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John B. Hood (search for this): chapter 7
f Rocky-face. Or if McPherson had not held the entire natural position as far east as the Connasauga River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. It seems to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken and held that position. Indeed it does not seem at all certain that, however large his force might have been, he could have put troops enough in position before night to accomplish the object of cutting off Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of Hood's crossing Duck River in November of that year, and trying to cut off our retreat at Spring Hill. There was simply not time enough to do it in that one day, and if not done in one day it could not be done at all. So that it does not seem at all certain that this, which was Thomas's plan to throw the entire Army of the Cumberland on the road in Johnston's rear and thus cut off his retreat, would have succeeded any better than Sherman's, yet it gave greater promise of success, and therefore
John G. Foster (search for this): chapter 7
n Sherman's memoirs faulty organization of Sherman's army McPherson's task at Resaca McPherson's character example of the working of a faulty system. I arrived at Knoxville, Tennessee, on February 8, 1864, and the next day relieved General John G. Foster. The troops then about Knoxville were the Ninth Corps, two divisions of the Twenty-third, and about one thousand cavalry and two divisions of the Fourth Corps; the latter belonged to the Department of the Cumberland, but had been left wir, and other articles to gladden the hearts of hungry soldiers. The Confederate army under Longstreet still remained in East Tennessee. A movement had recently been made by our troops, under the immediate command of General John G. Parke (General Foster being too lame to take the field in person), to drive Longstreet out. But the movement had failed, the troops returning to Knoxville with the loss of considerable material. In consequence of this, much anxiety was felt in Washington regardin
P. H. Sheridan (search for this): chapter 7
to whip somebody anyhow. This information and advice elicited a long reply, from which the following are extracts, which expressed pretty fully my views and feelings on that subject, and which, with events that soon followed, ended all trouble I ever had with that august body, the United States Senate. I recollect in this connection a very pertinent remark made by General Grant soon after he became President. My nomination as major-general in the regular army, with those of Sherman and Sheridan as general and lieutenant-general, had been sent to the Senate and returned approved so promptly as to occasion comment. I remarked that it had on one occasion taken me a year and a half to get through the Senate. President Grant, as he handed me my commission, replied: Yes; and if your conduct then had been such as to avoid that difficulty with the Senate, you would probably never have received this commission at all. I have no doubt he was right. To have pleased the radical politician
Pulaski Stanley (search for this): chapter 7
orders or requests unless they were in accord with their own views; while one of these corps commanders, General Sherman says, manifested an ambition to get one of the separate armies under his command and win a victory on his own hook. But General Sherman fails to state that he encouraged all this by his own now well-known erroneous opinion upon the question of the relative rank of army and corps commanders; that this vital question was evaded until its decision in a special case—that of Stanley and Schofield—became absolutely necessary, and was then decided erroneously, the error resulting in failure and great disappointment to Sherman. Had this question been decided at an early day according to the plain import of the law, as was afterward done by the War Department, and orders given to corps commanders to obey instead of cooperate or support, much trouble would have been avoided. First among the most important events of the Atlanta campaign were the operations about Dalton a
John G. Parke (search for this): chapter 7
uts of joy. It proved to consist of ten car-loads of horse and mule shoes for the dead animals which strewed the plains! Fortunately the disgust produced by this disappointment was not of long duration. The next train, which followed very soon, contained coffee, sugar, and other articles to gladden the hearts of hungry soldiers. The Confederate army under Longstreet still remained in East Tennessee. A movement had recently been made by our troops, under the immediate command of General John G. Parke (General Foster being too lame to take the field in person), to drive Longstreet out. But the movement had failed, the troops returning to Knoxville with the loss of considerable material. In consequence of this, much anxiety was felt in Washington regarding the situation in East Tennessee. It was even apprehended that Knoxville might be in danger; and an advance of Longstreet's force to Strawberry Plains, where he laid a bridge over the Holston and crossed a part of his troops, se
J. M. Schofield (search for this): chapter 7
quests unless they were in accord with their own views; while one of these corps commanders, General Sherman says, manifested an ambition to get one of the separate armies under his command and win a victory on his own hook. But General Sherman fails to state that he encouraged all this by his own now well-known erroneous opinion upon the question of the relative rank of army and corps commanders; that this vital question was evaded until its decision in a special case—that of Stanley and Schofield—became absolutely necessary, and was then decided erroneously, the error resulting in failure and great disappointment to Sherman. Had this question been decided at an early day according to the plain import of the law, as was afterward done by the War Department, and orders given to corps commanders to obey instead of cooperate or support, much trouble would have been avoided. First among the most important events of the Atlanta campaign were the operations about Dalton and Resaca. H
H. W. Halleck (search for this): chapter 7
onvince the Senate of the United States that I had won a great victory, and secure my confirmation by acclamation. Such things have been done, alas! too frequently during this war. But such is not my theory of a soldier's duties. I have an idea that my military superiors are the proper judges of my character and conduct, and that their testimony ought to be considered satisfactory as to my military qualities. I have the approval and support of the President, the Secretary of War, General Halleck, General Grant, and General Sherman. I am willing to abide the decision of any one or all of them, and I would not give a copper for the weight of anybody's or everybody's opinion in addition to, or in opposition to, theirs. If the Senate is not satisfied with such testimony, I can't help it. I never have and never will resort to buncombe for the purpose of securing my own advancement. If I cannot gain promotion by legitimate means, I do not want it at all. . . . In all this time I
William T. Sherman (search for this): chapter 7
armies for the Atlanta campaign comments on Sherman's memoirs faulty organization of Sherman's ad. . . . Grant was here in the winter, and Sherman only a few days ago. They are fully acquaintethe just and generous treatment shown by General Sherman toward me from the beginning of that campints in the history of those campaigns of General Sherman in which I was one of his principal suborn and Resaca. Here I have always thought General Sherman committed the mistake, so common in war (been a little timid. I believe the error was Sherman's, not McPherson's; that McPherson was correc that night, and at daylight the next morning Sherman would have found in the enemy's trenches at D day the next morning, while the main body of Sherman's army was far away on the other side of Rockretreat, would have succeeded any better than Sherman's, yet it gave greater promise of success, ander of date of those I wish to consider. General Sherman does not allude to it at all in his Memoi[38 more...]
James Longstreet (search for this): chapter 7
of hungry soldiers. The Confederate army under Longstreet still remained in East Tennessee. A movement hadg too lame to take the field in person), to drive Longstreet out. But the movement had failed, the troops retut Knoxville might be in danger; and an advance of Longstreet's force to Strawberry Plains, where he laid a britanooga, and to let me begin the campaign against Longstreet at once. But on February 16 he informed me that reported in that direction. Upon our advance, Longstreet's troops withdrew across the Holston and French B February 29 with sufficient force to reconnoiter Longstreet's position. This reconnaissance demonstrated thaemy, although reliable information indicated that Longstreet was preparing for, and had perhaps already begun,nt, left me wholly unable to do more than observe Longstreet as he leisurely withdrew from Tennessee and joine Confederate government could not afford to leave Longstreet's force in East Tennessee during the summer. He
J. B. Henderson (search for this): chapter 7
Chapter VII Condition of the troops at Knoxville effect of the promotion of Grant and Sherman letter to Senator Henderson a visit from General Sherman United with his other armies for the Atlanta campaign comments on Sherman's memoirsenate reported against the confirmation of my appointment as major-general. Of this I was informed by my friend Senator J. B. Henderson, in a letter urging me to whip somebody anyhow. This information and advice elicited a long reply, from which tomebody anyhow, so I will stop where I am. Let me hear from you again soon. Yours very truly, J. M. Schofield. Hon. J. B. Henderson, U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C. Of course I knew the advice of my friend Senator Henderson was not intended tSenator Henderson was not intended to be taken seriously, but only as expressing his view, much the same as my own, of the then existing situation in the Senate. But it gave me, all the same, the opportunity I wanted to give his brother senators, through him, a piece of my mind. G
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