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U. S. Grant (search for this): chapter 9
a compact army of one hundred thousand men, as I witnessed them with the intense interest of a young commander and student of the great art which has so often in the history of the world determined the destinies of nations. After the capture of Atlanta, in September, 1864, General Sherman proposed to give his army rest for a month while he perfected his plans and preparations for a change of base to some point on the Atlantic or the gulf, in pursuance of the general plan outlined by General Grant before the Atlanta campaign was opened in May. But the Confederate commander took the initiative, about September 20, by moving his army around Sherman's right, striking his railroad about Allatoona and toward Chattanooga, doing some damage, and then marching off westward with the design of transferring the theater of war from Georgia to Alabama, Mississippi, or Tennessee. Sherman very promptly decided not to accept that challenge to meet Hood upon a field chosen by the latter, but t
Thomas H. Ruger (search for this): chapter 9
rched from Pulaski to that place, and our cavalry moved on the enemy's right to cover the turnpike and railroad. The whole army was in position at Columbia, November 24, and began to intrench. Hood's infantry did not appear in sight until the 26th. Cox had a brush with the enemy's cavalry, which had driven in one of our cavalry brigades. That action was magnified at the time, and afterward, into evidence of a race between our troops and the enemy for the possession of Columbia. In fact, Ruger's troops at Columbia were quite capable of holding that place against Forrest and Hood's infantry was not within a day's march of either Cox or Stanley until after both had reached Columbia. We held our intrenched position in front of Columbia until the evening of November 27, inviting an attack, and hoping that Thomas would arrive with, or send, reinforcements in time to assume the offensive from Columbia; but reinforcements did not come, and the enemy did not attack. It became evident
Slocum (search for this): chapter 9
ance of thirty miles, one corps below Jonesboroa being just driven from its ground with considerable loss and in retreat to Lovejoy's, the main body leaving Atlanta and stretched along the road toward McDonough; while Sherman's whole army, except Slocum's corps, was in compact order about Jonesboroa, nearly in a straight line between Atlanta and Lovejoy's. This seemed exactly the opportunity to destroy Hood's army, if that was the objective of the campaign. So anxious was I that this be attemptas to command the army in Tennessee, and I wanted only to go back and help him because he would, in my opinion, have to do the fighting while Sherman's march would be unopposed. Sherman then replied that he must have three grand divisions, under Slocum, Howard, and myself, to make his army complete, and that he could not spare me; and he gave no indication of concurrence in my opinion that he ought to send back more troops. After leaving General Sherman that afternoon and returning to my own
Pulaski Stanley (search for this): chapter 9
f the highest commander present, and that General Stanley, having the older commission, was that hit morning, before I had time to report to General Stanley, he appeared at my camp, evidently much d front, I rode rapidly forward to the head of Stanley's column, which was then not advancing, made wenty-third Corps out of the road occupied by Stanley's corps, moved it to the front through woods than a skirmish-line (Vol. II, page 108) in Stanley's front that gave us that fire both of musketne of the ugliest they ever experienced. General Stanley's fault was, not that he deployed his trohat had arisen between Generals Schofield and Stanley. At this General Stanley was very indignant,of the War Department that I, instead of General Stanley, had command of the force that in the folm Georgia to Tennessee and report to Thomas. Stanley had started by rail to Tullahoma, and was to ated to me the same orders he had sent to General Stanley, in these words: If the enemy advances in[14 more...]
J. D. Cox (search for this): chapter 9
new nothing because I was unacquainted with the geography of the surrounding country. Upon Stanley's statement, I halted Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps a few miles north of Pulaski so that the troops might be the more readily placed as try dispositions to oppose him. Our cavalry gave us accurate information that the enemy was advancing on the 21st, when Cox, with Wagner in support, was ordered to interpose between the enemy's cavalry and Columbia; while Stanley, with two divisiwas in position at Columbia, November 24, and began to intrench. Hood's infantry did not appear in sight until the 26th. Cox had a brush with the enemy's cavalry, which had driven in one of our cavalry brigades. That action was magnified at the tlumbia were quite capable of holding that place against Forrest and Hood's infantry was not within a day's march of either Cox or Stanley until after both had reached Columbia. We held our intrenched position in front of Columbia until the evenin
J. E. B. Stuart (search for this): chapter 9
to justify me in speaking from the records,—it was a similar mistake on the part of the Confederate cavalry commander General J. E. B. Stuart, in trying to get between Sheridan and Richmond, which gave Sheridan the advantage and led to Stuart's defeStuart's defeat. Stuart had ridden hard all night, and got between Sheridan and Richmond, his men and horses exhausted, while Sheridan had been resting and feeding his men and animals. In the morning Sheridan rode over his exhausted antagonist. These are amongStuart had ridden hard all night, and got between Sheridan and Richmond, his men and horses exhausted, while Sheridan had been resting and feeding his men and animals. In the morning Sheridan rode over his exhausted antagonist. These are among the many cases where exaggerated ideas of the importance of places have led to the defeat of armies. I knew Stuart well at West Point, he having been in the class next to mine. He then gave promise of his future brilliant career as a cavalry leadeStuart well at West Point, he having been in the class next to mine. He then gave promise of his future brilliant career as a cavalry leader. The only specially hazardous part of Sherman's movement was that which would fall to my lot—namely, to hold the pivot against a possible attack of Hood's whole army while Thomas and Howard should swing round it, and then draw out and join them
Forrest (search for this): chapter 9
r 30, to march to the nearest point on the railroad, and report by telegraph to General Thomas for orders. At first General Thomas ordered me to move by rail to Tullahoma, and then march across to Pulaski, as Stanley was doing. But just then Forrest with his cavalry appeared at Johnsonville, on the Tennessee River west of Nashville, and destroyed a great quantity of property, General Thomas not having sufficient force available to oppose him; hence on November 3 Thomas ordered me to come atvalry brigades. That action was magnified at the time, and afterward, into evidence of a race between our troops and the enemy for the possession of Columbia. In fact, Ruger's troops at Columbia were quite capable of holding that place against Forrest and Hood's infantry was not within a day's march of either Cox or Stanley until after both had reached Columbia. We held our intrenched position in front of Columbia until the evening of November 27, inviting an attack, and hoping that Thomas
John B. Hood (search for this): chapter 9
Atlanta Johnston's untried plan of resistance Hood's faulty move holding the Pivot of the positioor carloads of fixed ammunition, and hence that Hood was abandoning that place. I reported my obser firm hold of the railroad at Rough and Ready. Hood having failed to attack our exposed flank durin This seemed exactly the opportunity to destroy Hood's army, if that was the objective of the campaie that in the following November, 1864, opposed Hood's advance from the Tennessee River and repulsedan had been stopped by the reported approach of Hood. I ordered all back to Cleveland, and we barelly decided not to accept that challenge to meet Hood upon a field chosen by the latter, but to contin Georgia, and to direct the operations against Hood. Thomas had in his department at that time otempting to carry out his instructions to fight Hood at Pulaski if he should advance upon that placement upon it more fully later. The season of Hood's invasion of Tennessee was extremely unfavorab[33 more...]
John M. Schofield (search for this): chapter 9
t morning, as Sherman says (Vol. II, page 107), Howard found an intrenched foe (Hardee's corps) covering Jonesboroa, and orders were sent to Generals Thomas and Schofield to turn straight for Jonesboroa, tearing up the railroad track as they advanced. But of course, as General Sherman had anticipated the night before, such ordersecision upon the question of relative rank, which I did. This he submitted to the War Department for decision, as a question of rank that had arisen between Generals Schofield and Stanley. At this General Stanley was very indignant, as well as at General Sherman's censure of his conduct on September 1; for the reason that no quesuctions given by him during the progress of those operations, but referred only to instructions already given before I went to Pulaski, and said: My plans and wishes were fully explained to General Schofield, and, as subsequent events will show, properly appreciated and executed by him. War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part i, p. 590.
Edward Hatch (search for this): chapter 9
try. Upon Stanley's statement, I halted Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps a few miles north of Pulaski so that the troops might be the more readily placed as the situation required when I had time to consider it. No part of the Twenty-third Corps actually went to Pulaski, although that was the place to which General Thomas had ordered it. On the 19th General Thomas repeated to me the same orders he had sent to General Stanley, in these words: If the enemy advances in force, as General Hatch believes, have everything in readiness either to fight him at Pulaski if he advances on that place, or cover the railroad and concentrate at Columbia, should he attempt to turn your right flank. . . . War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 944. I then telegraphed General Thomas, November 20, pointing out the faulty nature of the position selected by him for the troops at Pulaski, and the danger that must be incurred in attempting to carry out his instructions to fight Hood at Pulaski if h
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