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13th (search for this): chapter 11
comes in. the Henry House Hill. night and rain. no pursuit. Centreville turned. affair at Ox Hill. Stevens and Kearny. casualties. the ammunition supply. Gen. Lee had arrived at Gordonsville early on Aug. 15, and taken command. On the 13th McClellan had abandoned his camp at Harrison's Landing and marched for Fortress Monroe. Lee now left at Richmond but two brigades of infantry to protect the city against cavalry raids, and took the rest of his army to the vicinity of Gordonsvillest of Mitchell Station on the O. & A. R. R. His centre was at Cedar Mountain, and his right on Robertson's River, about five miles west of the railroad. He was, therefore, directly opposite Gordonsville, where Jackson's forces had arrived on the 13th. About two miles below Rapidan Station was a high hill called Clark's Mountain, close to the Rapidan, and giving from its top an extensive view of the flat lands of Culpeper, across the river. A signal station was maintained there, and from it
15th (search for this): chapter 11
er, across the river. A signal station was maintained there, and from it the white tents of the Federal camps, marking out their positions, were plainly visible. Spurs of Clark's Mountain, running parallel to the Rapidan, extended eastward down the river about three miles, to the vicinity of a ford called Somerville's, two miles above Raccoon Ford. Raccoon Ford was within ten miles of Culpeper C. H., almost as near it as the position of Pope's army. Lee, on arriving about 8 A. M. on the 15th, and learning the details of the situation, lost no time. The topography gave him a beautiful opportunity to mass his army (now about 54,000 men) behind Clark's Mountain, to cross at Somerville Ford, fall upon Pope's left flank and sweep around it with a superior force, cutting off Pope's retreat to Washington. Probably at no time during the war was a more brilliant opportunity put so easily within his grasp. He appreciated it, and promptly issued the necessary orders on the very day of hi
17th (search for this): chapter 11
es may occur a hundred times without any serious result, but once in a while the fate of campaigns will be changed by them, and this was such an occasion. A scouting party of Federal cavalry had been sent across Raccoon Ford on the evening of the 17th, and, in the darkness of the night, Maj. Fitzhugh, searching for the lost brigade, rode into it and was captured. His copy of Lee's order was taken from him, and on the 18th was delivered to Pope. Meanwhile, Stuart and his staff had slept in torning had been surprised by the Federal scouting party. All managed to escape, but the enemy secured Stuart's cloak and plumed hat. But the end of the matter was not yet. When no cavalry appeared at Verdiersville, as expected on the night of the 17th, Longstreet ordered two regiments of infantry to be put on picket on the road to Raccoon Ford. The order was brought to Toombs's brigade, when he was absent, visiting a neighboring brigadier. The senior colonel, however, sent out the regiments,
20th (search for this): chapter 11
until the 20th, and orders were issued accordingly. Doubtless, Lee found it hard to believe that Pope, so soon after his boasting order, and still sooner after the victory he had claimed at Cedar Mountain, would now turn his back and fly without firing a shot; but, later on that day, there came reports of activity and stir among the enemy's camps, and on the 19th Lee and Longstreet, going up the mountain to see for themselves, saw Pope's whole army march away to the Rappahannock. On the 20th Lee's advance took place, but although the march was rapidly made in hopes of overtaking some delayed portion of the enemy, the hopes proved vain. On the north side of the Rappahannock, Pope found such advantages of position that, although for five precious days Lee sought diligently by feints and demonstrations to find a favorable opening, his efforts were vain. But to do nothing was to lose the campaign. By a bold raid of Stuart's, however, Lee now had the good luck to turn the tables
25th (search for this): chapter 11
25th to cross above Waterloo, etc. Jackson's report says, — Pursuing the instructions of the commanding general, I left Jeffersonton on the morning of the 25th, etc. The most natural supposition would ascribe the plan to Lee. His own words would seem to confirm the supposition, and Jackson's form of expression to indohich it was to be expected the enemy would have scouts and signal stations. This was actually the case, and the march of the column was observed by 8 A. M. on the 25th, and it was watched for 15 miles, and fair estimates were made of its strength from counting the regimental flags and the batteries. It was plainly seen that thei on the Warrenton and Alexandria pike, by mid-afternoon. Here he was overtaken by Stuart with the cavalry. These had skirmished at Waterloo Bridge all day of the 25th, and marched at 2 A. M. on the 26th to follow Jackson's route. Near Salem, finding the roads blocked by Jackson's artillery and trains, they had left the roads, a
26th (search for this): chapter 11
, it had been for some days, was to fall back with his whole army to Manassas. He would, perhaps, have done this but that Halleck had ordered him to hold especially the lower Rappahannock, covering Falmouth, and to fight like the devil. On the 26th, Jackson marched at dawn, and now the head of his column was turned to the east, and his men knew where they were going. In front of them was Thoroughfare Gap, through the Bull Run Mountains, which debouched upon the heart of the enemy's territorps, would be hurrying to throw himself into the lion's den by the side of Jackson. He seems to have thought that his effort should be to bag Jackson, rather than to keep him from uniting with Lee. Let us now turn to Lee and Longstreet. On the 26th, Jackson having about a day and a half the start, Longstreet's corps set out to follow. One division, Anderson's, of four brigades, was left at Sulphur Springs, in observation of the enemy, while the remaining 17 brigades, somewhat loosely organi
27th (search for this): chapter 11
ion of their rival's plans or orders, by virtue of some accident, and there is yet to tell of other similar occurrences. Besides these there was also a narrow escape from capture by Lee himself. A Confederate quartermaster, on the morning of the 27th, was riding some distance ahead of Longstreet's column on the march northward from Orleans. Approaching Salem, he suddenly came upon the head of a Federal squadron. He turned and took to flight, and the squadron, breaking into a gallop, pursued istance. This regular formation deceived the enemy into the belief that it was the head of a Confederate squadron. They halted, gazed for a while, and then, wheeling about, turned back, never dreaming of the prize so near. On the night of the 27th, while Jackson is burning Manassas, Lee and Longstreet are in bivouac at White Plains, 24 miles west and beyond Thoroughfare Gap, while McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds are about Gainsville, directly between them. In this situation, the game is in P
28th (search for this): chapter 11
tion is to make short work of Jackson, who, he probably supposed, would fight in the earthworks around Manassas. In some such belief, during the night he issued further orders. All of his forces were ordered to march upon Manassas at dawn on the 28th. This is the order which lost Pope his campaign. It is now time to return to Jackson. He knew that Lee and Longstreet were coming, and his most obvious move, perhaps, would have been to march for Thoroughfare Gap by some route which would avovalry, which was on that flank, during the morning raided Burke's Station on the railroad, only 12 miles from Alexandria. This, with the reported presence of Hill at Centreville, entirely misled Pope as to Jackson's true location. Early on the 28th, two Federal couriers were captured, bearing important orders. Those of the first were from McDowell to Sigel, directing him to march to Manassas Junction. This order was taken to Jackson, and he seems to have interpreted the movement to mean th
29th (search for this): chapter 11
column had been strung out upon the march, and partly, perhaps, because of the absence of Gen. King. But he came upon hearing of the action, and at 1 A. M. on the 29th, by his order, the division was put in motion for Manassas Junction. He thought himself in the presence of superior forces, and decided that it was best to get neson was the aggressor. He supposed that King had intercepted Jackson in an effort to escape through Thoroughfare Gap. His available forces, on the morning of the 29th, were as follows: — On Bull Run, two miles east of Jackson, were Sigel's corps, three divisions, and Milroy's independent brigade, together about 11,000 strong him, and this error made him the aggressor next morning and cost him the battle, as we shall see. The object of the Confederate advance on the afternoon of the 29th, as we have seen, was a reconnoissance preparatory to an attack at dawn, which Longstreet had suggested as better than one so late in the afternoon. Hood and Evan
31st (search for this): chapter 11
was only a mass of divisions, associated by temporary assignments to Longstreet and Jackson, who were themselves only division commanders. On the morning of the 31st, Lee lost no time in renewing his advance. As the position at Centreville was strong, and had been fortified by the Confederates in 1861, he ordered Jackson's corch had been closely followed by heavy rain, — Bull Run, Malvern Hill, and Second Manassas. The theory took root that cannonading has rain-making virtue. On the 31st Jackson, over wretched roads and through continued rain, advanced only about 10 miles, and bivouacked at Pleasant Valley on the Little River pike. Longstreet's ady all supplies and to come to join him at Centreville, with his troops, by a night march. With Franklin's, Banks's, and Sumner's corps, which arrived early on the 31st, he had now 30,000 fresh men, but his delay at Centreville was limited to a single day. That evening the presence of Stuart's cavalry, shelling his trains near Fai
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