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A. H. Engle (search for this): chapter 8
pudence in Yankees was not to be tolerated. Yet a single shell from the same direction,—probably from the same battery,--when we were moving into action that morning, exploded near my head, and killed the aide who was riding behind me. Captain A. H. Engle, who was killed at Resaca, was a most charming and talented youth, only twenty years of age. That was his first battle. He was caterer of the headquarters mess. That morning, before leaving camp, Captain Engle made out all his accounts aCaptain Engle made out all his accounts and handed them, with the money for which he was responsible, to another staff officer, saying he was going to be killed that day. My too numerous staff and escort had attracted attention. I had at Dalton a few days before forbade the staff and escort to follow me into action, unless specially ordered to do so; but they had not so soon learned the lesson which the sad casualty at Resaca taught them. It was then early in the campaign. Later, both generals and orderlies had learned to restrain
Christmas (search for this): chapter 8
n in the corps. I could not compete with Mac at all in the lettering business, but I tried to follow his good example, in my own way, by helping the boys over knotty points in math and phil. I had taught district school one winter before going to West Point, and hence had acquired the knack of explaining things. Hood was not well up in mathematics. The first part of the course especially he found very hard—so much so that he became discouraged. After the unauthorized festivities of Christmas, particularly, he seemed much depressed. On the 26th he asked me which I would prefer to be, an officer of the army or a farmer in Kentucky? I replied in a way which aroused his ambition to accomplish what he had set out to do in coming to West Point, without regard to preference between farming and soldiering. He went to work in good earnest, and passed the January examination, though by a very narrow margin. From that time on he did not seem to have so much difficulty. When we were
John B. Hood (search for this): chapter 8
reted a conversation with James B. McPherson over the question of relative rank encouraging John B. Hood to become a soldier visit to the Camp of Frank P. Blair, Jr. anecdote of Sherman and Hookerf believing there were three entire corps in front of us, I doubted whether there was even all of Hood's corps. General Hooker's habit of swinging off from the rest of General Thomas's army, and ge one winter before going to West Point, and hence had acquired the knack of explaining things. Hood was not well up in mathematics. The first part of the course especially he found very hard—so muiculty. When we were fighting each other so desperately, fifteen years later, I wondered whether Hood remembered the encouragement I had given him to become a soldier, and came very near thinking onc generals were unwilling to attempt it. Had Sherman divided his army in such a way, and struck at Hood's rear, he might have found a chance to destroy that army as well as the railroads in Georgia.
William T. Sherman (search for this): chapter 8
Chapter VIII Sherman's displeasure with Hooker Growing out of the affair at Kolb's Farmefore the hour of Hooker's signal-despatch to Sherman expressing anxiety about our extreme right. ved the idea, as indicated by his despatch to Sherman, that Johnston had drawn his main force from y to those who are comparatively young. When Sherman read Hooker's despatch, which he interpreted terview in the little church described by General Sherman (Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. II, page 59). Ing generals were unwilling to attempt it. Had Sherman divided his army in such a way, and struck atr aid. This action of mine was taken with General Sherman's knowledge and approval, and was the cormemory is only that of conversations with General Sherman during the day, and he ought to be much bth Corps, as such. Nor do I believe with General Sherman that its slowness on that occasion was duobably the gravest responsibility of war. Yet Sherman's opinion and decision would have placed this[45 more...]
J. M. Schofield (search for this): chapter 8
s meaning that my corps was not in position to protect Hooker's flank, he said in substance, if not literally, and with great emphasis: That is not true. I sent Schofield an order to be there. I know he received the order, for his initials, in his own hand, are on the envelop which the orderly brought back, and I know he is thereuncommon in the short intervals of rest from deadly work. General Sherman says in Vol. II, page 60, of his Memoirs: During the 24th and 25th of June, General Schofield extended his right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong assaults at points where success would give us the greatest advantage. I had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, and we all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any more, and therefore there was no alternative but to attack fortified lines—a thing carefully avoided up to that time. The first sentence literally m
Chapter VIII Sherman's displeasure with Hooker Growing out of the affair at Kolb's Farm Hooker's despatch evidently Misinterpreted a conversation with James B. McPherson over the question of relative rank encouraging John B. Hood to become a soldier visit to the Camp of Frank P. Blair, Jr. anecdote of Sherman and Hooker under fire the assault on Kenesaw tendency of veteran troops the death of McPherson before Atlanta Sherman's error in a question of relative rank. in the affair at Kolb's Farm, on June 22, Hascall's division of the Twenty-third Corps was abreast of and connecting with Hooker's right, while his advance-guard was many yards in advance of the line, when the enemy's attack at the Kolb House began. The first attack fell upon this advance-guard, the 14th Kentucky Volunteers, which gallantly held its ground until twice ordered to retire and join the main line. In the meantime Hascall's line had been formed in prolongation of Hooker's and covered with
Pulaski Stanley (search for this): chapter 8
th Corps. It cannot for a moment be admitted that any share of the blame for that failure attaches to the Fourteenth Corps, as such. Nor do I believe with General Sherman that its slowness on that occasion was due to anything imbibed from General Thomas. My own view of military duty was different from that entertained by the commander of the Fourteenth Corps, as was shown in my subsequent action, hereinafter referred to, when I was ordered to report to and act under the orders of General Stanley. But if the distinguished statesman who then commanded the Fourteenth Corps fell into error at that time, he has doubtless since regretted it far more than any other man could possibly do; and he has many times atoned for that error by the great services to the country which he has continued to render up to the present time. The primary and principal cause of this and all similar difficulties during the Atlanta campaign was the grave error of opinion which disregarded the special r
John M. Palmer (search for this): chapter 8
s of the troops when the order for the movement was made rendered it convenient that the Twenty-third Corps be put in first,—that is, next to the right of General Thomas's troops then in position,— while the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General John M. Palmer, was relied upon to develop rapidly to our right and endeavor to strike the enemy's flank before he could extend his intrenched line far enough to meet and resist our attack. It was not until some time after my orders for this movement hn any field or department, approved April 4, 1862. Palpable as this fallacy seems, yet it was adhered to until overruled by the War Department. It is proper for me to add that I had at that time but a very slight personal acquaintance with General Palmer. However, I knew him well by reputation, and esteemed him highly. General Thomas, especially, had given me a high estimate of his character and abilities. If there was any cause of jealousy or ill-feeling between us, I never suspected
April 4th, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 8
influence or otherwise had got an earlier commission of major-general. So many of the latter had proved to be unqualified for responsible command that Congress had enacted a special law authorizing the President to supersede such prior commissions and assign commanders of armies or army corps in the field and in any department whom he deemed competent. Reference is made here to the 122d Article of War, and the resolution of Congress especially intended to modify it in respect to command in any field or department, approved April 4, 1862. Palpable as this fallacy seems, yet it was adhered to until overruled by the War Department. It is proper for me to add that I had at that time but a very slight personal acquaintance with General Palmer. However, I knew him well by reputation, and esteemed him highly. General Thomas, especially, had given me a high estimate of his character and abilities. If there was any cause of jealousy or ill-feeling between us, I never suspected it.
the lettering business, but I tried to follow his good example, in my own way, by helping the boys over knotty points in math and phil. I had taught district school one winter before going to West Point, and hence had acquired the knack of explaining things. Hood was not well up in mathematics. The first part of the course especially he found very hard—so much so that he became discouraged. After the unauthorized festivities of Christmas, particularly, he seemed much depressed. On the 26th he asked me which I would prefer to be, an officer of the army or a farmer in Kentucky? I replied in a way which aroused his ambition to accomplish what he had set out to do in coming to West Point, without regard to preference between farming and soldiering. He went to work in good earnest, and passed the January examination, though by a very narrow margin. From that time on he did not seem to have so much difficulty. When we were fighting each other so desperately, fifteen years later,
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