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27th (search for this): chapter 9
ed by his orders in advance, on the north and west bank of the Chattahoochee, covering the railroad crossing and his several pontoon bridges. The points of this narrative are very clearly made, but most contradictory of each other, as even a causual reading will reveal, and wholly at variance in important particulars with the official record, as will shortly be made to appear. They may be fairly summed up as follows: 1. During the 25th of June, the assault being on the morning of the 27th, General Schofield had extended his right as far as prudent. 2. After a consultation with Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, it was agreed, because the line was then extended as far as prudent, that there was no alternative but to assault the mountain. 3. Notwithstanding it was so imprudent to stretch out any more, that an assault was necessary instead, still Schofield, while the assault was in progress, moved off to the right, across Olley's Creek, while the cavalry extended his line s
June 24th (search for this): chapter 9
, as he wrote, to teach his own army that it was sometimes necessary to assault fortified lines, and show the enemy that, on occasion, he would assault, and that boldly. And it cost over two thousand veterans killed and wounded to teach those who survived such a lesson as this! Those who read Sherman's Memoirs from the stand-point of the three armies then operating under him, will naturally look for his account of Kenesaw, and all material points are hereby given in full: During the 24th and 25th of June, General Schofield extended his right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong assaults at points where success would give us the greatest advantage. I had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not, with prudence, stretch out any more; and, therefore, there was no alternative but to attack fortified lines, a thing carefully avoided up to that time.
June 25th (search for this): chapter 9
a lesson as this! Those who read Sherman's Memoirs from the stand-point of the three armies then operating under him, will naturally look for his account of Kenesaw, and all material points are hereby given in full: During the 24th and 25th of June, General Schofield extended his right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong assaults at points where success would give us the greatest advantage. I had consut most contradictory of each other, as even a causual reading will reveal, and wholly at variance in important particulars with the official record, as will shortly be made to appear. They may be fairly summed up as follows: 1. During the 25th of June, the assault being on the morning of the 27th, General Schofield had extended his right as far as prudent. 2. After a consultation with Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, it was agreed, because the line was then extended as far as prudent,
June 26th (search for this): chapter 9
ht, will be sufficient to show that the latter was extending his lines during the 26th and also during the 27th, the day of the assault: Sherman to Schofield, June 26: Is the brigade across Olley's Creek above the Sandtown road, or at the road? Sherman to Schofield, June 26: All right. Be careful of a brigade so exposed, buJune 26: All right. Be careful of a brigade so exposed, but I am willing to risk a good deal. Sherman to Schofield, June 26: Good bridge should be made to-night across Olley's Creek, where the brigade is across, and operations resumed there in the morning early. Sherman to Schofield, June 27, 11:45 A. M.: Neither McPherson nor Thomas has succeeded in breaking through, but each has mJune 26: Good bridge should be made to-night across Olley's Creek, where the brigade is across, and operations resumed there in the morning early. Sherman to Schofield, June 27, 11:45 A. M.: Neither McPherson nor Thomas has succeeded in breaking through, but each has made substantial progress at some cost. Push your operations on the flank and keep me advised. The following parts of dispatches to General Thomas bear upon the same point: Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 1:30 P. M.: Schofield has one division close up on the Powder Spring road, and the other (division) across Olley's Creek, abou
June 27th (search for this): chapter 9
y advantage of the day. Sherman to Thomas, June 27; evening: Schofield has the Sandtown road, wition at issue: Thomas to Sherman, 8 A. M., June 27: The movement of my troops against the enemy' the line, as follows: Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 11:45 A. M.: McPherson's column marched to thomas, Major-General. Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 4:10 P. M.: Schofield has gained the crossin to regular approaches. Thomas to Sherman, June 27, 6 P. M.: The assault of the enemy's works in one hundred prisoners. Sherman to Thomas, June 27, evening: Let your troops fortify as close upery move to the latter: headquarters, June 27, 9 P. M. General Thomas: Are you willing ity that his pontoons might be needed: June 27. General Sherman. How far is Fulton from were answered as follows, Sherman to Thomas, June 27th, 9:30 P. M.: According to Merrill's map it ing day after to-morrow. Sherman to Thomas, June 27, 9:45 P. M.: If we move on Fulton, we must mo[12 more...]
July 1st (search for this): chapter 9
a movement similar to the one afterward so successfully practiced at Atlanta. All the orders were issued to bring forward supplies enough to fill our wagons, intending to strip the railroad back to Allatoona, and leave that place as our depot, to be covered as well as possible by Garrard's cavalry. General Thomas, as usual, shook his head, deeming it risky to leave the railroad; but something had to be done, and I had resolved on this move, as reported in my dispatch to General Halleck on July 1st: General Schofield is now south of Olley's Creek, and on the head of Nickajack. I have been hurrying down provisions and forage, and to-morrow night propose to move McPherson from the left to the extreme right, back of General Thomas. This will bring my right within three miles of the Chattahoochee River, and about five miles from the railroad. By this movement I think I can force Johnston to move his whole army down from Kenesaw to defend his railroad and the Chattahoochee, when I w
July 2nd (search for this): chapter 9
outh of Kenesaw. I think that Allatoona and the line of the Etowah are strong enough for me to venture on this move. The movement is substantially down the Sandtown road straight for Atlanta. McPherson drew out his lines during the night of July 2d, leaving Garrard's cavalry, dismounted, occupying his trenches, and moved to the rear of the Army of the Cumberland, stretching down the Nickajack; but Johnston detected the movement, and promptly abandoned Marietta and Kenesaw. I expected as mes accessible to General Sherman, and they are quite sufficient to show that the correct history of the battle at Kenesaw is not set forth in his Memoirs. Of the immediate effect of the flanking movement on Kenesaw, begun on the night of the 2d of July following the assault, General Sherman says: As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving McPherson's entire army from the extreme left, at the base of Kenesaw to the right, below Olley's Creek, and stretching it down the Nickajack tow
July 3rd (search for this): chapter 9
etected the movement, and promptly abandoned Marietta and Kenesaw. I expected as much, for by the earliest dawn of the 3d of July I was up at a large spy-glass, mounted on a tripod, which Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, had at his bivouac closthe confusion of retreat, especially at the crossing of the Chattahoochee River. * * * * As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving McPherson's entire army from the extreme left, at the base of Kenesaw, to the right, below Olley's Creek, anesaw, begun on the night of the 2d of July following the assault, General Sherman says: As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving McPherson's entire army from the extreme left, at the base of Kenesaw to the right, below Olley's Creek, ande, a broad and deep river then to his rear. Ordering every part of the army to pursue vigorously on the morning of the 3d of July, I rode into Marietta, just quitted by the rebel rear guard, and was terribly angry at the cautious pursuit by Garrard'
July 4th (search for this): chapter 9
on of Powder Springs toward Marietta, producing delay and confusion. By night Thomas' head of column ran up against a strong rear guard intrenched at Smyrna camp ground, six miles below Marietta, and there, on the next day, we celebrated our Fourth of July, by a noisy but not a desperate battle, designed chiefly to hold the enemy there till Generals McPherson and Schofield could get well into position below him, near the Chattahoochee crossings. It was here that General Noyes, late Governor ofst his leg. * * * * During the night Johnston drew back all his army and trains inside the tete du-pont at the Chattahoochee, which proved one of the strongest pieces of field fortification I ever saw. This noisy but not desperate battle of July 4th was nothing less than an attack upon the strong works at Smyrna camp ground by the Sixteenth Corps under General Dodge, who pressed close up, and then sent a storming party of two brigades over them. It was one of the most gallant and successfu
July 9th (search for this): chapter 9
cing Lee, but to assault him in position will cost us more lives than we can spare. And yet at 9 o'clock the same evening he telegraphed General Thomas: Are you willing to risk the move on Fulton, cutting loose from our railroad? It would bring matters to a crisis, and Schofield has secured the way. But his excuses to Generals Halleck and Grant a few days later cap the climax of all which the records contain in regard to Kenesaw. Witness the following: Sherman to Halleck, July 9: The assault I made was no mistake. I had to do it. The enemy, and our own army and officers, had settled down into the conviction that the assault of lines formed no part of my game, and the moment the enemy was found behind any thing like a parapet, why, every body would deploy, throw up counter-works and take it easy, leaving it to the Old man to turn the position. Had the assault been made with one-fourth more vigor, mathematically, I would have put the head of George Thomas' whole arm
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