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Spring Hill (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
nasauga River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. It seems to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken and held that position. Indeed it does not seem at all certain that, however large his force might have been, he could have put troops enough in position before night to accomplish the object of cutting off Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of Hood's crossing Duck River in November of that year, and trying to cut off our retreat at Spring Hill. There was simply not time enough to do it in that one day, and if not done in one day it could not be done at all. So that it does not seem at all certain that this, which was Thomas's plan to throw the entire Army of the Cumberland on the road in Johnston's rear and thus cut off his retreat, would have succeeded any better than Sherman's, yet it gave greater promise of success, and therefore ought to have been tried. It is at least probable that Johnston's view of the case (see his
Hindman (search for this): chapter 7
erybody's opinion in addition to, or in opposition to, theirs. If the Senate is not satisfied with such testimony, I can't help it. I never have and never will resort to buncombe for the purpose of securing my own advancement. If I cannot gain promotion by legitimate means, I do not want it at all. . . . In all this time I have yet to hear the first word of disapproval, from my superior officer, of any one of my military operations (unless I except Curtis, who disapproved of my pursuing Hindman so far into Arkansas), and in general have received high commendation from my superiors, both for my military operations and administration. I would rather have this record without a major-general's commission, than to gain the commission by adding to my reputation one grain of falsehood. . . . Grant was here in the winter, and Sherman only a few days ago. They are fully acquainted with the condition of affairs. I have been acting all the time under their instructions, and I believe wi
John M. Schofield (search for this): chapter 7
tatives, nor the newspapers, nor the people of the United States, nor even all of them together, can command an army. I rather think if you let Grant alone, and let him have his own way, he will end the war this year. At all events, the next ninety days will show whether he will or not. I find this letter is both too long and too ill-natured. I feel too much as if I would like to whip somebody anyhow, so I will stop where I am. Let me hear from you again soon. Yours very truly, J. M. Schofield. Hon. J. B. Henderson, U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C. Of course I knew the advice of my friend Senator Henderson was not intended to be taken seriously, but only as expressing his view, much the same as my own, of the then existing situation in the Senate. But it gave me, all the same, the opportunity I wanted to give his brother senators, through him, a piece of my mind. General Sherman, on a visit to Knoxville about the end of March, a few days before the date of the foregoin
Joseph E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 7
essee during the summer. He must join Lee or Johnston before the opening of the summer campaign. Iidge was virtually as unassailable as that of Johnston behind it. The only weak point of our positioforce large enough to hold its ground against Johnston's whole army could have been put upon the rain what Sherman expected. Indeed, the fate of Johnston's army might perhaps have been decided then ais expectations in the first movement against Johnston. It seems at least probable that at the beto hold their ground against the main body of Johnston's army; and this must have been done in a sinposition as far east as the Connasauga River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. Itnight to accomplish the object of cutting off Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of entire Army of the Cumberland on the road in Johnston's rear and thus cut off his retreat, would happosition, and there intrenched. That night Johnston abandoned his lines. An inspection of the en[6 more...]
P. Blair (search for this): chapter 7
little army which I had the honor to command. I shall speak mainly of the acts of others, especially the noble dead. I must preface my remarks by observing that the organization of Sherman's army during the Atlanta campaign was extremely faulty, in that the three grand divisions were very unequal in strength, the Army of the Cumberland having nearly five times the infantry strength of the Army of the Ohio, and more than twice that of the Army of the Tennessee, even after the junction of Blair's corps. The cavalry, of which two divisions belonged to the Army of the Ohio, always acted either under the direct orders of General Sherman or of the nearest army commander, according to the flank on which it was operating. This inequality resulted from the fact that Sherman's army was composed of three separate armies, or such portions of them as could be spared from their several departments, united for that campaign. General Thomas was, naturally enough, disinclined to part with any
George H. Thomas (search for this): chapter 7
d to give me 10,000 additional troops from General Thomas's army at Chattanooga, and to let me beginelayed because of some operations in which General Thomas was to engage. Nevertheless, I advanced oal departments, united for that campaign. General Thomas was, naturally enough, disinclined to partthe commander whom they revered. Besides, General Thomas had had much greater experience in the comcesses that characterized our operations. General Thomas's command often proved unwieldy and slow fn estimated Johnston's force at about 60,000. Thomas's position in front of Rocky-face Ridge was viosition between Dalton and Resaca. As it was, Thomas should have followed close upon his rear throus not seem at all certain that this, which was Thomas's plan to throw the entire Army of the Cumberlarapet. He replied that he was ordered by General Thomas only to support me, and that he would do nfacts were immediately reported to Sherman and Thomas. I do not know what action, if any, was taken[3 more...]
U. S. Grant (search for this): chapter 7
the troops at Knoxville effect of the promotion of Grant and Sherman letter to Senator Henderson a visit frtain it as far as possible. Early in February General Grant had proposed to give me 10,000 additional troopsr an attack, when, on the 15th, orders came from General Grant to send the Ninth Corps to the Army of the Potomprogram doubtless resulted from the promotion of General Grant to lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief, an this connection a very pertinent remark made by General Grant soon after he became President. My nomination ae a year and a half to get through the Senate. President Grant, as he handed me my commission, replied: Yes; aresident, the Secretary of War, General Halleck, General Grant, and General Sherman. I am willing to abide theng to my reputation one grain of falsehood. . . . Grant was here in the winter, and Sherman only a few days her, can command an army. I rather think if you let Grant alone, and let him have his own way, he will end the
Burnside (search for this): chapter 7
. The troops then about Knoxville were the Ninth Corps, two divisions of the Twenty-third, and about one thousand cavalry and two divisions of the Fourth Corps; the latter belonged to the Department of the Cumberland, but had been left with General Burnside after the siege of Knoxville was raised by General Sherman. The Ninth and Twenty-third Corps were reduced in effective strength to mere skeletons, the former reporting present for duty equipped only 2800 men, and the latter 3000 men; and d or clothing, or were employed in the care of the sick or on extra duty. Many thousands of dead horses and mules were scattered round the town, while the few remaining alive were reduced to skeletons. Of about 30,000 animals with which General Burnside had gone into East Tennessee, scarcely 1000 remained fit for service; while his army of over 25,000 men had been reduced to not more than 7000 fit for duty and effective for service in the field. Such was the result of the siege of Knoxvill
James B. McPherson (search for this): chapter 7
oirs faulty organization of Sherman's army McPherson's task at Resaca McPherson's character exapon the vital point of an enemy's position. McPherson had only about 22,000 infantry, while Shermamid. I believe the error was Sherman's, not McPherson's; that McPherson was correct in his judgmenpportunity General Sherman had of judging of McPherson's qualities as a commander; but I knew him wearest and dearest friend of my youth. If McPherson had commanded one third of the army, he mighd to let go from his stronghold by reason of McPherson's operations in his rear; while McPherson, able for producing any important result. Had McPherson broken the road ever so good and then falle three roads have been in position to attack McPherson at dawn of day the next morning, while the maway on the other side of Rocky-face. Or if McPherson had not held the entire natural position as m in the night. It seems to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken and held[11 more...]
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 7
General Grant to send the Ninth Corps to the Army of the Potomac. Such a reduction of my command, instead of the expected reinforcement, left me wholly unable to do more than observe Longstreet as he leisurely withdrew from Tennessee and joined Lee in Virginia, and prepare for the campaign of the coning summer, the nature of which I could then only conjecture. This entire change of program doubtless resulted from the promotion of General Grant to lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief,ommand of the Military Division of the Mississippi, which occurred at that time. The change of plans was undoubtedly wise. The Confederate government could not afford to leave Longstreet's force in East Tennessee during the summer. He must join Lee or Johnston before the opening of the summer campaign. It was not worth while for us to expend time and strength in driving him out, which ought to be devoted to preparations for vastly more important work. I felt disappointed at the time in not
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