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28th (search for this): chapter 11
iven as 3:30 A. M. It was answered by General Thomas at 10:30 P. M. and his answer was received by me November 29 (no hour mentioned in the records). The Department of the Ohio records say that I sent it at 2:30 P. M. The appendix to my report mentions the date November 29, but does not give the hour. My official report, as published, also says this information was received about 2 A. M. on the 29th; but this is evidently a clerical error: clearly the report should read, about 2 P. M. on the 28th. But our cavalry was unable to drive that of the enemy back, and hence Hood was free to lay his pontoon bridge and cross his infantry and artillery at any point above Columbia. We had not been able to hold even the crossings near us. The same day, November 28, at 4 P. M., I telegraphed: If Hood advances on the Lewisburg and Franklin pike, where do you propose to fight him? I have all the force that is necessary here, and General Smith's troops should be placed with reference to th
27th (search for this): chapter 11
avalry day before yesterday, two yesterday, and will send another to-day. If you can hold Hood in check until I can get Smith up, we can whip him. Thus it appears that even as late as November 27 General Thomas had not thought of sending the 7000 men at Chattanooga to join the main force, although so anxious that I should hold Hood in check until he could get Smith up. He was still relying entirely upon A. J. Smith, whose advance, so surely expected on the 25th, was still expected on the 27th. It seems incredible that General Thomas had not thought of sending Steedman's troops from Chattanooga, instead of waiting for the uncertain arrival of A. J. Smith. On November 27 I received an important despatch from General Thomas, dated November 25. It was written under the apprehension that Hood's design might be to move upon the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, as I had suggested to Thomas on the 24th, and informed me fully of his plans and instructions to meet such a movement, r
November 9th (search for this): chapter 11
tion. And again, at 6 P. M.: The enemy's cavalry in force has crossed the river on the Lewisburg pike, and is now in possession of Rally Hill. Wilson is trying to get on to the Franklin road ahead of them. He thinks the enemy may swing around in between him and me, and strike Spring Hill, and wants Hammond's brigade to halt there. Please give it orders if you know where it is. Also, I think it would be well to send A. J. Smith's force to that place. In the night of November 28-9, about 2 A. M., I received the report of the cavalry commander, conveying the information given him by prisoners that the enemy had commenced to bridge the river near Huey's Mill, and urging the necessity of immediate retreat to Franklin. War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 1143. The staff officer who handed me the despatch called my attention especially to the words urging immediate action, and I considered the subject quite a long time. But there did not seem to me to be any necessity for
January 20th, 1865 AD (search for this): chapter 11
ater. Hood's forces were then understood by General Thomas to consist of from 40,000 to 45,000 infantry and artillery, and 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry, including Forrest's command. I find from General Sherman's despatch to Thomas, dated October 19, that his estimate of Hood's strength, October 19, 1864, was about 40,000 men of all arms. I do not find in General Thomas's report or despatches any exact statement of his own estimate; but the following language in his official report of January 20, 1865, seems quite sufficiently explicit on that point: Two divisions of infantry, under Major-General A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to join me from Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments then arriving in the department, and detachments collected from points of minor importance, would swell my command, when concentrated, to an army nearly as large as that of the enemy. Had the enemy delayed his advance a week or ten days longer, I would have been ready to meet him at some
November 19th (search for this): chapter 11
n the field, if possible; he must be able to act with more confidence than any subordinate can possibly feel. He was the sole judge as to the necessity of his remaining in Nashville, and no good reason could now be given for questioning the correctness of his judgment. It is only intended as an expression of a general rule for the consideration of military students. General Thomas's orders to General D. S. Stanley upon his being sent to Pulaski, and his subsequent orders to me, dated November 19, to fight the enemy at Pulaski if he advanced against that place, were, as shown in the following despatch from me, quite inapplicable to the then existing situation: Pulaski, November 20, 1864. Major-General Thomas: After full consideration I am of the opinion that this is not the best position for the main body of our troops, at least so long as we are inferior in strength to the enemy. If Hood advances, whether his design be to strike this place or Columbia, he must move vi
November 21st (search for this): chapter 11
front, but failing to reach Sherman's army in time, all assembled at Chattanooga, made a surplus force at that point of about 7000 men. See General Thomas's report: War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 33. Some of these troops had been sent to East Tennessee, as well as all the mounted troops available in Kentucky, for the purpose of retrieving the disaster which had befallen the Tennessee military governor's troops there, under Gillem. But all sent from Chattanooga had been returned by November 21, about the time when Hood's advance from Florence had become certainly known. Yet it does not appear that General Thomas even inquired what force was available at Chattanooga until November 25, when, in reply to a telegram, he learned that Steedman could raise 5000 men (in fact, 7000), in addition to all necessary garrisons and guards, to threaten enemy in rear, in case he should get on Chattanooga railroad. It may then (November 25) have been too late to send those 5000 or 7000 men to
November 7th, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 11
battle until the crisis of the campaign was passed at Franklin. The following correspondence relating to the command of the army in the field, to increasing the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, and to the use to be made of R. S. Granger's troops, and the reason why Thomas should assume the offensive as soon as possible, is also important, especially as showing that Sherman expected the two corps to be increased to 50,000 men, and that Thomas should command in person: Kingston, November 7, 1864, 10 A. M. Major-General Thomas: Despatch of 12:30 P. M. yesterday received. General Schofield is entitled to the command lover Stanley] by virtue of a recent decision of the War Department. I would advise you to add to those corps new regiments until they number 25,000 men each. If Beauregard advances from Corinth, it will be better for you to command in person. Your presence alone will give confidence. Granger should continue all the time to threaten the rear, and as soon as po
November 25th (search for this): chapter 11
t General Thomas even inquired what force was available at Chattanooga until November 25, when, in reply to a telegram, he learned that Steedman could raise 5000 men enemy in rear, in case he should get on Chattanooga railroad. It may then (November 25) have been too late to send those 5000 or 7000 men to the line of Duck River being left at Chattanooga to threaten enemy in rear. Thomas to Steedman, November 25: War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p.1050. As suggested in my despatch of Noveg me to believe that Hood intended to cross Duck River above Columbia. On November 25 General Thomas telegraphed me, in the following terms, his approval of the d On November 27 I received an important despatch from General Thomas, dated November 25. It was written under the apprehension that Hood's design might be to move . I believe your dispositions are wise. It appears from his despatch of November 25 that Thomas hoped we might be able to hold the line of Duck River from Colum
November 24th (search for this): chapter 11
inforcements must be available from his own department, and felt a little impatient about the long delay in their arrival, and hence telegraphed General Thomas, November 24, suggesting the concentration of R. S. Granger's troops and those along the railroad. The despatches to me at that time, to be found in the War Records, Senquestionably to have been sent to Columbia, or at least moved up to Nashville or Franklin, where they could join the main force, as suggested in my despatch of November 24 to Thomas, War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 1017. instead of being left at Chattanooga to threaten enemy in rear. Thomas to Steedman, November 25: War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p.1050. As suggested in my despatch of November 24, R. S. Granger's force and others along the railroad south of Duck River, as well as Steedman's, might have joined the main force at Columbia, if orders had been given in time, thus increasing the army in the field by fully 10,000 men. If R. S. Granger
November 27th (search for this): chapter 11
it before was—at the crossing of the turnpike. I abandoned that bridge-head on the night of November 27, upon receipt of information leading me to believe that Hood intended to cross Duck River abo in check until I can get Smith up, we can whip him. Thus it appears that even as late as November 27 General Thomas had not thought of sending the 7000 men at Chattanooga to join the main force,s troops from Chattanooga, instead of waiting for the uncertain arrival of A. J. Smith. On November 27 I received an important despatch from General Thomas, dated November 25. It was written undected on the north bank of Duck River, opposite Columbia. Hence I telegraphed General Thomas, November 27, at 12:30 P. M.: The enemy has made no real attack, and I am satisfied he does not intend the concentration certain if orders were given in due time. I learned in the afternoon of November 27, by General Thomas's despatch of 8 A. M., already quoted, that A. J. Smith's troops were not,
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