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Tullahoma (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 11
vailable active force into one army, so as to move against the enemy with the greatest possible force, no matter what the enemy might do. With the exception of those 7000 men belonging to Sherman's column, Thomas had for necessary garrisons and railroad guards essentially the same number of men as had been employed in that service all the preceding summer,—no more and no less,—and the necessity for that service had not been very much diminished, except at and about Decatur, Stevenson, and Tullahoma, which Hood's advance from Florence had rendered of no further consequence at that time. But the 7000 men available at Chattanooga ought unquestionably to have been sent to Columbia, or at least moved up to Nashville or Franklin, where they could join the main force, as suggested in my despatch of November 24 to Thomas, War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 1017. instead of being left at Chattanooga to threaten enemy in rear. Thomas to Steedman, November 25: War Records, Vol. XLV, par
J. H. Wilson (search for this): chapter 11
well watched and guarded as far as possible. Wilson is operating with his main force on my left. l upon him with our whole force, or wait until Wilson can organize his entire cavalry force, and thespatch of 3:30 [2:30] P. M. just received. If Wilson cannot succeed in driving back the enemy, shou after 8 A. M.,—as indicated by my despatch to Wilson of 8:15 A. M. I thus learned, a short time rossed in force on the Lewisburg pike, and General Wilson reports the infantry crossing above Huey'sey and Ruger, and my despatch of 8:15 A. M. to Wilson. Soon after 10 A. M., November 29, the firsg east and southeast. Try to communicate with Wilson on the Lewisburg pike. Tell him to cover Franwill have all across the river this evening. Wilson is here, and has his cavalry on my flank. I dt, will strike our flank and rear again soon. Wilson is entirely unable to cope with him. Of courseroad trains sent back immediately. Notify General Wilson of my instructions. He will govern himse[9 more...]
trate all his available active force into one army, so as to move against the enemy with the greatest possible force, no matter what the enemy might do. With the exception of those 7000 men belonging to Sherman's column, Thomas had for necessary garrisons and railroad guards essentially the same number of men as had been employed in that service all the preceding summer,—no more and no less,—and the necessity for that service had not been very much diminished, except at and about Decatur, Stevenson, and Tullahoma, which Hood's advance from Florence had rendered of no further consequence at that time. But the 7000 men available at Chattanooga ought unquestionably to have been sent to Columbia, or at least moved up to Nashville or Franklin, where they could join the main force, as suggested in my despatch of November 24 to Thomas, War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 1017. instead of being left at Chattanooga to threaten enemy in rear. Thomas to Steedman, November 25: War Records,
d suggested to Thomas on the 24th, and informed me fully of his plans and instructions to meet such a movement, requesting me to give him my views in reply. In that despatch General Thomas said: In case you have to move to the north bank of Duck River, I wish you to keep some cavalry on the south side to observe and delay Hood's advance on the Chattanooga Railroad as much as possible. I hope to have five regiments of Granger's troops in Murfreesboroa to-day. Have made arrangements for Milroy to fall back to Murfreesboroa or this side of Duck River also, if the enemy advances. The cavalry on the south side of Duck River should cover the approaches to Shelbyville, and cross at that place, and hold the bridge in case of an advance in force. I have asked General Steedman how large a force he can raise to threaten the enemy's rear, should he get on the Chattanooga road, and expect an answer soon. About 1000 of Hatch's cavalry have arrived here from Memphis, dismounted, but they w
Laurence H. Rousseau (search for this): chapter 11
meet with your approval. Thomas to Schofield. Nashville, November 24, 1864. . . . Can you not cover the pontoon bridge with a bridgehead, and hold it so as to preserve the bridge for crossing whenever we get ready to advance? General Rousseau informed me that the blockhouses protecting the railroad bridge cannot be reached by the enemy's artillery; therefore the enemy could not get near enough to the bridge to destroy it if the blockhouses are held. . . As stated in my offica bridge-head covering both the railroad and the pontoon bridges over Duck River at the same time, for which purpose I floated the pontoons down the river to a point near the railroad bridge, having found that the blockhouses referred to by General Rousseau could not be made available for the protection of the pontoon bridge where it before was—at the crossing of the turnpike. I abandoned that bridge-head on the night of November 27, upon receipt of information leading me to believe that Hood
U. S. Grant (search for this): chapter 11
ides the moral strength due to the fact that it was Thomas's old corps,—the discrepancy in his own estimate would doubtless have been sufficiently overcome, and the line of Duck River at least, if not that of the Tennessee, as Sherman had assured Grant, would have been securely held until A. J. Smith arrived and Thomas could assume the offensive. Hood's force was ready to invade Tennessee in one compact army, while Thomas then had in the field ready to oppose it a decidedly inferior force, emonstrating the wisdom of all that had gone before, even including Sherman's division of his army between himself and Thomas before his march to the sea. Such is the logic of contemporaneous military history! In my long conversations with General Grant on the steamer Rhode Island in January, 1865, I explained to him fully the error into which he had been led in respect to Thomas's action or non-action at Nashville in December, and he seemed to be perfectly satisfied on that point. But he d
men to the line of Duck River, or perhaps even to Franklin. They were sent to Nashville, reaching there afte issued—that is, soon after 8 A. M.—a courier from Franklin brought me the two following despatches from Generd records say that it was telegraphed in cipher to Franklin at 9 P. M., and there deciphered and sent by couri the cipher-operator had left his post and gone to Franklin. Hence the despatch could not be read by me in tireceived by me. If it was telegraphed in cipher to Franklin, and there deciphered and sent by courier, the samvember] 30, [1864,] 4 A. M. Captain W. J. Twining, Franklin: Your despatch of 1 A. M. to-day is received. ate necessity to retain him here, will send him to Franklin or Brentwood, according to circumstances. If you isk too much. I send you a map of the environs of Franklin. Again I telegraphed at 9:50 A. M.: My traville, November 30, 1864. Major-General Schofield, Franklin: General Smith reported to me this morning tha
Beauregard (search for this): chapter 11
of 12:30 P. M. yesterday received. General Schofield is entitled to the command lover Stanley] by virtue of a recent decision of the War Department. I would advise you to add to those corps new regiments until they number 25,000 men each. If Beauregard advances from Corinth, it will be better for you to command in person. Your presence alone will give confidence. Granger should continue all the time to threaten the rear, and as soon as possible some demonstration should be made from the direction of Vicksburg against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Also I want you to assume the offensive as quick as possible, as I have reason to believe all of Beauregard's army is not there, but that he has also divided his forces. W. T. Sherman, Major-General. War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part III, p. 685. On the same day Thomas telegraphed to Sherman in reply to the above: It is, and always has been, my intention to command the troops with me in person. My object in giving the preference t
umbia. Cox's division, being the last, was to form our extreme right. In that contemplated position, if Hood had attacked at any time in the night we would have had decidedly the advantage of him. I had no anxiety on that point. When informed, about midnight, that Cox had arrived, I understood that my orders had been exactly executed, and then ordered Cox to take the lead and the other divisions to follow, from the right by the rear, in the march to Franklin. But it happened that only Whitaker's brigade of Kimball's division, to which I gave the orders in person, followed Ruger's. Hence that one brigade was the only force we had in line between Hood's bivouac and the turnpike that night. If that fact had been known to the enemy, the result would have been embarrassing, but not very serious. If the enemy had got possession of a point on the pike, the column from Duck River would have taken the country road a short distance to the west of Spring Hill and Thompson's Station, and m
xact understanding of some things that occurred, to the relation in which I stood to General Thomas. He was my senior by thirteen years as a graduate of the Military Academy, where I had known him well as my highly respected instructor. He had won high distinction in Mexico, and had been twice brevetted for gallant services in that war. He had seen far more service in the field than I had, and in much larger commands, though almost always under the immediate command of a superior— Buell, Rosecrans, and Sherman. Even in the Atlanta campaign, then recently ended, his command was nearly five times as large as mine. In 1864 he had already become a brigadier-general in the regular army, having risen to that rank by regular stages, while I was only a captain thirty-three years of age. It will also be necessary for the reader to realize that when I asked for and received orders to report with the Twenty-third Corps to General Thomas in Tennessee, I felt in the fullest degree all the def
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