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t his desire to wear the troops out by excessive fatigue and marches, and thus unfit them for the work they will be called upon to perform. In fact, Lee did not know that Meade had moved at all, and his own movement eastward was really inspired by apprehension for his own communications, aroused by Hooker's action before he had been superseded. Although Meade had selected his proposed line of battle behind Pipe Creek, and now announced his intention to rest his troops, he still, on the 1st, ordered a further advance of each of his seven corps, as follows: The 5th corps was ordered to Hanover; the 6th corps to Manchester; the 12th corps to Two Taverns; the 3d corps to Emmitsburg, and the 1st and 11th corps to Gettysburg. These advances were not intended to bring on a battle, but to cover the position selected, allowing space in front to delay the enemy's approach and give time for preparation. The instructions to Reynolds, who was in command on the left, were not to bring on
mpatient. When Stuart, at last, reported in person, late in the afternoon of the 2d, although Lee said only, Well, General, you are here at last, his manner implieder Lee's death that Longstreet had disobeyed orders in not attacking early on the 2d. No orders whatever were given Longstreet that night. Before sunset, he had ridnight they bivouacked four miles from the field. Marching again at dawn on the 2d, they arrived near the field between 6 and 8 A. M. His reserve artillery (the Was, recalled from New Guilford C. H., did not rejoin its division until noon on the 2d, having marched at 3 A. M., and covered by that time about 20 miles. Pickett's dirching from Hanover at 7 P. M., arrived on the field, 14 miles, at 8 A. M. on the 2d. The 6th corps, from the Union right at Manchester, arrived about 2 P. M., after a march of about 32 miles in 17 hours. At 8 A. M. of the 2d, therefore, practically the whole of both armies was upon the field except Pickett's division and La
r Beauregard, at Culpeper C. H. Meanwhile, some demonstrations by the enemy from the York River had excited apprehensions at Richmond, and neither Corse's or Jenkins's brigades were sent forward, as had been planned. A reply was despatched on June 29, saying,— This is the first intimation the President has had that such a plan was ever in contemplation, and, taking all things into consideration, he cannot see how it can by any possibility be carried into effect. Explaining the diffietween the waters of the Potomac and Chesapeake Bay. Here he, too, hoped to fight on the defensive. It would have been safe play, but not so brilliant as what Hooker had proposed, or as what Lee himself had used with Pope in Aug., 1862. On June 29, Hill moved Heth's division from Fayetteville to Cashtown, about 10 miles. Heth heard that shoes could be purchased in Gettysburg, and, with Hill's permission, authorized Pettigrew's brigade to go there next day and get them. On the 30th, Pende
May, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 16
one flank to the other, across our country, more quickly than the enemy could discover and follow our movements by roundabout routes. Only by such transfers of her armies could the South ever hope to face her adversaries with superior, or even with equal, numbers— by demanding double duty of her regiments, fighting battles with them alternately in the east and in the west. In Lee we had a leader of phenomenal ability, could this policy have been once adopted under his direction. Here in May, 1863, was presented a rare opportunity to inaugurate what might be called an Army on Wheels within the Confederate lines, as distinguished from an Army of Invasion beyond them. The situation was this. Grant was investing Vicksburg with 60,000 men, and we were threatened with the loss of the Mississippi River, and of 30,000 men at Vicksburg under Pemberton. At Jackson, Miss., Johnston, with scarcely 24,000 men, was looking on and begging vainly for reenforcements. At Murfreesboro, Tenn., B
eneral artillery reserve, which had been commanded by Pendleton, was broken up, on the organization of the 3d corps, and it was never reestablished. Pendleton, however, was retained as chief of artillery. It is worthy of note that this artillery organization of a few batteries with each division, and a reserve with each corps, but with no general reserve for the army, was the first of the kind ever adopted by any foreign army, and that it was subsequently copied by Prussia and Austria after 1866, and by France after 1870, and later by England. But, although our reserve under Pendleton had never found the opportunity to render much service, its being discontinued was due to our poverty of guns, not to dissatisfaction with the system. And the fine service at Gettysburg by the Federal reserve of 110 guns, under Hunt, would seem to demonstrate the advantage of such an organization in every large army. On Wednesday, June 3, Lee began the delicate operation of manoeuvring Hooker out
re of the coming battle will be found in the number of important events which seemed to happen without any control for the Commander-in-Chief. To gain information, Stuart had designed to have two efficient scouts operating within the enemy's line, but accident had prevented in both cases. Mosby, one of them, had failed to reach Stuart, at his crossing of the Potomac, owing to an enforced change of Stuart's line of march. Stringfellow, the other, had been captured. Lee, therefore, on June 28, still believed that Hooker's army had not yet crossed the Potomac, and, to hurry Hooker up, he issued orders for an advance, the next day, of all his forces upon Harrisburg. But there was still one scout, Harrison, within the Federal lines. Longstreet had despatched him from Culpeper, three weeks before, to go into Washington and remain until he had important information to communicate. With good judgment and good fortune he appeared about midnight on the 28th, with the news that Ho
has been incurred in fortifying them. Hooker appealed in vain to Stanton and Lincoln, pointing out the folly of holding so large a force idle. Then Hooker realized that he had lost the support of the government, and tendered his resignation June 27. It was just what Stanton and Halleck had been seeking, and was no sooner received than accepted, and prompt measures adopted to relieve him, lest the armies should come into collision with Hooker still in command. Meade succeeded Hooker. Heliver the order superseding him. Hooker had hoped for a different outcome. He acquiesced gracefully, but the scene was a painful one. Meanwhile, Lee, with Longstreet and Hill, had reached Chambersburg and bivouacked in its neighborhood from June 27 to the 29th. The Federal army had now been across the Potomac for three days, but Lee was not yet informed, and he now became anxious to hear from his cavalry. An additional large brigade coming from W. Va., under Imboden, should have joined h
east of the Blue Ridge, while Hill passed in his rear and crossed the mountains to Winchester via Front Royal. When Hill was safely in the Valley, Longstreet also entered through Ashby's and Snicker's gaps, and about the 20th the two corps were united. The cavalry had acted as a screen in front of Longstreet during this advance, and, in this duty, had severe encounters with the enemy at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, losing in them over 500 in killed, wounded, and missing. About June 22, as Hill and Longstreet drew near the Potomac, ready to cross, Stuart made to Lee a very unwise proposition, which Lee more unwisely entertained. It was destined to have an unfortunate influence on the campaign. Stuart thus refers to the matter in his official report:— I submitted to the commanding general the plan of leaving a brigade or so in my present front, passing through Hopewell or some other gap in the Bull Run Mountains, attain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body
y the absence of his cavalry, and Lee's Gettysburg campaign was similarly compromised. Lee, however, acquiesced, only attaching the condition that Longstreet could spare the cavalry from his front, and approved the adventure. Longstreet, thus suddenly called on to decide the question, seems not to have appreciated its importance, for he decided it on the imaginary ground that the passage of the Potomac by our rear would, in a measure, disclose our plans. Accordingly, about midnight of June 24, Stuart, with Hampton's, W. H. F. Lee's, and Fitz-Lee's brigades, six guns, and some ambulances, marched from Salem, for the Potomac River. Making a circuit by Brentsville, Wolf Run shoals, Fairfax C. H., and Dranesville, he crossed the Potomac at Rowser's Ford at midnight of the 27th, about 80 miles by the route travelled. The ford was barely passable. The water came on the saddles of the horses and entirely submerged the artillery carriages. These were emptied and the ammunition carri
epartment south of the James, under D. H. Hill. He did not take the War Dept. into his confidence at first, hoping to accomplish his purpose by gradual suggestion and request. The process was too slow, and the result was unfortunate. Only on June 23 from Berryville, Va., did he fully explain to the President his wishes. On the 25th, from Williamsport, he followed the matter up with two letters, urging the organization of an army, even in effigy, under Beauregard, at Culpeper C. H. Meanwhil strategic mistake, for it resulted in the battle's being one of chance collision, with the Confederates taking the offensive, whereas the plan of the campaign had been to fight a defensive battle. Hill crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on June 23, and Longstreet began crossing at Williamsport on the 24th. Hooker was not far behind, for he crossed at Edward's Ferry on the 25th and 26th, and moved to the vicinity of Frederick. Here he threatened Lee's rear through the South Mountain pass
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