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The Atlanta (Georgia) Campaign: May 1 - September 8, 1864., Part I: General Report. (ed. Maj. George B. Davis, Mr. Leslie J. Perry, Mr. Joseph W. Kirkley) 111 1 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 98 2 Browse Search
Maj. Jed. Hotchkiss, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 3, Virginia (ed. Clement Anselm Evans) 95 1 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 7. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 93 3 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 12. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 90 2 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 6. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 88 4 Browse Search
Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government 86 4 Browse Search
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 4. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.) 78 2 Browse Search
Col. O. M. Roberts, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 11.1, Texas (ed. Clement Anselm Evans) 66 4 Browse Search
Fitzhugh Lee, General Lee 64 0 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army. You can also browse the collection for John B. Hood or search for John B. Hood in all documents.

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John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XVI (search)
hen he started on his march through Georgia, as Hood had supposed that Sherman would follow him intod his letter of September 20 by Colonel Porter, Hood commenced his movement to Sherman's rear, and tis and confidence, two armies, each larger than Hood's, even assuming the largest estimate then made it possible Sherman thought he could not catch Hood with three or four armies? But another despatco not believe you would meet Hood's army. . . . Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking berman to Grant. October 11, 1864, 10 A. M. Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by of which you shall have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will follow me, at least wit I despatched you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far north, behe had given Thomas ample means to take care of Hood, no matter what that bold and reckless adversars then ready for field service, to take care of Hood until he could get A. J. Smith from Missouri, i[87 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XVII (search)
after he had concentrated his troops, and after Hood had done considerable damage, to drive the latt the fall of 1864, than that if either Lee's or Hood's army could be captured or destroyed, the surrspondence between Grant and Sherman previous to Hood's march to the west, including the letters of Splan of a change of base to Savannah. But when Hood's movement had gone so far, and his designs wers had failed to obey his instructions to pursue Hood into the Gulf States, whereby the fragments of f like prudence in all his own operations. But Hood signalized his accession to the command by the tions, ought not to have happened, and by which Hood was tempted to make at Franklin one of those fu the Union army, because the force assaulted by Hood might always have had a more powerful army nearturned to their posts and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes. If the purpose that prome back to Tennessee was to serve as a decoy to Hood, I must say that my part of the sport would hav[22 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XVIII (search)
nemy's country and resources, demoralizing to the people at home and the army in Virginia, cutting off supplies necessary to the support of the latter, possibly expediting somewhat the final crisis at Richmond, and certainly making the subjugation more complete of those of the Southern people who were thus made to feel the weight of war. Considered as to its military results, Sherman's march cannot be regarded as more than I have stated—a grand raid. The defeat and practical destruction of Hood's army in Tennessee was what paved the way to the speedy termination of the war, which the capture of Lee by Grant fully accomplished; and the result ought to have been essentially the same as to time if Sherman's march had never been made. The capitulation of Johnston was but the natural sequence of Lee's surrender; for Johnston's army was not surrounded, and could not have been compelled to surrender. Indeed Sherman could not have prevented that army from marching back into the Gulf State
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Index (search)
2 Honor graduate, the distinction of, 460 Hood, Gen. John B., at West Point, 14, 15, 138; dashes Hood's assault at Franklin, 183; relieved by Hood, 231, 312; on Davis's desire for aggressive cam4, 340 Kentucky, apprehended invasion of, by Hood, 163, 185, 193, 259, 260, 300, 303, 305, 316; p99; Sherman proposes to destroy, 317, 318, 333; Hood assembles militia at, 319; Sherman's movement o, 221, 222; deprecates further attempts to hold Hood back, 222, 223; Thomas's failure to support him Selma, Ala., Thomas to move toward, 317, 322; Hood's position near, 318 Seminole Indians, armedult at Kenesaw Mountain, 144; policy concerning Hood, doubts about his movements, relative strength,1, 43, 46, 47; S. at, 65 Spring Hill, Tenn., Hood's movements and strategy at, apprehensions and 0, 211, 214, 215, 219; necessity of heading off Hood at, 213; Ruger's movement to, suspended, 214; cve policy, 194; possibilities of moving against Hood from Pulaski or Columbia, 194-197; his policy o[110 more...]
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