r extracts from official records.
But Generals Sherman and Prentiss were not the only commanding officers surprised by Beauregard's foolish attack.
Generals Halleck, Grant, and Buell seem to have been equally unprepared for his sudden onslaught.
General Buell, with five divisions of his army, well organized and fully equipped, numbering at least thirty-seven thousand men of all arms, had left Nashville from the 15th to the 20th of March, to form a junction at his leisure with Grant at Savannah, via Columbia, Mount Pleasant, and Waynesboro.
He was delayed several days at Columbia by high water in Duck River, the bridge having been destroyed by the Confederates.
While there he first heard, on or about the 29th of March, that Grant's army had moved to Pittsburg Landing, on the left bank of the Tennessee River. General Buell resumed his march on the 31st, intending—having obtained the approval of General Halleck—to stop for cleaning up and rest at Waynesboro; he had not yet receive
lled to retire to the fortified and distant camp of Chalons, to recruit and reorganize another army, which was lost shortly afterwards at Sedan.
The left wing of the French army met with nearly the same fate.
It consisted of five corps, scattered along the frontier in advance of Metz, all under the immediate direction of the French Emperor, Napoleon III., whose headquarters were established in that fortified city.
Three Prussian corps, under General Von Steinmetz, suddenly appeared at Sarrebruck, on the Sarre River, which they crossed rapidly, and, on the 6th, surprised the 2d French corps (Frossard's) at Speicheren, where another desperate engagement ensued while awaiting the support of the other four French corps.
These arrived, however, in the vicinity only in time to be caught on the wing, and had to fall back in great haste towards Metz—in a divergent direction from McMahon's line of retreat—where they were finally surrounded, and compelled to surrender, with Marshal Bazaine