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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865. Search the whole document.

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A. R. Chisolm (search for this): chapter 9
much annoyed at the thought that it had been too long delayed to effect any substantial good. He so informed the War Department, but lost no time in communicating with General Johnston, through telegram and by means of a special messenger, Colonel Chisolm, one of his aids. The latter was instructed to say to General Johnston that there was not a moment to lose, and that all the available transportation of the Manassas Gap Railroad would be in waiting at Piedmont, to assist in conveying his troops. Colonel Chisolm carried also a proposition that at least a portion of General Johnston's forces should march by the way of Aldie, so as to assail McDowell's left flank and rear, at Centreville. But, for reasons General Johnston must have thought important, based, as he alleges, on the difficulty of directing the movements of troops so distant from each other, no action was taken by him about this suggestion. The feigned resistance and retreat from Fairfax Court-House, had had the de
Winfield Scott (search for this): chapter 9
e Colonel Chestnut was sent to Richmond. Manassas Junction, Va., July 13th, 1861. General J. E. Johnston: My dear General,—I write in haste. What a pity we cannot carry into effect the following plan of operations: That you should leave four or five thousand men to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, and unite the mass of your troops with mine. We will probably have, in a few days, about forty thousand men to operate with. This force would enable us to destroy the forces of Generals Scott and McDowell, in my front. Then we would go back with as many men as necessary to attack and disperse General Patterson's army, before he could know positively what had become of you. We could then proceed to General McClellan's theatre of war, and treat him likewise, after which we could pass over into Maryland, to operate in rear of Washington. I think this whole campaign could be completed brilliantly in from fifteen to twentyfive days. Oh, that we had but one good head to conduct
McDowell (search for this): chapter 9
neral Beauregard to General Johnston. comments upon Mr. Davis's refusal. General McDowell ordered to advance. strong demonstration against General Bonham. General with. This force would enable us to destroy the forces of Generals Scott and McDowell, in my front. Then we would go back with as many men as necessary to attack aard; which, however, the former positively declined to do. The extension of McDowell's pickets had now interrupted our underground mail, between Washington and Manm Mrs. G——, and announced, in cipher, this simple but important piece of news: McDowell has been ordered to advance to-night; confirming General Beauregard's belief aops. The news of the enemy's movement was true. On the morning of the 17th McDowell's advance was reported to be approaching; and before noon, General Bonham's piof General Johnston's forces should march by the way of Aldie, so as to assail McDowell's left flank and rear, at Centreville. But, for reasons General Johnston must
June 20th (search for this): chapter 9
t that morning from Washington, to a point on the opposite shore, by Mr. D——, from Mrs. G——, and announced, in cipher, this simple but important piece of news: McDowell has been ordered to advance to-night; confirming General Beauregard's belief as to the intended Federal movement, which was otherwise apparent to him. General Bonham was at once informed of the impending event, and directed to execute his retreat on the appearance of the enemy in force, as prescribed by the order of the 20th of June, unchanged, though issued nearly a month previously. Colonel Rhodes, at Fairfax Station, received like instructions through General Ewell, his brigade commander; and, in view of the exigency, Colonel J. L. Kemper, whose energy and efficiency had already been tested, was again detached from his command and sent to Fairfax Court-House, to provide all necessary means of transportation. During the night which followed (16th-17th July), General Beauregard sent an urgent request to Richmo
July 15th (search for this): chapter 9
ert it as an incontrovertible truth, fully proved by later events, that the President of the Confederacy, by neglecting to compel his Quarter master-General to procure the transportation which could have been easily procured, more than a month before the battle of Manassas; by refusing, as early as the 13th of June, to assent to General Beauregard's urgent request that authority should be given to concentrate our forces at the proper moment, at Manassas Junction; by again refusing, on the 15th of July, to allow him to execute his bold, offensive plans against the enemy, the certain result of which would have been the taking of Washington; that the President of the Confederacy, by thus persisting in these three lamentable errors, lost the South her independence. We write this in no spirit of detraction. But, after a lapse of more than twenty-two years, President Davis must expect to stand before the public merely on the merits of his acts and omissions. Personal friendships, which wou
18th (search for this): chapter 9
ille, says Major Barnard, United States Engineer, See his book entitled The C. S. A. and the Battle of Bull Run, p. 46. and our three right columns were directed to co-operate, on that point. We entered that place about noon of the 17th, finding the intrenchments abandoned, and every sign of a hasty retreat. Hence the loud exultation of the Federal troops, and the predictions, in the Northern journals, of the certain defeat of the Confederate army. On the morning of the next day, the 18th, the enemy was reported advancing on Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords. As the former was the only point even partially intrenched, and the latter had natural defensive advantages, General Beauregard was gratified that the attack, as he had hoped, was made there. His line now extended some five miles, from Union Mills Ford, on the right, to the stone bridge, on the left, as follows: at Union Mills Ford, Ewell's brigade, with four 12-pounder howitzers and three companies of Virginia cavalry;
17th (search for this): chapter 9
e feigned resistance and retreat from Fairfax Court-House, had had the desired effect of leading the enemy to believe in the abandonment of our position at Manassas. We had expected to encounter the enemy at Fairfax Court-House, seven miles this side of Centreville, says Major Barnard, United States Engineer, See his book entitled The C. S. A. and the Battle of Bull Run, p. 46. and our three right columns were directed to co-operate, on that point. We entered that place about noon of the 17th, finding the intrenchments abandoned, and every sign of a hasty retreat. Hence the loud exultation of the Federal troops, and the predictions, in the Northern journals, of the certain defeat of the Confederate army. On the morning of the next day, the 18th, the enemy was reported advancing on Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords. As the former was the only point even partially intrenched, and the latter had natural defensive advantages, General Beauregard was gratified that the attack, as h
June 13th (search for this): chapter 9
sighted and far-reaching a campaign as was proposed to him, is more than we can well explain. But, exercising the right which a thorough knowledge of what then transpired affords us, we assert it as an incontrovertible truth, fully proved by later events, that the President of the Confederacy, by neglecting to compel his Quarter master-General to procure the transportation which could have been easily procured, more than a month before the battle of Manassas; by refusing, as early as the 13th of June, to assent to General Beauregard's urgent request that authority should be given to concentrate our forces at the proper moment, at Manassas Junction; by again refusing, on the 15th of July, to allow him to execute his bold, offensive plans against the enemy, the certain result of which would have been the taking of Washington; that the President of the Confederacy, by thus persisting in these three lamentable errors, lost the South her independence. We write this in no spirit of detracti
16th (search for this): chapter 9
ed at headquarters by Colonel Chestnut as perfectly trustworthy, and capable of performing the delicate office of communicating with the friendly agencies we had managed to establish in Washington. He was provided with a paper, having neither signature nor address, but upon which was written the ciphered message, Trust the bearer, and with it immediately despatched to the residence of Mrs. G——, our secret emissary in the Federal capital. The result was that, at about 8 o'clock P. M., on the 16th, a sealed communication was received at headquarters, despatched by relays from General Holmes's picket line, near Eastport. It had been brought that morning from Washington, to a point on the opposite shore, by Mr. D——, from Mrs. G——, and announced, in cipher, this simple but important piece of news: McDowell has been ordered to advance to-night; confirming General Beauregard's belief as to the intended Federal movement, which was otherwise apparent to him. General Bonham was at onc
14th (search for this): chapter 9
his careful consideration. See Appendix to Chapter VIII. On the 16th of July, Colonel Chestnut, upon his return, presented his official report, containing a detailed account of his mission. So great has become the historical value of this paper, that we present it in full to the reader: Headquarters army of the Potomac, Manassas, Va., July 16th, 1861. Brigadier-General Beauregard, Commanding Army of the Potomac: Sir,—In obedience to your order, I proceeded on Sunday last, 14th instant, to Richmond, with the purpose of laying before the President, for his consideration, your views and plans for the combined operation of the two armies under the commands of General Joseph E. Johnston and yourself respectively. I arrived at Richmond at 3.30 on the same day I left your quarters, and without delay reported to the President, who, although sick in bed, received me with great kindness and cordiality. After stating to him the object of my visit, he appointed an hour to meet h
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