defenses, and as the heads of columns began to deploy into line of battle and throw out skirmishers cheer after cheer went up from those who had for nearly two days and nights formed a feeble but fortunately effectual barrier to the rebel advance. Early's men heard the cheering, and in the darkness fast closing in upon the 12th of July felt its cause as the reinforcements opened fire. This is quite graphic, and it is a pity that it is but the baseless fabric of a vision as it represents the Silent Man smoking his cigar in a very interesting posture. It may also be observed that the perverse Lee, notwithstanding he was thus throttled, continued to breathe with considerable vigor for some time thereafter. Here is what the Silent man himself says in his report dated the 22d of July, 1865: Immediately upon the enemy's
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