hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
G. T. Beauregard 3,199 167 Browse Search
Georgia (Georgia, United States) 638 0 Browse Search
Florida (Florida, United States) 544 0 Browse Search
Morris Island (South Carolina, United States) 520 4 Browse Search
Savannah (Georgia, United States) 480 26 Browse Search
Headquarters (Washington, United States) 466 0 Browse Search
J. B. Hood 382 0 Browse Search
Robert E. Lee 368 54 Browse Search
R. E. Lee 356 0 Browse Search
Comdg 353 131 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Alfred Roman, The military operations of General Beauregard in the war between the states, 1861 to 1865. Search the whole document.

Found 139 total hits in 38 results.

1 2 3 4
Norfolk (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 12
trenches. He proposed an attack upon General Grant's left flank, so as to double him up on his right and centre, while his rear should be assailed by all the cavalry that could be massed against it. General Lee at first appeared to favor the idea, but expressed some fear that the Norfolk Railroad cuts and the Second Swamp would prove too great obstacles in our way for the offensive. It was upon this point that he consulted General Mahone, who had been the civil engineer and builder of the Norfolk road, and was necessarily familiar with the country over which our forces would have to operate. General Mahone was of General Lee's opinion, and the suggested plan was not carried out. Meanwhile, and after a thorough examination of the new lines—of the Jerusalem plank road and of the Blandford ridge—General Beauregard expressed the opinion that we had better hold on, for the time being, to the line we then occupied, for the following reasons: 1st. That it kept the enemy's batteries at
John D. Young (search for this): chapter 12
alled to his assistance Major-General William Mahone, an officer in whom he reposed great confidence, and who, besides being an engineer by profession, was familiar with the topography of the country around Petersburg. See criticism by Captain John D. Young, late a commander of sharpshooters, 3d Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, as published, June 22d, 1878, in the Philadelphia Weekly Times. General Beauregard is clear and positive on this point. He says: General Lee was too good a ment, vol. II., p. 638. it is evident that he never expressed dissatisfaction as to a position he had himself selected. If, on the other hand, he did condemn the location of that new line (for which we have only the unsupported testimony of Captain Young), then Mr. Davis, who, in that respect, disagreed with General Lee, unconsciously lauds General Beauregard for the skill he there displayed; and Messrs. McCabe and Cooke lead their readers into error when they assert that the line spoken of w
neral Lee's two army corps; nor were the breastworks they would have assaulted so formidable as they are represented to be; for, though begun by General Beauregard during the night of the 17th, they were not completed until days and weeks after General Lee's arrival. Some other reason must be assigned for the inertness and comparative inactivity of the Federal army after the 18th of June, and that reason General Badeau himself finally gives in the following language: * * * Hancock and Burnside crossed the river, and then moved and manoeuvred with alacrity and skill; and the men themselves never flagged nor failed. Every one was earnest, every one did his best, till the fatal moment that lost the result which all had been striving for, which had, indeed, been absolutely attained, all but secured; when Smith, having won Petersburg, hesitated to grasp his prize. Then, indeed, when all their exertions had proved fruitless, when, having out-marched and out-manoeuvred Lee, the soldie
J. B. Kershaw (search for this): chapter 12
night and day, by officers and men, and the knowledge that they were outnumbered seven to one, make the courage and stubborn resolution there displayed truly sublime. It was a great feat in military annals. On the 15th 2200 men defending Petersburg prevented 22,000 from effecting its capture. On the evening of the 16th 10,000 men stood a successful barrier to 66,000. The same 10,000 men, on the 17th, confronted 90,000, and were not defeated. On the 18th our troops, reinforced, first by Kershaw's, then by Field's division, of General Lee's army—making an aggregate of 15,000 in the forenoon, and about 20,000 in the afternoon—not only withstood, but bloodily repulsed, the combined attack of these 90,000 men. The loss of the enemy exceeded ours in more than the proportion of his strength to ours—it was nine times greater. Indeed, it amounted to more than the number of men we had in action. In these preliminary operations against Petersburg, which may be brought together under the<
as greatly chagrined at the failure of Smith to capture Petersburg. The plan of the movement had been to take that place by surprise; and when, on the 15th, Grant ascertained that Lee was still on the northern side of the James, while Smith and Hancock were combined, with nearly forty thousand men, in front of Petersburg, A fact which even President Davis appears not to have known. he looked upon victory as assured. Even after the early success of Smith had been left unimproved, it was sti after General Lee's arrival. Some other reason must be assigned for the inertness and comparative inactivity of the Federal army after the 18th of June, and that reason General Badeau himself finally gives in the following language: * * * Hancock and Burnside crossed the river, and then moved and manoeuvred with alacrity and skill; and the men themselves never flagged nor failed. Every one was earnest, every one did his best, till the fatal moment that lost the result which all had been
Braxton Bragg (search for this): chapter 12
eans displayed consummate generalship. He made at the outset the grave mistake, which came so near being fatal, of remaining north of the James till Grant had arrived in front of Petersburg; and, even after starting from Cold Harbor, his alacrity was not conspicuous. It was not until the morning of the 18th that his principal columns again confronted the Army of the Potomac; and he himself only arrived in Petersburg on that day. General Badeau quotes General Beauregard's telegram to General Bragg, dated June 18th, wherein it appears that General Lee, in person, reached Petersburg on that day, at 11.30 A. M. It was Beauregard who saved the town. It was he who foresaw the intention of Grant, and brought the troops from Bermuda Hundreds without orders, neglecting or, rather, risking the lesser place, to secure that which was all-important; massing and strengthening the inner works on the night of the 15th, and, afterwards, holding Meade and Smith at bay, until Lee arrived in force.
G. T. Beauregard (search for this): chapter 12
late arrival of General Lee's Army. how General Beauregard saved the city. Inaction of General Mearg on that day. General Badeau quotes General Beauregard's telegram to General Bragg, dated June etersburg on that day, at 11.30 A. M. It was Beauregard who saved the town. It was he who foresaw t represented to be; for, though begun by General Beauregard during the night of the 17th, they were character. Here is again illustrated General Beauregard's military foresight. When, about mid-dter due reflection and with great care. General Beauregard's object—and he accomplished it—was to hular attack. General Lee concurred in General Beauregard's opinion, and approved his selection. nsive operations. The best proof that General Beauregard's new lines were properly located is, thed with General Lee, unconsciously lauds General Beauregard for the skill he there displayed; and Methe selection of General Lee, and not of General Beauregard. The inconsistencies of the authors o[9 more...]<
A. H. Colquitt (search for this): chapter 12
y operations against Petersburg, which may be brought together under the definition of the period of assaults, though no large action had taken place, the rolls of the army showed a loss of 15,000 men. Swinton, Army of the Potomac, p. 515. If we cannot here inscribe the names of all those who figured in that bloody drama, we may at least make mention of their commanders and of those whose untiring efforts aided them successfully to maintain their ground. Hoke, Johnson, Wise, Hagood, Colquitt, Gracie, Martin, Dearing, are names that should be remembered. To the men who fought under them the highest praise is due; and whatever of glory belongs to the former belongs also to those whose strong arms and stout hearts so effectually carried out their orders. Nor should the name of Harris, the able Engineer and fearless officer, be omitted from that list of heroes. When the war-cloud settled upon that part of Virginia, and the fate of Petersburg hung in the balance, the noble wome
ter June 18th. General Meade intrenches. what General Badeau says of the failure to capture Petersburg. hisl Meade's Army. erroneous explanation of it by General Badeau. General Beauregard's comprehension of the depHistory of Ulysses S. Grant (vol. II., p. 372) General Badeau uses the following language: The General-inself only arrived in Petersburg on that day. General Badeau quotes General Beauregard's telegram to Generalto point out a palpable omission on the part of General Badeau. On the 20th of June, after the arrival of G000 men; and the wearied veterans alluded to by General Badeau had undergone no such fatigue as General Beaureal army after the 18th of June, and that reason General Badeau himself finally gives in the following languagetion of our men, would be all in our favor; and General Badeau's and Mr. Swinton's admissions now show the cord probably have had a different termination. General Badeau reports General Grant as having said, at ten o'
William Butler (search for this): chapter 12
pture of the place before Lee's entire army could arrive. The assaults of the 16th, 17th, and 18th were all made with this idea; for if the rebels were not at once dislodged, it was apparent that a long and tedious siege must follow; in fact, a new series of combinations would become necessary, and a chilling disappointment fall upon the spirit of the North. Every effort was therefore made south of the Appomattox; and when an unexpected opportunity was offered in front of Bermuda Hundreds, Butler was urged again and again to hold what he had acquired, and even to retake the position, after it had slipped from his grasp. He seemed, indeed, to appreciate the importance of his prize, but did not succeed in retaining it, and, at the end of three days, the rebels again held the railway between Petersburg and Richmond, and all the great avenues connecting the Confederacy and its capital were in their control. But, if the well-laid plans of the National commander had thus been doubly a
1 2 3 4