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irection of Turkey Bend. The highest commendation that can be given of this movement is that it deceived his adversary and gained him a day's breathing time. Lee was uncertain as to McClellan's designs on the 28th, and such movements as he made that day were made with the notion that McClellan would recross the Chickahominy at Battner's bridge or at some of the crossings below. It was night before the Confederate commander divined McClellan's plans, and issued orders accordingly. On the 29th Longstreet and A. P. Hill were sent to the south side of the Chickahominy. They were, by a circuit, to strike the Long-Bridge road and the flank of the retreating army. McGruder and Huger were to press the rear of the Federals by the Williamsburg and Charles City roads, Jackson to cross the Chickahominy and join in the pursuit. Longstreet was busy all day marching towards his destination. Jackson was compelled to repair the bridge over the Chickahominy, which kept him back all day. Magrud
base, and now cut off from the Pamunkey, he determined to move towards the James at its nearest point, instead of recrossing the Chickahominy and retreating down the peninsula. He began at once the movement of the immense trains and material of his army across White Oak Swamp, in the direction of Turkey Bend. The highest commendation that can be given of this movement is that it deceived his adversary and gained him a day's breathing time. Lee was uncertain as to McClellan's designs on the 28th, and such movements as he made that day were made with the notion that McClellan would recross the Chickahominy at Battner's bridge or at some of the crossings below. It was night before the Confederate commander divined McClellan's plans, and issued orders accordingly. On the 29th Longstreet and A. P. Hill were sent to the south side of the Chickahominy. They were, by a circuit, to strike the Long-Bridge road and the flank of the retreating army. McGruder and Huger were to press the re
place from the Valley at the critical moment. (General Webb is in error in attributing this movement to Jackson himself, as he does on page 122. Jackson had been constantly instructed to keep such a movement in view, as may be seen from General Lee's letter to him of May 16.) The victories of Cross Keys and Port Republic, on June 8 and June 9, made the withdrawal of McDowell's corps from McClellan permanent, and left Jackson free to join Lee. Meantime the latter was busy in preparation. On June 11 Stuart was sent with the Confederate cavalry to reconnoiter McClellan's right and rear. This gallant cavalryman extended his reconnoissance into a raid completely around the Federal army, cutting its communications and destroying supplies as he went. This expedition, one of the most brilliant and successful feats of arms that had been accomplished up to that time in the war, gave Lee the information on which he planned his attack on McClellan. General Webb thinks it worthy of only a pass
for a renewal of the struggle. Troops that could be spared from the South were ordered to Richmond. Jackson was directed to be prepared to move to the same place from the Valley at the critical moment. (General Webb is in error in attributing this movement to Jackson himself, as he does on page 122. Jackson had been constantly instructed to keep such a movement in view, as may be seen from General Lee's letter to him of May 16.) The victories of Cross Keys and Port Republic, on June 8 and June 9, made the withdrawal of McDowell's corps from McClellan permanent, and left Jackson free to join Lee. Meantime the latter was busy in preparation. On June 11 Stuart was sent with the Confederate cavalry to reconnoiter McClellan's right and rear. This gallant cavalryman extended his reconnoissance into a raid completely around the Federal army, cutting its communications and destroying supplies as he went. This expedition, one of the most brilliant and successful feats of arms that had bee
their supports. On May 30th Johnston concentrated twenty-three of his twenty-seven brigades, and prepared to throw them, on the morrow, against the Federal corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, which were on the south side. A terrific rain storm occurred on the night of the 30th, which by flooding the Chickahominy imperiled and finally interrupted the communication between McClellan's wings. While in this respect assisting the Confederates, it seriously interferred with their movements on the 31st, as the whole country was covered with water, and some of the swollen sources of White Oak Swamp caused a delay of many hours in the march of Huger's division. Longstreet with his own and D. H. Hill's division was sent out to attack Keyes in front at Seven Pines. Huger was to strike Keyes's left flank, and Johnston himself was to direct G. W. Smith's division against his right flank and prevent a retreat towards the Chickahominy. Hours were wasted in waiting for Huger to get into position.
he Federal Commander had any certain information of the approach of his swift-footed assailant. Lee was now ready to deliver battle. His strength, including Jackson, was from 80,000 to 81,000 men. (See the careful computations of General Early, Southern Historical papers, vol. I, p. 421, and of Colonel Taylor, Four Years with General Lee, the latter of which General Webb adopts, p. 119). General McClellan's strength, omitting Dix's command at Fort Monroe, was by his official return for June 10, 105,825 present for duty. (This number General Webb unfairly reduces to 92,500.) This disparity was not greater than must naturally exist between two combatants so unequal in resources as were the North and South. If the independence of the South was to be achieved it must be done in spite of it. To Lee's mind a simply defensive policy, resulting ultimately in a siege, promised nothing beyond a protracted struggle, with certain disaster at the end of it. He believed he could best thwart
reparations for a renewal of the struggle. Troops that could be spared from the South were ordered to Richmond. Jackson was directed to be prepared to move to the same place from the Valley at the critical moment. (General Webb is in error in attributing this movement to Jackson himself, as he does on page 122. Jackson had been constantly instructed to keep such a movement in view, as may be seen from General Lee's letter to him of May 16.) The victories of Cross Keys and Port Republic, on June 8 and June 9, made the withdrawal of McDowell's corps from McClellan permanent, and left Jackson free to join Lee. Meantime the latter was busy in preparation. On June 11 Stuart was sent with the Confederate cavalry to reconnoiter McClellan's right and rear. This gallant cavalryman extended his reconnoissance into a raid completely around the Federal army, cutting its communications and destroying supplies as he went. This expedition, one of the most brilliant and successful feats of arms t
native plan which he had kept in reserve (General Webb calls it a dernier ressort, p. 30) of making his base at Fortress Monroe and advancing thence up the Peninsula. The brilliant naval victory of the Virginia (March 8) in Hampton Roads closed the James for the time, but the Federal fleet in the lower Chesapeake was able to confine the formidable iron-clad to that river, and thus the bay and the York river up to Yorktown were open to the unmolested use of the Federal commander. By the first of April a large part of McClellan's army was at Fort Monroe and ready to go forward. The closing weeks of March and the early ones of April were anxious ones to the Confederates. McClellan's great army was evidently on the move against Richmond, but from what point or points it would advance was for a time uncertain, and the utmost vigilance had to be exercised. The Confederate forces were fearfully inadequate, even when concentrated, and now they were scattered to guard many places. Early
sful than those by which Magruder accomplished his task. Magruder's line stretched across the Peninsula from Yorktown to Mulberry Point on the James. With 6,000 of his men he garrisoned the extremities of his line, holding Gloucester Point and closing the York river by his batteries. The other 5,000 held the line of the Warwick creek, which he had converted into a formidable line of defense by the use of all the resources that nature and engineering skill had placed within his reach. On April 2 McClellan reached Fort Monroe, and finding 58,000 of his troops ready to move, he ordered this force forward on the 4th, leaving the remainder to follow. Next day he found himself in front of Magruder's line, where his advance was checked, and so vigorously and skilfully did Magruder manage his forces that the Federal army forbore to assault, and deliberately set down to force the handful of Confederates out of their Yorktown lines by regular approaches and siege guns. A feeble and unsucc
had succeeded in crossing the Chickahominy on the already floating bridges just before they were carried away, and hastening forward arrived soon enough to stop Smith, and by engaging him in a stubborn and bloody contest until night, prevented his going to Longstreet's assistance. General Johnston fell severely wounded at night-fall and the usual result of a change of commanders in the midst of a battle was seen next day. No concerted, definite plan of operations guided the Confederates on June 1st. Severe but desultory fighting took place between Longstreet's lines and the fresh troops of Hooker's and Richardson's divisions without any decided result, while Smith, now in chief command of the Confederates remained quiet in front of Sumner, though Magruder's large division, which had been unengaged, was at hand. By midday all fighting had ceased. Early in the afternoon General R. E. Lee, was placed in command by President Davis, and during the evening and night he ordered the Confed
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