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2nd (search for this): chapter 123
some were so distant, Sedgwick's in particular, that it did not arrive on the field until sundown of the second of July, after having marched thirty-five miles. General Meade did not himself reach the field until one o'clock on the morning of the second, long after the first day's fight had been brought to a close. On the second of July, 1863, that portion of the army that was on the field was placed in a defensive position, but General Meade had so little assurance in his own ability to maintain himself, or in the strength of his position, that when the rebels partially broke our line in the afternoon of the second, he directed me to collect what cavalry I could and prepare to cover the retreat of the army; and I was thus engaged until twelve o'clock that night. I mention this fact now, because when I was before your honorable Committee, and was asked the question, whether General Meade ever had any idea of retreating from Gettysburg, I answered that I did not remember; the above
12th (search for this): chapter 123
omac at Falling Water. Every military reason demanded that the rebels should be immediately attacked; for after the three days heavy fighting at Gettysburg, it was a moderate conclusion to arrive at, that the rebels were short of ammunition and could not sustain a protracted fight. General Lee admitted this afterward in his official report, and expected to be attacked; when he says, our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition, and again, the enemy in force reached our front on the twelfth. A position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Water, and an attack was awaited during that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity, the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines. The army of the Potomac having had all its wants supplied since the battle of Gettysburg, and with the prestige of that battle, was eager for the fight, and was in good condition for it. Here General Meade a
17th (search for this): chapter 123
in command of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac, and made a Major-General of volunteers, after the battle of Chancellorsville, and the campaign of Gettysburg began by my attacking the rebel cavalry at Beverly ford on the Rappahannock river, on the ninth of June, 1863. The rebels were defeated, and very important information was obtained relative to their proposed invasion of Pennsylvania, upon which General Hooker acted immediately, and moved his army toward Maryland. On the seventeenth, the nineteenth and the twenty-first of June, 1863, I attacked the rebels at Aldie, at Middleburg and Upperville, with such success, that General Lee abandoned his design of crossing the Potomac at Poolesville, and moved the bulk of his army to Hagerstown, by the way of Williamsport, and from thence to Chambersburg. When our army had arrived at Frederick City, General Hooker was relieved from the command and General Meade was assigned in his place. General Hooker left the army in fine c
20th (search for this): chapter 123
sent in pursuit, and which did good service in compelling Price to keep his command together, and so save the country from being badly pillaged. All other troops that could possibly take the field were prepared to do so, and by the sixteenth of October a cavalry force of seven thousand men and eight pieces of artillery, including the force that was sent in pursuit of Price, was organized and on the march. I assumed the command of this force, and by forced marches came to Lexington on the twentieth, out of which place Price had driven General Curtis' troops, under General Blunt, that morning. I pushed on the next day to the Little Blue, engaged Price's troops, captured two pieces of cannon, and drover them back to the Big Blue, through Independence. While this was going on, General Price with part of his force attacked Major-General Curtis, who had a force of twenty thousand men and thirty-two pieces of artillery, and drove him to Westport, in Kansas, Curtis losing one of his gun
25th (search for this): chapter 123
ding Department of Kansas, joined me, and proposed, as my command had done so much hard fighting, that he should take the advance. To this I assented, when Curtis, after marching for a day in front, on finding Price had halted on the Osage river, in position to give battle, requested me to take the advance and attack Price. I, therefore, moved immediately with my command to the front, and continued my march all night of the twenty-fourth of October, and at daylight on the morning of the twenty-fifth, I surprised Price in his camp, and drove him from it, and by a series of heavy engagements throughout the day, captured eight pieces of artillery, several standards, one majorgeneral, one brigadier-general, four colonels, and many subordinate officers, and fifteen hundred men. besides a large number of wagons, beefcattle, sheep, &c., Price's force becoming demoralized and retreating rapidly, throwing away their arms and other property that encumbered them. I regret to add that Major-G
April 30th (search for this): chapter 123
Chancellorsville. The brilliant success of these preparatory movements, I was under the impression, gave General Hooker an undue confidence as to his being master of the situation, and all the necessary steps were not taken on his arrival at Chancellorsville to ensure complete success. The country around Chanoellorsville was too cramped to admit of our whole army being properly developed there, and two corps, the Eleventh and Twelfth, should have been thrown, on the night of the thirtieth of April, to Spottsylvania Court-House, with orders to intrench, while the remainder of the army should have been disposed so as to support them. This would have compelled General Lee to attack our whole force, or retire with his flank exposed — a dangerous operation in war — or else, remain in position, and receive the attack of Sedgwick in rear and Hooker in front; a still worse dilemma. In the third day's fight at Chancellorsville, General Hooker was badly stunned by the concussion of a
July (search for this): chapter 123
epest mortification throughout the country. The doubt, hesitation, and fear of consequences displayed by General Meade was in striking contrast to the heroic valor so constantly and stubbornly exhibited by the army. Never did the cavalry, though few in numbers for the labors assigned them, perform more brilliant and successful deeds of arms than those which, after the battle of Gettysburg, brought to bay a shattered, baffled and beaten army at Falling Waters, on the banks of the Potomao, in July, 18631 The army was eager for the attack, they knew the end of the rebellion was within their grasp but their commander, General Meade, receiving no inspiration from their genius, only held them back until the enemy had escaped. The same fear of consequences which animated General Meade, caused the army to fall back from Culpepper to Centreville, in the fall of 1863, when the rebels advanced and took from the campaign of Gettysburg whatever might have been claimed for it on the score of gene
July 2nd (search for this): chapter 123
de was seventeen miles off, at Tarrytown, leisurely planning a line of battle on some obscure creek in another direction; when he was aroused by a despatch from Buford through me, stating that Reynolds was killed, the field was becoming disordered, and if he expected to save it the army must be moved up at once. The different again corps were then directed to march on Gettysburg, but some were so distant, Sedgwick's in particular, that it did not arrive on the field until sundown of the second of July, after having marched thirty-five miles. General Meade did not himself reach the field until one o'clock on the morning of the second, long after the first day's fight had been brought to a close. On the second of July, 1863, that portion of the army that was on the field was placed in a defensive position, but General Meade had so little assurance in his own ability to maintain himself, or in the strength of his position, that when the rebels partially broke our line in the afternoon
September 17th (search for this): chapter 123
east three miles from where my command was, without any troops being between us, and with Antietam creek, which was not fordable, behind us. Fitz John Porter's corps was behind my position, a mile and a half on the opposite sided of Antietam creek, as a reserve, but it was never brought into action except in small squads. Notwithstanding the disadvantages our army labored under from these arrangements, a decisive victory could have been won at four o'clock on the afternoon of the seventeenth of September, if a strong attack had been made on Sharpsburg from our centre. My command had cleared the enemy from my front, and were in high spirits, while the stubborn fighting of the army generally had told fearfully upon the rebels. I therefore recommended this attack, and requested to be permitted to take the initiative in it. The proposition was not approved and I was directed to hold the position I then had. The enemy were then so far off, falling back, my guns could not reach them, an
October 16th (search for this): chapter 123
efferson City would be lost, ordered me to proceed to that place, and take command of all the forces in that vicinity. I arrived in time to see Price move off, and immediately organized a cavalry force of about four thousand men, with a battery, which was sent in pursuit, and which did good service in compelling Price to keep his command together, and so save the country from being badly pillaged. All other troops that could possibly take the field were prepared to do so, and by the sixteenth of October a cavalry force of seven thousand men and eight pieces of artillery, including the force that was sent in pursuit of Price, was organized and on the march. I assumed the command of this force, and by forced marches came to Lexington on the twentieth, out of which place Price had driven General Curtis' troops, under General Blunt, that morning. I pushed on the next day to the Little Blue, engaged Price's troops, captured two pieces of cannon, and drover them back to the Big Blue, thr
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