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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Edward Porter Alexander, Military memoirs of a Confederate: a critical narrative. Search the whole document.

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February 28th, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 3
Kirby Smith. These 18 brigades averaged about four regiments, and the regiments averaged about 500 men each. Besides these there were other troops under Jackson in the valley and under Holmes near Acquia. The total effective strength on February 28, 1862, was 47,617, with about 175 guns. Early in March the Federal army was organized into five army corps under McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, and Banks. Each corps was generally composed of three divisions, each division of three brigades, and each brigade of four regiments. The regiments were generally fuller than ours, and would average about 700 men. The total effective strength of all arms on February 28, 1862, was 185,420, with 465 field guns, of which 100 were massed in a reserve under the Chief of Artillery. During the winter the Federal engineers had completely surrounded Washington with a cordon of fortifications consisting of detached forts impregnable to assault, with heavy guns and permanent garrisons conne
March 23rd (search for this): chapter 3
ion. A considerable loss of provisions resulted to the Confederates from the condition of the roads, and the fact that their Commissary Department had established a meat-packing depot on the Manassas Gap Railroad at Thoroughfare Gap, and accumulated there an amount of stores much greater than the railroad could remove upon short notice. The army paused for a while behind the Rappahannock, but then took a better position behind the Rapidan, where it awaited developments. Meanwhile on March 23, something took place in the Valley. Stonewall Jackson had been in command there of two small brigades through the winter, but had fallen back, about 40 miles south of Winchester, when Johnston's army abandoned Manassas. Banks's Federal Corps had been opposed to him, and it was now ordered to Manassas. Jackson learned of the movement in progress, and, believing that he might surprise its rear, and at least disconcert plans, he made a march of 36 miles in a day and a half, and fell upon
October 7th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 3
ercentage of hits is always small, the fire of infantry should not be rapid, lest the men waste too much ammunition. After a year or two some of the best breech-loaders got admission among cavalry regiments, and common sense and experience gradually forced a recognition of the value of a heavy fire. By 1864, the Spencer breech-loading carbine had been adopted as the regulation arm for the Federal cavalry, and by the fall of that year brigades of infantry began to appear with it. On October 7, 1864, on the Darbytown road, Field's division was easily repulsed by two brigades armed with Spencers, with severe loss, including Genls. Gregg killed and Bratton wounded; and on Nov. 30, 1864, at Franklin, Tennessee, Casement's, brigade with these arms decided that battle with terrific slaughter, It was written of this fight that never before in the history of war did a command, of the approximate strength of Casement's. in so short a period of time kill and wound as many men. There is
November 30th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 3
cavalry regiments, and common sense and experience gradually forced a recognition of the value of a heavy fire. By 1864, the Spencer breech-loading carbine had been adopted as the regulation arm for the Federal cavalry, and by the fall of that year brigades of infantry began to appear with it. On October 7, 1864, on the Darbytown road, Field's division was easily repulsed by two brigades armed with Spencers, with severe loss, including Genls. Gregg killed and Bratton wounded; and on Nov. 30, 1864, at Franklin, Tennessee, Casement's, brigade with these arms decided that battle with terrific slaughter, It was written of this fight that never before in the history of war did a command, of the approximate strength of Casement's. in so short a period of time kill and wound as many men. There is reason to believe that had the Federal infantry been armed from the first with even the breech-loaders available in 1861 the war would have been terminated within a year. The old smooth-b
ootsteps along the railroad from Alexandria, and was defeated upon nearly the same ground which had witnessed McDowell's defeat. Fourth. Burnside took the railroad via Fredericksburg, and in December, 1862, met a bloody repulse at that point and gave up his campaign. Fifth. Hooker also took the Fredericksburg route, but was attacked at Chancellorsville so severely that he also gave up his campaign early in May, 1863. Sixth. Meade, after repulsing Lee at Gettysburg in July, 1863, in November essayed an advance from Alexandria upon Lee's right flank at Mine Run, about halfway between the two railroad lines. He found Lee so strongly intrenched that he withdrew without attacking. Seventh. On May 4, 1864, Grant, with the largest force yet assembled, set out from Alexandria on a line between Meade's Mine Run and Hooker's Spottsylvania routes. Lee attacked his columns in the Wilderness. The battle thus joined raged for over 11 months, and only ended at Appomattox on April 9, 18
s very poorly drilled and wretchedly equipped, and it had, practically, no intrenchments whatever. And although it numbered able officers among its generals, it was badly commanded, in that it was not organized into divisions, and could not have been well handled either on a march or in action. McClellan, though unfit to command in battle, had no superior in organizing an army to take the field as a thoroughly fit machine, able to concentrate its energies wherever needed. By the end of October he might easily have advanced upon the Confederates with a force three to one in numbers and twice better armed and organized. Public opinion would have forced McClellan into making an attack, but for the moral effect of the imaginary battalions which Pinkerton's Bureau had conjured into existence and drilled and equipped so easily. And as so good a fighting machine of American soldiers would do hard fighting, even without a general at their head, as was abundantly shown by McClellan's
September (search for this): chapter 3
strength to the army at Manassas to enable it to take the offensive. As it was, the new troops sent were little more than enough to make good the losses from sickness which befell the army in the summer of 1861. The entire country about Bull Run was malarial, and the troops were badly equipped and ignorant about sanitary measures. All our new regiments from country districts were great sufferers from measles, which often reduced their effective force one-half. In the latter part of Sept., feeling that the opportunity was about to pass, President Davis was induced to visit Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith at Manassas, and this matter was discussed. The three generals asked for 10,000 or 20,000 more men than the 40,000 they had. With this addition to their numbers they proposed to cross the Potomac and make an offensive campaign in Maryland. Mr. Davis seemed greatly disappointed to find so few troops available. He acknowledged the force of the argument for the offensive, but
May 4th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 3
bloody repulse at that point and gave up his campaign. Fifth. Hooker also took the Fredericksburg route, but was attacked at Chancellorsville so severely that he also gave up his campaign early in May, 1863. Sixth. Meade, after repulsing Lee at Gettysburg in July, 1863, in November essayed an advance from Alexandria upon Lee's right flank at Mine Run, about halfway between the two railroad lines. He found Lee so strongly intrenched that he withdrew without attacking. Seventh. On May 4, 1864, Grant, with the largest force yet assembled, set out from Alexandria on a line between Meade's Mine Run and Hooker's Spottsylvania routes. Lee attacked his columns in the Wilderness. The battle thus joined raged for over 11 months, and only ended at Appomattox on April 9, 1865. Our only concern here is to note the advantages and the disadvantages of the different lines. The overland route again proved a failure. At Spottsylvania, North Anna, Totopotomoy, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg
imony which they could use in place of fulminate of mercury; and we collected all the turpentine and apple-brandy stills in the country and sent them to Richmond to be cut up and rerolled into copper strips. From this copper and the above chemical mixture all the caps were made which we used during the last year of the war, but at its close the copper stills were exhausted. It is hard to imagine what we would then have done had not the surrender at Appomattox relieved the quandary. In August our line of pickets was advanced within five miles of the Potomac, opposite Washington, and it included two hills, Munson's and Mason's, from which many houses in Washington were plainly visible. This suggested opening a line of secret signals from a window in one of these houses to an observation room on the top of a residence on Mason's Hill. A powerful telescope was borrowed from Charleston, and an intelligent signal employee, E. P. Bryan, of Maryland, was sent in disguise to Washingto
strong position and intrenched itself. His fourth regiment, the 18th Miss., came in contact with the Ball's Bluff advance, and drove it back to the main body at the top of the bluff. There the fight grew hotter. Gen. Baker, commanding the Federals, brought up his whole brigade of five regiments and three pieces of artillery, — about 3000 men, — and Evans sent two of his three regiments, the 8th Va. and 17th Miss., from in front of Edward's Ferry, making the Confederate force engaged about 1600. After a sharp and well-conducted fight under the inspiration of Col. Jenifer, Baker was killed, his artillery captured, and his entire force driven into the river, many being drowned. The casualties were:— Federal:Killed 49,wounded 158,missing 714,total 921 Confederate:Killed 36,wounded 117,missing 2,total 155 This affair, so soon following Bull Run, had a powerful influence upon the Confederate morale. About this period we unmasked on the Potomac, near the mouth of the Occoquan, <
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