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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Edward Porter Alexander, Military memoirs of a Confederate: a critical narrative. Search the whole document.

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John Pope (search for this): chapter 3
garrisons connected by infantry parapets, and batteries for field guns. Within these lines a small movable force could defy any adversary not able to sit down and resort to siege operations. This was amply shown when Lee, in August, 1862, drove Pope into Washington, and also in July, 1864, when Early made his demonstration, but withdrew without venturing to attack. The Federal government, however, had received such a scare in the Bull Run campaign that it had small confidence in fortificattress Monroe via the York River. As we shall see, he had some success. His advance was within six miles of Richmond when he was beaten at Gaines Mill. He found a refuge on the James River, but his army was soon recalled to Washington. Third. Pope, in August, 1862, followed in McDowell's footsteps along the railroad from Alexandria, and was defeated upon nearly the same ground which had witnessed McDowell's defeat. Fourth. Burnside took the railroad via Fredericksburg, and in December, 1
Albert Sidney Johnston (search for this): chapter 3
anized an army of about 273,000 men, which he said would take the blockading batteries without firing a gun. Lincoln submitted, but his discontent was increased. Meanwhile winter put in its appearance. The vicinity of each army became a vast quagmire, and all military operations became impossible. The Confederate army was withdrawn to Centreville and the vicinity of Bull Run, where it went into winter quarters. Soon after this Beauregard was transferred to the Western Army under Gen. A. S. Johnston. His position in Virginia had been that of a supernumerary, and in his new position it was little better until after the battle of Shiloh, where Johnston was killed as he was about to grasp a victory. Beauregard was not yet immune to attacks of overcaution, the bane of new commanders, and his excellent chance to win a great success was lost. He recalled his attack just at the critical moment when it gave every promise of developing a panic among the enemy. Gen. Joseph E. Johnst
Fremont (search for this): chapter 3
s Monroe as a base, Mr. Lincoln gave but reluctant consent, as it involved the removal of a large body of troops from their position between the enemy and the capital. At length he agreed that about 73,000 would be enough to keep for the defence of Washington. This would allow McClellan to have about 150,000 at Fortress Monroe. Early in April, however, under some strong political pressure, Mr. Lincoln detached Blenker's division, about 10,000 men, from McClellan's force and sent them to Fremont in West Virginia. Before taking up the history of this campaign, it will be interesting to take a general view of all routes to Richmond which were tried during the war. There were seven campaigns under as many different commanders. First. McDowell set out to follow the Orange and Alexandria Railway, but was defeated at Manassas in his first battle. Second. McClellan set out from Fortress Monroe via the York River. As we shall see, he had some success. His advance was within s
Baker (search for this): chapter 3
Ferry body, which had taken a strong position and intrenched itself. His fourth regiment, the 18th Miss., came in contact with the Ball's Bluff advance, and drove it back to the main body at the top of the bluff. There the fight grew hotter. Gen. Baker, commanding the Federals, brought up his whole brigade of five regiments and three pieces of artillery, — about 3000 men, — and Evans sent two of his three regiments, the 8th Va. and 17th Miss., from in front of Edward's Ferry, making the Confederate force engaged about 1600. After a sharp and well-conducted fight under the inspiration of Col. Jenifer, Baker was killed, his artillery captured, and his entire force driven into the river, many being drowned. The casualties were:— Federal:Killed 49,wounded 158,missing 714,total 921 Confederate:Killed 36,wounded 117,missing 2,total 155 This affair, so soon following Bull Run, had a powerful influence upon the Confederate morale. About this period we unmasked on the Potomac, n<
August, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 3
ns and permanent garrisons connected by infantry parapets, and batteries for field guns. Within these lines a small movable force could defy any adversary not able to sit down and resort to siege operations. This was amply shown when Lee, in August, 1862, drove Pope into Washington, and also in July, 1864, when Early made his demonstration, but withdrew without venturing to attack. The Federal government, however, had received such a scare in the Bull Run campaign that it had small confidenvia the York River. As we shall see, he had some success. His advance was within six miles of Richmond when he was beaten at Gaines Mill. He found a refuge on the James River, but his army was soon recalled to Washington. Third. Pope, in August, 1862, followed in McDowell's footsteps along the railroad from Alexandria, and was defeated upon nearly the same ground which had witnessed McDowell's defeat. Fourth. Burnside took the railroad via Fredericksburg, and in December, 1862, met a bl
October, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 3
signments to brigades and divisions, and, by tabulating these, we always knew quite accurately the strength of the enemy's army. Why the enemy, by similar obvious methods, did not, also, always know our strength, remains a mystery. But McClellan had a bureau under Pinkerton to estimate for him, from the reports of spies, prisoners, and deserters, and implicitly believed, by preference, the most absurd and impossible of all their reports. As an illustration may be taken his report in October, 1861, in which he estimates the Confederate army on the Potomac as not less than 150,000 strong, well-drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly intrenched. In fact, the Confederate army at the time was only about 40,000 strong. It was very poorly drilled and wretchedly equipped, and it had, practically, no intrenchments whatever. And although it numbered able officers among its generals, it was badly commanded, in that it was not organized into divisions, and could not have been
November, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 3
armed and organized. Public opinion would have forced McClellan into making an attack, but for the moral effect of the imaginary battalions which Pinkerton's Bureau had conjured into existence and drilled and equipped so easily. And as so good a fighting machine of American soldiers would do hard fighting, even without a general at their head, as was abundantly shown by McClellan's subsequent career, it is entirely possible that the Confederates may owe their escape from a defeat in November, 1861, as much to yarns spun by their deserters as to their own impudent attitude in the field. After the battle of Bull Run it was apparent that if the South sat quietly in a defensive attitude until the enemy was ready to advance again, he would come in overwhelming force. Consequently the burden was upon us to bring on the collision while our comparative resources were greatest. Johnston and Beauregard recognized this, but deferred action from day to day, hoping to receive reenforcemen
December, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 3
Fortress Monroe via the York River. As we shall see, he had some success. His advance was within six miles of Richmond when he was beaten at Gaines Mill. He found a refuge on the James River, but his army was soon recalled to Washington. Third. Pope, in August, 1862, followed in McDowell's footsteps along the railroad from Alexandria, and was defeated upon nearly the same ground which had witnessed McDowell's defeat. Fourth. Burnside took the railroad via Fredericksburg, and in December, 1862, met a bloody repulse at that point and gave up his campaign. Fifth. Hooker also took the Fredericksburg route, but was attacked at Chancellorsville so severely that he also gave up his campaign early in May, 1863. Sixth. Meade, after repulsing Lee at Gettysburg in July, 1863, in November essayed an advance from Alexandria upon Lee's right flank at Mine Run, about halfway between the two railroad lines. He found Lee so strongly intrenched that he withdrew without attacking. Sev
April 4th (search for this): chapter 3
division of three brigades, about 10,000 men. Jackson had upon the field only about 3500. Consequently, when the battle became fully developed, Jackson was driven off with a loss of 455 killed and wounded and 263 captured. Shields lost 568 killed and wounded, and 22 captured. It was a small affair, and apparently a Federal victory, but it was bread cast upon strategic waters. There soon followed a serious development. Jackson's name and aggressiveness, and the fierceness of his attack, all tended to increase Mr. Lincoln's reluctance to see Washington stripped of any force available for its defence. He had already taken Blenker's division of 10,000 men from McClellan, and now, on April 4, he took also McDowell's corps of 37,000, ordering it to report to the Secretary of War. As the result of that order was to keep McDowell out of the Seven Days battles in June, Jackson's battle at Kernstown, though generally reckoned a defeat, was really the first step to Lee's victory in June.
July, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 3
hief of Artillery. During the winter the Federal engineers had completely surrounded Washington with a cordon of fortifications consisting of detached forts impregnable to assault, with heavy guns and permanent garrisons connected by infantry parapets, and batteries for field guns. Within these lines a small movable force could defy any adversary not able to sit down and resort to siege operations. This was amply shown when Lee, in August, 1862, drove Pope into Washington, and also in July, 1864, when Early made his demonstration, but withdrew without venturing to attack. The Federal government, however, had received such a scare in the Bull Run campaign that it had small confidence in fortifications without a big army to hold them. So when McClellan proposed to make his next advance upon Richmond, from Fortress Monroe as a base, Mr. Lincoln gave but reluctant consent, as it involved the removal of a large body of troops from their position between the enemy and the capital.
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