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12th (search for this): chapter 18
ook to avoid the enemy's main body, was about one hundred and seventy-five miles. That part of Tennessee, although no longer a newly settled country, abounded in forests and streams difficult to cross. The nights were getting cold, the roads were bad, and the entire country open to raids of the Confederate cavalry. We succeeded in making our way through Smith's Crossroads, Prestonville, and Kingston, to Lenoir's Station, and thence by rail to Knoxville, where we arrived late at night on the 12th. Calling at once on Burnside, we spent most of the night and the next day in conference with him and his generals. Early on the morning of the 14th we started on our return trip, and, riding around the head of Longstreet's column, reached Chattanooga without accident or delay by the night of the 17th. Dana sent two telegrams from Knoxville to Stanton, and three from Chattanooga, while I sent one to Grant, giving a full statement of the situation as we found it in east Tennessee. It was Da
29th (search for this): chapter 18
Sherman at Charleston, on the Hiwassee River, two days from Chattanooga. Thenceforth we were constantly with the advance-guard, doing all in our power to hurry the march. Our route traversed Athens, Philadelphia, Morgantown, and Marysville, all the way through a beautiful country, well supplied with cattle and provisions. Long's cavalry reached Knoxville at 3 A. M., December 4th, but we were delayed till late the next afternoon. Meanwhile the enemy, after suffering a bloody repulse on the 29th, had raised the siege and marched away to the north the next day. He had, of course, been advised of Sherman's coming, but as the relieving march was necessarily slow, he had ample start to make it difficult, if not impossible, to overtake him. In addition to taking an active part in all the operations, Dana, by his despatches, as usual kept the government informed as to the incidents of the march, the construction of the bridges, the movements of the various infantry corps and divisions,
October 29th (search for this): chapter 18
He had but a poor opinion of Hooker at best, and neither the incident at Stevenson nor our report had diminished his anxiety. We had done all we could to convince Hooker that he was in danger, as had Hazen, who was in command at the bridge-head, but Grant sent no further orders, and Hooker did not move. The temptation was too great for the enemy, and the consequence was the bloody affair of Wauhatchie, which took place between midnight and four o'clock next morning, Dana to Stanton, October 29th and 30th. at the cost of several hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. The next morning Dana and I rode with Grant and Thomas into Lookout Valley, where we met Hooker, Howard, and Geary. The meeting, as may well be imagined, deepened Grant's mistrust of Hooker, and resulted, as soon as he got back to headquarters, in a despatch from Dana to Stanton, dated that day, October 29, 1863-1 P. M., which runs as follows: General Grant desires me to request for him that Lieutenant
October 30th (search for this): chapter 18
poor opinion of Hooker at best, and neither the incident at Stevenson nor our report had diminished his anxiety. We had done all we could to convince Hooker that he was in danger, as had Hazen, who was in command at the bridge-head, but Grant sent no further orders, and Hooker did not move. The temptation was too great for the enemy, and the consequence was the bloody affair of Wauhatchie, which took place between midnight and four o'clock next morning, Dana to Stanton, October 29th and 30th. at the cost of several hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. The next morning Dana and I rode with Grant and Thomas into Lookout Valley, where we met Hooker, Howard, and Geary. The meeting, as may well be imagined, deepened Grant's mistrust of Hooker, and resulted, as soon as he got back to headquarters, in a despatch from Dana to Stanton, dated that day, October 29, 1863-1 P. M., which runs as follows: General Grant desires me to request for him that Lieutenant-Colonel J. H
November (search for this): chapter 18
en communicated to me by Rawlins and Dana in response to the appeal I was making at the time to secure promotion for Porter. My promotion, to take effect from the date of its recommendation, came in due time, but, for reasons which I never ascertained, Grant's request for the removal of Hooker and Slocum from his command was not granted, and this is specially noticeable for the reason that such requests through Dana were generally complied with promptly enough. During the first week of November Bragg detached a part of his force, and it was correctly surmised that this was for the purpose of co-operating with other Confederate forces in an effort to drive Burnside out of east Tennessee. Grant therefore became anxious to know the actual condition of affairs in Burnside's department, and concluded to send Dana and myself to ascertain, with discretionary authority to issue orders in his name, should it become necessary to secure compliance with such suggestions as we might think bes
November 9th (search for this): chapter 18
is force, and it was correctly surmised that this was for the purpose of co-operating with other Confederate forces in an effort to drive Burnside out of east Tennessee. Grant therefore became anxious to know the actual condition of affairs in Burnside's department, and concluded to send Dana and myself to ascertain, with discretionary authority to issue orders in his name, should it become necessary to secure compliance with such suggestions as we might think best to make. We started November 9th, with an escort consisting of one troop of cavalry. The distance to Knoxville, by the route we took to avoid the enemy's main body, was about one hundred and seventy-five miles. That part of Tennessee, although no longer a newly settled country, abounded in forests and streams difficult to cross. The nights were getting cold, the roads were bad, and the entire country open to raids of the Confederate cavalry. We succeeded in making our way through Smith's Crossroads, Prestonville, and
November 18th (search for this): chapter 18
force. He had constructed a bridge across the Holston for that purpose, and appeared to think it would be a pity not to use it. As this movement would have left the road to Knoxville open to the advancing columns of the enemy, and might easily, in the presence of such a leader as Longstreet, have ended in the capture of Burnside and his whole force, we united in earnest remonstrance against the suggestion. It was in allusion to this foolish project that Dana, in his despatch of 12 M., November 18th, said: Parke argued against this idea in vain, but finally General Wilson overcame it by representing that Grant did not wish him to include the capture of his entire army among the elements of his plan of operations. Dana's despatches, as published in the Official Records, will well repay the military student by the light they cast upon the difficulty which is frequently encountered in controlling the operations of a widely separated but cooperating army or army corps. The
November 23rd (search for this): chapter 18
of the battle that Bragg was moving troops to his right against Sherman, and it was to prevent an overwhelming concentration of the enemy on that flank that Grant first mildly suggested that the time had come, and an hour later positively ordered Thomas to make a diversion from his front in Sheridan's favor by advancing his line against the enemy's rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge. It should be remembered that all the marching and skirmishing on the first day of the battle, November 23d, was for position, and that Dana, in his despatches of 7.30 P. M. of that day, said: Grant has given orders for a vigorous attack at daybreak by Sherman on the left, and Granger [commanding a corps of Thomas's army] in the centre, and if Bragg does not withdraw the remainder of his troops, we shall have a decisive battle. It is to be specially noted that Sherman's attack was neither delivered on time nor was it successful, that it did not commence till after 9 A. M., and that Gr
November 26th (search for this): chapter 18
ss service of a field-gun close to headquarters, greatly to the annoyance of Grant, and finally that this incident, trivial as it was, became the first step towards Granger's undoing. It convinced Grant that the Marshal Ney of the army, as Dana had styled him, was a trifler instead of a great soldier, and it was well known at the time to Rawlins and myself that it produced the same effect upon Dana. With these facts well in mind, it is easy to understand that part of Dana's despatch of November 26th-10 A. M., in which, referring to the final attack at the battle of Missionary Ridge, he says: The storming of the Ridge by our troops was one of the greatest miracles in military history. No man that climbs the ascent by any of the roads that wind along its front can believe that eighteen thousand men were moved up its broken and crumbling face, unless it was his fortune to witness the deed. It seems as awful as the visible interposition of God. Neither Grant nor Thomas intended
November 29th (search for this): chapter 18
hered to that view. They either failed to consult Dana's despatches to the Secretary of War, or deliberately ignored them in favor of their own misconceptions. It may be safely added that history, and especially military history, is far too frequently written in that way. The military student will find a brief but accurate summary of the remainder of this campaign in Dana's despatches. He was personally present with General Grant in his visits to the various parts of the army up to November 29th, on which day he left Chattanooga again with me for Knoxville. I had been sent to act as chief engineer to the forces detached for the relief of Burnside. Grant had pushed Bragg back from Missionary Ridge towards Resaca and Atlanta, thus separating him hopelessly from Longstreet and rendering effective co-operation between them henceforth impossible. But Longstreet had shut Burnside up and was closely besieging him in Knoxville. The emergency was a pressing one, and in designating G
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