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28th (search for this): chapter 5
mmediately determined to attack on the 29th. As McDowell was approaching behind the enemy's right, his strongest effort would be made to crush that flank. On the 28th Johnston got his troops into position to attack at dawn on the 29th. Three of his seven divisions (Whiting's, A. P. Hill's, and D. R. Jones's) were to attack Portereet's, D. H. Hill's, and Huger's) would be held in observation, ready to cross when Porter's corps was driven back. Everything was in readiness by sundown on the 28th, when further news was received. McDowell had suddenly stopped his advance, and his troops seemed to be falling back toward Manassas. What had happened was that ing on with the attack for which the troops were already in position, but Johnston decided to withdraw the troops north of the Chickahominy during the night of the 28th, and to have reconnoissances made to discover the location and strength of the enemy's position on the south side. Accordingly, on the 29th, and again on the 30th
29th (search for this): chapter 5
nce as Johnston could now expect. So he immediately determined to attack on the 29th. As McDowell was approaching behind the enemy's right, his strongest effort wouank. On the 28th Johnston got his troops into position to attack at dawn on the 29th. Three of his seven divisions (Whiting's, A. P. Hill's, and D. R. Jones's) were ion and strength of the enemy's position on the south side. Accordingly, on the 29th, and again on the 30th, one or two regiments were advanced and drove in the enemr delay; for, by the arrival at Richmond of Huger's division from Norfolk on the 29th, Johnston now had all the force possible to get. His problem was to defeat four Johnston immediately ordered troops into position for the attack at dawn on the 29th. But, as has been told, on the 28th he received news of McDowell's recall northage conveyed by Lee, that he proposed to attack north of the Chickahominy on the 29th, may serve to acquit him of literal disobedience; but the change of programme wa
30th (search for this): chapter 5
on decided to withdraw the troops north of the Chickahominy during the night of the 28th, and to have reconnoissances made to discover the location and strength of the enemy's position on the south side. Accordingly, on the 29th, and again on the 30th, one or two regiments were advanced and drove in the enemy's pickets on our extreme right flank, developing his presence and that he was fortifying. This being reported to Johnston by D. H. Hill soon after noon on the 30th, Hill was informed in r30th, Hill was informed in reply that he would lead an attack upon the enemy next morning. There was nothing to gain by further delay; for, by the arrival at Richmond of Huger's division from Norfolk on the 29th, Johnston now had all the force possible to get. His problem was to defeat four divisions of the enemy, 12 brigades fortified, and crush them before assistance could cross the Chickahominy to their relief. If he could do this quickly his chance was good to involve in the defeat also some of the reenforcements t
31st (search for this): chapter 5
t together until near midnight. . . . We regained our own intrenchments near sunrise. The moon that night was about five days old. The official reports do not show separately the casualties either of this last action or of Hill's battle on the 31st, though those of Johnston's battle are given by both sides. But Kearny's division and some of Longstreet's brigades were engaged both on the 31st and the 1st, and, on the latter day, two of Huger's. The totals of the whole affair, as nearly as cased to attack north of the Chickahominy on the 29th, may serve to acquit him of literal disobedience; but the change of programme was neither notified beforehand, or explained afterward, nor was any notice given of the attack at Seven Pines on the 31st, although there was ample opportunity to do so. It is not probable, however, that Johnston intended his course to be one either of disrespect or disobedience. It had its source, doubtless, in his aversion to detail, or to committing himself as
May 15th (search for this): chapter 5
n. artillery service. Davis and Johnston. Meanwhile, Norfolk had now been evacuated by our forces, which were withdrawn at first to Petersburg and then to Richmond. Our ironclad, the Virginia (the old Merrimac), drawing too much water to ascend the James, had been blown up. This river was now open to the Federal fleet, except for some hurriedly built batteries at Drury's Bluff, about six miles below Richmond, covering obstructions made of a row of piles and some sunken schooners. On May 15 the fleet, which included three ironclads, the Monitor, Galena, and Naugatuck, attacked the batteries, but was repulsed with 25 killed and wounded, and considerable injury to some of the vessels. Until that time Johnston had contemplated fighting on the north of the Chickahominy, but he now decided to concentrate his army nearer Richmond, and on May 17 it was all encamped within three or four miles to the east of the city. The situation had grown very threatening; for McDowell's army, st
May 17th (search for this): chapter 5
lt batteries at Drury's Bluff, about six miles below Richmond, covering obstructions made of a row of piles and some sunken schooners. On May 15 the fleet, which included three ironclads, the Monitor, Galena, and Naugatuck, attacked the batteries, but was repulsed with 25 killed and wounded, and considerable injury to some of the vessels. Until that time Johnston had contemplated fighting on the north of the Chickahominy, but he now decided to concentrate his army nearer Richmond, and on May 17 it was all encamped within three or four miles to the east of the city. The situation had grown very threatening; for McDowell's army, still at Fredericksburg with 31,000 men, had again been assigned to McClellan. He only awaited the arrival of Shields, marching to join him with 11,000 more, before advancing. If it was now in Johnston's power to do anything to save Richmond, it must be done before McDowell arrived. It was not likely that McClellan would himself seek battle when such
May 21st (search for this): chapter 5
own to the house and asked Gen. Lee what the musketry firing meant. He replied by asking whether I had heard it, and being answered in the affirmative, he said he had been under that impression himself; but Gen. Johnston had assured him that it could be nothing more than an artillery duel. It is scarcely necessary to add that neither of us had been advised of a design to attack the enemy that day. It seems clear from this narrative that Gen. Johnston entirely disregarded the letter of May 21, so far as it required him to acquaint the President with his proposed programme of operations. The verbal message conveyed by Lee, that he proposed to attack north of the Chickahominy on the 29th, may serve to acquit him of literal disobedience; but the change of programme was neither notified beforehand, or explained afterward, nor was any notice given of the attack at Seven Pines on the 31st, although there was ample opportunity to do so. It is not probable, however, that Johnston int
May 23rd (search for this): chapter 5
m. The other four divisions on the south side of the Chickahominy (McLaws's, Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's, and Huger's) would be held in observation, ready to cross when Porter's corps was driven back. Everything was in readiness by sundown on the 28th, when further news was received. McDowell had suddenly stopped his advance, and his troops seemed to be falling back toward Manassas. What had happened was that Jackson had again broken loose in the Valley and defeated Banks at Strasburg on May 23, and at Winchester on May 25, and was moving on the Potomac, as will be told more fully in a later chapter. This had created a panic at Washington, for rumor had magnified Jackson's forces greatly, and McDowell, just in the nick of time for us, had been turned back for the defence of the capital. Johnston was glad of a respite, and an opportunity to consider as an alternative an attack upon McClellan's left. The strength of the position at Beaver Dam Creek made any direct attack very
May 25th (search for this): chapter 5
on the south side of the Chickahominy (McLaws's, Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's, and Huger's) would be held in observation, ready to cross when Porter's corps was driven back. Everything was in readiness by sundown on the 28th, when further news was received. McDowell had suddenly stopped his advance, and his troops seemed to be falling back toward Manassas. What had happened was that Jackson had again broken loose in the Valley and defeated Banks at Strasburg on May 23, and at Winchester on May 25, and was moving on the Potomac, as will be told more fully in a later chapter. This had created a panic at Washington, for rumor had magnified Jackson's forces greatly, and McDowell, just in the nick of time for us, had been turned back for the defence of the capital. Johnston was glad of a respite, and an opportunity to consider as an alternative an attack upon McClellan's left. The strength of the position at Beaver Dam Creek made any direct attack very dangerous, and to turn it wou
May 26th (search for this): chapter 5
wn behind the Chickahominy, on our left, and united into a new division under A. P. Hill. Before this could be accomplished, however, Branch was attacked by Morell's division and Warren's brigade of Porter's corps, and was forced back with a loss of about 300 killed and wounded, and 700 prisoners, the enemy reporting 62 killed, 223 wounded, and 70 missing, total 355. At Fredericksburg, McDowell's column was at last joined by Shields, who had been detached from Banks in the Valley, and on May 26 McDowell was put in motion. In the forenoon of the 27th notice of his advance reached Johnston, who at once recognized that he must now attack before McDowell could unite with McClellan. The latter had moved so cautiously as to offer no favorable opportunity until his last move which had put his army astride of the Chickahominy. That presented as fair a chance as Johnston could now expect. So he immediately determined to attack on the 29th. As McDowell was approaching behind the enemy
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