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Tilton (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
of the army, he might, with a corps of Thomas's army in close support, have felt strong enough to occupy and hold a position between Dalton and Resaca. As it was, Thomas should have followed close upon his rear through Snake Creek Gap, with two corps. The distance between the two wings of the army would have been so short and the ground between them so impassable to the enemy as to give us practically a continuous line of battle, and Thomas's two corps in the valley of the Connasauga near Tilton would have been in far better position to strike the retreating enemy when he was compelled to let go of Dalton, than they were in front of Rocky-face Ridge. Impartial history must, I believe, hold Sherman himself mainly responsible for the failure to realize his expectations in the first movement against Johnston. It seems at least probable that at the beginning of the movement against Dalton, Sherman did not fully understand the character of the enemy's position; for his plan clearly a
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
,000 animals with which General Burnside had gone into East Tennessee, scarcely 1000 remained fit for service; while his armhe Confederate army under Longstreet still remained in East Tennessee. A movement had recently been made by our troops, undiety was felt in Washington regarding the situation in East Tennessee. It was even apprehended that Knoxville might be in dore than observe Longstreet as he leisurely withdrew from Tennessee and joined Lee in Virginia, and prepare for the campaign rnment could not afford to leave Longstreet's force in East Tennessee during the summer. He must join Lee or Johnston befor public reports of what had been done, or not done, in East Tennessee, and the Military Committee of the Senate reported agausy of my senior brother commanders of the Cumberland and Tennessee. My first care was to provide my men with all necessarordinate position in the campaigns of 1864 in Georgia and Tennessee, I shall not attempt to write a full account of those cam
West Point (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
al moment McPherson seems to have been a little timid. I believe the error was Sherman's, not McPherson's; that McPherson was correct in his judgment, which certainly was mine (after passing over the same ground and fighting the battle of Resaca), that his force was entirely too small for the work assigned it. I had not the same opportunity General Sherman had of judging of McPherson's qualities as a commander; but I knew him well and intimately, having sat upon the same bench with him at West Point for four years, and been his room-mate for a year and a half. His was the most completely balanced mind and character with which I have ever been intimately acquainted, although he did not possess in a very high degree the power of invention or originality of thought. His personal courage seemed to amount to unconsciousness of danger, while his care of his troops cannot, I believe, be justly characterized otherwise than as wise prudence. I consider this to be only a just tribute to the
United States (United States) (search for this): chapter 7
have rendered, I shall not condescend to humbug them into the belief that I have done something which I really have not. You ask me what are the prospects of putting down the rebellion. I answer unhesitatingly that when the management of military matters is left to military men, the rebellion will be put down very quickly, and not before. I regard it as having been fully demonstrated that neither the Senate, nor the House of Representatives, nor the newspapers, nor the people of the United States, nor even all of them together, can command an army. I rather think if you let Grant alone, and let him have his own way, he will end the war this year. At all events, the next ninety days will show whether he will or not. I find this letter is both too long and too ill-natured. I feel too much as if I would like to whip somebody anyhow, so I will stop where I am. Let me hear from you again soon. Yours very truly, J. M. Schofield. Hon. J. B. Henderson, U. S. Senate, Washington,
Resaca (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
could have been put upon the railroad between Resaca and Dalton. The result would then, in all pro occupy and hold a position between Dalton and Resaca. As it was, Thomas should have followed closely retreated before him to the new position at Resaca. The result would have been essentially the sSherman thinks McPherson ought to have done at Resaca; and, as Sherman says, such an opportunity doed in his orders. If McPherson had assaulted Resaca, it is possible, but only possible, that he miate with the extent of the line, like those at Resaca, were successfully assaulted. It is true thastly superior to the single brigade that held Resaca that day, but that practically amounts to nothlt such as would have been required to capture Resaca on May 9, 1864. Clearly, such an assault shoun. The only chance of success was to invest Resaca on the west and north, and put between the inveated any possible attempt to cut him off from Resaca. To illustrate the faulty system of organiz[6 more...]
French Broad River (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
ce, and to maintain it as far as possible. Early in February General Grant had proposed to give me 10,000 additional troops from General Thomas's army at Chattanooga, and to let me begin the campaign against Longstreet at once. But on February 16 he informed me that the movement would have to be delayed because of some operations in which General Thomas was to engage. Nevertheless, I advanced on the 24th with what force I had, at the same time sending a reconnaissance south of the French Broad River to ascertain the nature of a hostile movement reported in that direction. Upon our advance, Longstreet's troops withdrew across the Holston and French Broad and retreated toward Morristown. His advance had evidently been intended only to cover an attempted cavalry raid upon our rear, which the high water in the Little Tennessee rendered impracticable. We now occupied Strawberry Plains, rebuilt the railroad bridge, pushed forward the construction of a bateau bridge which had been
Georgia (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
criticism of General Sherman's acts or words shall seem unkind or be considered unjust, I can only disclaim any such feeling, and freely admit that it would be wholly unworthy of the relations that always existed between us. I write not for the present, but for the future, and my only wish is to represent the truth as it appears to me. If I fail to see it clearly, I do but condemn myself. History will do impartial justice. Having been in a subordinate position in the campaigns of 1864 in Georgia and Tennessee, I shall not attempt to write a full account of those campaigns, but shall limit myself to such comments as seem to me to be called for upon the already published histories of those campaigns. In estimating the merits of Sherman's Memoirs, The following was written in 1875, soon after the appearance of the first edition. it should be remembered that he does not, and does not claim to, occupy the position of a disinterested, impartial historian. He writes, not for the pu
Connasauga River (United States) (search for this): chapter 7
n body of Johnston's army; and this must have been done in a single day, starting from the debouche of Snake Creek Gap, the troops moving by a single, common country road. Johnston's whole army, except a small rear-guard, would by the use of three roads have been in position to attack McPherson at dawn of day the next morning, while the main body of Sherman's army was far away on the other side of Rocky-face. Or if McPherson had not held the entire natural position as far east as the Connasauga River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. It seems to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken and held that position. Indeed it does not seem at all certain that, however large his force might have been, he could have put troops enough in position before night to accomplish the object of cutting off Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of Hood's crossing Duck River in November of that year, and trying to cut off our retreat at Spring Hill
Morristown, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
ure of a hostile movement reported in that direction. Upon our advance, Longstreet's troops withdrew across the Holston and French Broad and retreated toward Morristown. His advance had evidently been intended only to cover an attempted cavalry raid upon our rear, which the high water in the Little Tennessee rendered impracticad been commenced, in the meantime using the bateaux already constructed to ferry the troops across the river. In this manner we were able to advance as far as Morristown by February 29 with sufficient force to reconnoiter Longstreet's position. This reconnaissance demonstrated that the enemy held Bull's Gap, and that his entire Although his force, if concentrated, was much superior to mine, I determined to endeavor to take advantage of his movement to attack his rear. My advance held Morristown; all the troops were ordered forward to that place, and preparations made for an attack, when, on the 15th, orders came from General Grant to send the Ninth Cor
Edgefield (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
animals with which General Burnside had gone into East Tennessee, scarcely 1000 remained fit for service; while his army of over 25,000 men had been reduced to not more than 7000 fit for duty and effective for service in the field. Such was the result of the siege of Knoxville, and such the Army of the Ohio when I became its commander. But the splendid victory gained a short time before at Chattanooga had raised the blockade upon our line of supply, and the railroad to Chattanooga and Nashville was soon opened, so that our starving and naked troops could begin to get supplies of food and clothing. The movement of the first train of cars was reported by telegraph from every station, and was eagerly awaited by the entire army. When the locomotive whistle announced its approach, everybody turned out to welcome it with shouts of joy. It proved to consist of ten car-loads of horse and mule shoes for the dead animals which strewed the plains! Fortunately the disgust produced by this
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