t, sir, if we are bound to act on the narrow principles contended for by the gentleman, I am wholly at a loss to conceive how he can reconcile his principles with his own practice.
The lands are, it seems, to be treated as so much treasure, and must be applied to the common benefits of all the States.
Now, if this be so, whence does he derive the right to appropriate them for partial and local objects?
How can the gentleman consent to vote away immense bodies of these lands for canals in Indiana and Illinois, to the Louisville and Portland canal, to Kenyon College in Ohio, to schools for the deaf and dumb, and other objects of a similar description?
If grants of this character can fairly be considered as made for the common benefit of all the States, it can only be because all the States are interested in the welfare of each—a principle which, carried to the full extent, destroys all distinction between local and national objects, and is certainly broad enough to embrace the princ