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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865. Search the whole document.

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September 11th (search for this): chapter 12
change Richmond, temporarily, for Washington and Maryland. As to a general action, he desired it, for the reason that the Federal army was yet undisciplined, while our forces, as strong in numbers as might for some time be expected, were in the full prestige of recent victory; an advantage now clearly perceptible in the occasional encounters, with or without an action, between the respective reconnoitring and foraging parties, and quite conspicuous in the affair at Lewinsville, on the 11th of September—but sure to diminish, as time elapsed, by the great increase in numbers, discipline, and armament of the opposing forces. The chronic evil—lack of transportation—had become the subject of anxious remonstrance from Captain Alexander, General Beauregard's Chief of Ordnance. With a portion of the army now at the threshold of the Federal encampments (Sept. 7th) his reserve ammunition had been more than a week awaiting transportation, for which requisition had been made on the 20th of A<
May, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 12
ing Maryland was earnestly supported by the three senior generals. Mr. Davis, however, would not agree to it. He declared that he could draw no troops from the points named, and that there were no arms in the country for new levies, if raised. This last objection, it is proper here to say, was not an insuperable one. The President should have remembered that if the Confederacy was thus deficient in armament it was because he had refused to avail himself of the offer by which, as early as May, 1861, Proposal of John Frazer & Co., set forth in Chapter V. all the arms and equipments needed for our armies could have been procured. But why should not arms have been imported, even at that time (October, 1861), when no Federal blockading squadron could have interfered with any of our plans to that effect? It is an historical fact that the blockade, though officially proclaimed in May, was only partially effectual twelve months afterwards. Was it that the President thought it too late
September 12th (search for this): chapter 12
er. Led by that singleness of purpose which guided him throughout the war, and unelated, except by a just gratification that his efforts in the cause had borne fruitful results, and had brought him heart to heart with his comrades and countrymen, he at once directed his whole care to the reorganization of the troops in the field, to the preparation for new successes, and the advancement of the strategic frontier beyond the Potomac. Throwing forward a portion of his troops, by the 12th of September, he moved his headquarters to Fairfax Court-House, in order to be nearer to his outer lines, which now stretched from Springfield, below Alexandria, on the right, to the little falls on the Potomac, above Georgetown, on the left, enclosing the Federal forces within a narrow circle, from which they made their observations and occasional sorties. For the purpose of watching our camps, and of gaining information of what transpired there, a balloon was much used by the enemy, often in the
September 7th (search for this): chapter 12
tion, between the respective reconnoitring and foraging parties, and quite conspicuous in the affair at Lewinsville, on the 11th of September—but sure to diminish, as time elapsed, by the great increase in numbers, discipline, and armament of the opposing forces. The chronic evil—lack of transportation—had become the subject of anxious remonstrance from Captain Alexander, General Beauregard's Chief of Ordnance. With a portion of the army now at the threshold of the Federal encampments (Sept. 7th) his reserve ammunition had been more than a week awaiting transportation, for which requisition had been made on the 20th of August, on the Chief Quartermaster of the army corps. These ever-recurring annoyances, resulting from the incurable inefficiency which had to be daily contended against, would have depressed and utterly discouraged a man less gifted than General Beauregard. But his activity, his energy and—we may add—his confidence in his own resources, seemed to increase wit
August 8th (search for this): chapter 12
ard advises that the army be placed under one head. President Davis invited to a conference at Fairfax Court-House. scheme of operations submitted. Generals Johnston and G. W. Smith approve it. troops in splendid fighting condition. the President objects. no reinforcements can be furnished, and no arms in the country. review of Mr. Davis's remarks on the subject. he proposes a plan for operations across the Potomac. the commanding Generals do not consider it feasible.> On the 8th of August, at General Beauregard's suggestion, Colonel Evans was ordered to move his brigade to Leesburg, and assume command of all the forces in Loudon County, the object being to protect that region against Federal incursions, about which numerous complaints were made. It was about that time that General Beauregard resolved to throw his own forces forward. He hoped, by an advance, to be able more easily to take the offensive, or draw on a battle, while the enemy was yet demoralized and undis
July 14th, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 12
one of them. What Mr. Davis says, to-day, of that conference, shows how wise and how far-seeing were Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith, in preparing the paper alluded to, which has aroused to such an extent the ire of the ex-President. General Beauregard, for one, had already had occasion to learn what light work could be made with a plan of operations verbally submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of our armies. We refer to the plan proposed, through Colonel Chestnut, on the 14th of July, 1861, before the battle of Manassas, which Mr. Davis denied having ever had any official cognizance of, because no written communication had been handed to him at the time; and because, no doubt, he was unaware that a full report of the circumstance had been drawn up by Colonel Chestnut, and was in General Beauregard's possession. And here, perhaps, the following query may find a fitting place in this review: Did Mr. Davis ever communicate to General Beauregard his official endorsement up
October, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 12
f the offer by which, as early as May, 1861, Proposal of John Frazer & Co., set forth in Chapter V. all the arms and equipments needed for our armies could have been procured. But why should not arms have been imported, even at that time (October, 1861), when no Federal blockading squadron could have interfered with any of our plans to that effect? It is an historical fact that the blockade, though officially proclaimed in May, was only partially effectual twelve months afterwards. Was it. This assertion shows how unsafe and untrustworthy Mr. Davis's memory is, and it explains, satisfactorily, we think, why it was that he would not give a place in his book to that secret report, as he is pleased to call it. If, as late as October, 1861, Mr. Davis had no arms to furnish to recruits, he had, unquestionably, at the different points designated by the three generals, troops already armed and equipped, already disciplined and drilled. These, had he been willing to favor the plan
August, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 12
ards obtained one from a private source, some defect in its construction rendered it of no avail. Anxious not to lose the present opportunities, General Beauregard now proposed to General Johnston, who had also moved his headquarters to Fairfax Court-House, a plan involving a decisive battle. General Gustavus W. Smith, General Smith had joined the Confederacy, and, upon the suggestion of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, had been commissioned as a Major-General by the War Department, August, 1861. with General Johnston's forces, was to advance and menace the Federal front, while General Beauregard, passing southward of the Occoquan, was to turn the Federal left flank and attack it with vigor; an operation resembling that subsequently made by General Jackson with brilliant success, near Richmond, in 1862, though the Confederate forces, at the time of which we write, were in a condition, both moral and material, more favorable to success in such a movement. General Johnston, howeve
t. This was followed by a recommendation, on the part of the senior generals, of seven officers for appointment as major-generals, and of eight others as brigadiers, two of whom were already in command of brigades. Towards the latter part of September General Johnston wrote to the Secretary of War, asking that either he or the President should come to Fairfax Court-House, to confer upon the subject of organization, and upon a plan for an offensive movement, which would then be submitted to y. Upon the submission of this plan to Generals Johnston and Smith, the latter at once approved it, and the former, though for some time unwilling, finally yielded his assent. President Davis arrived at Fairfax Court-House on the 30th of September, and remained there two days, at General Beauregard's headquarters. In the conferences which followed between him and Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith, he objected to the organization of the army into corps and divisions, and to the ap
June 20th, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 12
Beauregard's headquarters. In the conferences which followed between him and Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith, he objected to the organization of the army into corps and divisions, and to the appointment of major-generals, as suggested; but yielded so far as to consent to the formation of divisions and the appointment of two division-generals (Van Dorn and Longstreet) to the Army of the Potomac, Designation of General Beauregard's forces, as per orders issued by him, on the 20th of June, 1861. and two others (G. W. Smith and Jackson) to the Army of the Shenandoah. Designation of General Johnston's forces, before and after his junction with General Beauregard. This matter, which we may call a compromise, being thus settled, the plan of invading Maryland was earnestly supported by the three senior generals. Mr. Davis, however, would not agree to it. He declared that he could draw no troops from the points named, and that there were no arms in the country for new levies, if
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