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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865. Search the whole document.

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24th (search for this): chapter 11
transportation? It seems to me that if the States had been called upon to furnish their quota of wagons per regiment in the field, one of these evils could have been obviated. From all accounts, Washington could have been taken up to the 24th instant, by twenty thousand men! Only think of the brilliant results we have lost by the two causes referred to! Again, we must have a few more field-officers from the old service, otherwise our regiments will get worsted sooner or later. In haon the 22d. I wrote: The want of food and transportation has made us lose all the fruits of our victory. We ought at this time, the 29th of July, to be in or about Washington, and, from all accounts, Washington could have been taken up to the 24th inst. (July), by twenty thousand men. Every news from there confirms me still more in that opinion. For several days (about one week) after the battle, I could not put my new regiments in position for want of transportation. I do not say this to
23rd (search for this): chapter 11
s, Va., July 21st, 1861. Sir,—Appreciating your services in the battle of Manassas and on several other occasions during the existing war, as affording the highest evidence of your skill as a commander, your gallantry as a soldier, and your zeal as a patriot, you are appointed to be General in the army of the Confederate States of America, and, with the consent of the Congress, will be duly commissioned accordingly. Yours, etc., Jefferson Davis. General G. T. Beauregard. On the 23d, Hunton's 8th Virginia, with three companies of cavalry, was ordered to re-occupy Leesburg, and Bonham's brigade, with Delaware Kemper's and Shields's batteries and a force of cavalry, were ordered to advance to Vienna Station, and Longstreet to Centreville. As the leading column was approaching Fairfax Court-House, Captain Terry, of Texas, a noted marksman, lowered the Federal flag by cutting the halliards with a rifle ball. This flag was sent, through General Longstreet, as a present to
August 10th (search for this): chapter 11
General Beauregard, that he did not make use of any such language to Mr. Davis. In support of the position here so positively assumed the reader is referred, first, to the fact, afterwards so thoroughly verified, that no fortifications existed then at or around Washington; none, at any rate, that could have seriously obstructed the march of our army; second, to General Beauregard's letter to Colonels Chestnut and Miles, bearing date July 29th, 1861, and to his answer to President Davis (August 10th of the same year), wherein is considered this very question of an advance upon Washington, and its feasibility, as late as the 24th of July. These letters appear in full further on in the present chapter. The fact is, that General Beauregard's whole correspondence, official and private, touching these events, confirms, in every respect, what is stated in the two letters above mentioned. Our object is not, at present, to dwell upon the causes—whatever they may have been—of our failure
July 7th, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 11
communication to the President, as a necessary preparation for probable movements of the army, had long been the subject of General Beauregard's anxious thought. As we have already seen (Chapter VI.), he had endeavored, as early as June, to collect many of the wagons he needed, and twentyfive days' rations for about twenty thousand men. Again, a little later, he caused the following order to be given to his Chief Commissary: Headquarters army of the Potomac, Manassas Junction, July 7th, 1861. Captain W. H. Fowle, Camp Pickens: Captain,—The general commanding directs that you take prompt and effective measures to provide forthwith, at your depot near these headquarters, ample provisions—including fat cattle—for twenty-five thousand men for two weeks, and that amount, at least, must be constantly maintained on land, subject to requisition, until otherwise ordered. Thomas Jordan, A. A. G. That this had not been done, at the time referred to, or at any subsequent pe<
August 1st (search for this): chapter 11
nt results we have lost by the two causes referred to! Again, we must have a few more field-officers from the old service, otherwise our regiments will get worsted sooner or later. In haste, yours truly, G. T. Beauregard. On the 1st of August he forwarded the following telegram to Colonel A. C. Myers, Assistant Quartermaster-General: Several of my brigades are entirely destitute of transportation; no advance can be made until procured. Can you not send me about one hundre The same surprise and want of knowledge expressed by President Davis, concerning the deficiency of these two departments, was also manifested—strange to say—by the QuartermasterGen-eral himself. His communication to General Beauregard, dated August 1st, establishes the almost incredible fact that the head of one of the most important of our departments did not know the state of its affairs. This was but additional evidence of improvidence and mismanagement. There was this difference, howeve
June 3rd (search for this): chapter 11
am, your friend, Jefferson Davis. The foregoing letter shows, among other things, how completely the reiterated suggestions and remonstrances and requisitions of General Beauregard concerning the necessity of supplies and transportation, had slipped President Davis's memory. We refrain from fatiguing the attention of the reader, by again placing before him the evidence and correspondence given on this subject in a preceding chapter (Chapter VI.). It is enough to say that, from the 3d of June, just after his arrival at Manassas, to the time when President Davis penned the letter given above, General Beauregard had never ceased calling his attention and that of the War Department to the vital importance of these two matters. How President Davis could possibly plead imperfect knowledge, and complain of want of timely requisitions and estimates, is more than we can understand; and we have sought in vain, in his book, for any satisfactory explanation of the matter. But General Be
July 24th (search for this): chapter 11
reader is referred, first, to the fact, afterwards so thoroughly verified, that no fortifications existed then at or around Washington; none, at any rate, that could have seriously obstructed the march of our army; second, to General Beauregard's letter to Colonels Chestnut and Miles, bearing date July 29th, 1861, and to his answer to President Davis (August 10th of the same year), wherein is considered this very question of an advance upon Washington, and its feasibility, as late as the 24th of July. These letters appear in full further on in the present chapter. The fact is, that General Beauregard's whole correspondence, official and private, touching these events, confirms, in every respect, what is stated in the two letters above mentioned. Our object is not, at present, to dwell upon the causes—whatever they may have been—of our failure to reap the fruits of that first great victory of the war. We wish merely to state that General Beauregard exonerates Mr. Davis from all re
July 29th (search for this): chapter 11
iate supplies are forwarded, in conformity with these requisitions, most serious consequences are inevitable. With much respect, your obedient servant, R. E. Lee, Lieut.-Col. C. S. A., and Chief Commissary of Army of Potomac. On the 29th of July, no satisfactory change having resulted from the foregoing communication to the President, General Beauregard wrote the following letter to Colonels Wm. P. Miles and James Chestnut, both members of the Confederate Congress, at that time, and bsunderstood them, for I never stated that we could have pursued the enemy on the evening of the 21st, or even on the 22d. I wrote: The want of food and transportation has made us lose all the fruits of our victory. We ought at this time, the 29th of July, to be in or about Washington, and, from all accounts, Washington could have been taken up to the 24th inst. (July), by twenty thousand men. Every news from there confirms me still more in that opinion. For several days (about one week) af
July 21st (search for this): chapter 11
antially to Colonel Jordan, and condemned and abandoned without being despatched, is the only order with which Mr. Davis had anything to do on the night of the 21st of July. Colonel Jordan, in the letter quoted by Mr. Davis, says: This was the only instance during Mr. Davis's stay at Manassas in which he exercised any voice as to vis (that is, an order for pursuit, modified by him, and by him deferred till the next day, at early dawn), was sent by General Beauregard, on the night of the 21st of July, . . . for a copy of which Mr. Davis is indebted to the kindness of that chivalrous gentleman, soldier, and patriot, General Bonham. Ibid. vol. i. p. 355. f the war. We wish merely to state that General Beauregard exonerates Mr. Davis from all responsibility for the failure to pursue the enemy on the night of the 21st of July. Mr. Davis did not object to such a pursuit; on the contrary, he desired it. But it was declared inexpedient, and, after discussion, Mr. Davis himself acknowle
August 23rd, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 11
of the hour. But Colonel Northrop was less open to conviction. This officer, whose want of administrative capacity was obvious to all—the President alone excepted—could not be induced to pursue any other than the inefficient, improvident course he had, thus far, so persistently followed. This fact is again brought to notice by the following extract from another communication from General Beauregard to President Davis: Headquarters 1ST corps army of the Potomac, Manassas, Va., August 23d, 1861. To His Excellency, President Jefferson Davis, etc., etc.: Dear Sir,—I have the honor to enclose you herewith a copy of the statement of provisions, etc., remaining on hand at this point and available, on the 21st instant, for the army of the Potomac, by which it will be seen that little improvement has taken place in that respect, since I last had the honor of addressing your Excellency on the subject, on the 10th instant; and that we are still as unprepared to advance or retreat, <
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