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Browsing named entities in a specific section of C. Edwards Lester, Life and public services of Charles Sumner: Born Jan. 6, 1811. Died March 11, 1874.. Search the whole document.

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islation of Congress in pursuance thereof. I. And now for the true relations of the National Government to Slavery. These will be readily apparent, if we do not neglect well-established principles. If Slavery be national, if there be any power in the National Government to uphold this institution—as in the recent Slave Act—it must be by virtue of the Constitution. Nor can it be by mere inference, implication, or conjecture. According to the uniform admission of courts and jurists in Europe, again and again promulgated in our country, Slavery can be derived only from clear and special recognition. The state of Slavery, said Lord Mansfield, pronouncing judgment in the great case of Somersett, is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons moral or political, but only by positive law. It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law. And a slaveholding tribunal,—the Supreme Court of Mississippi,—adopting the same princi
United States (United States) (search for this): chapter 29
V. The relations of the Government of the United States—I speak of the National Government—to Slavery, though plain and obvious, are constantly misunderstood. A popular belief at this moment makes Slavery a national institution, and, of course, renders its support a national duty. The extravagance of this error can hardly be surpassed. An institution, which our fathers most carefully omitted to name in the Constitution, which, according to the debates in the Convention, they refused to cover with any sanction, and which, at the original organization of the Government, was merely sectional, existing nowhere on the national territory, is now, above all other things, blazoned as national. Its supporters plume themselves as national. The old political parties, while upholding it, claim to be national. A National Whig is simply a Slavery Whig, and a National Democrat is simply a Slavery Democrat, in contradistinction to all who regard Slavery as a sectional institution, within
ding tribunal,—the Supreme Court of Mississippi,—adopting the same principle, has said: Slavery is condemned by reason, and the laws of nature. It exists and can exist only through municipal regulations.—(Harry v. Decker, Walker R. 42.) And another slave-holding tribunal,—the Supreme Court of Kentucky,— has said: We view this as a right existing by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature or the unwritten and common law.—(Rankin v. Lydia, 2 Marshall, 470.) Of course every power to uphold Slavery must have an origin as distinct as that of Slavery itself. Every presumption must be as strong against such a power as against Slavery. A power so peculiar and offensive—so hostile to reason—so repugnant to the law of nature and the inborn Rights of Man; which despoils its victims of the fruits of their labor; which substitutes concubinage for marriage; which abrogates the relation of parent and child; which, by a denial of educ
ronouncing judgment in the great case of Somersett, is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons moral or political, but only by positive law. It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law. And a slaveholding tribunal,—the Supreme Court of Mississippi,—adopting the same principle, has said: Slavery is condemned by reason, and the laws of nature. It exists and can exist only through municipal regulations.—(Harry v. Decker, Walker R. 42.) And another slave-holding tribunal,—the Supreme Court of Kentucky,— has said: We view this as a right existing by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature or the unwritten and common law.—(Rankin v. Lydia, 2 Marshall, 470.) Of course every power to uphold Slavery must have an origin as distinct as that of Slavery itself. Every presumption must be as strong against such a power as against Slavery. A power so peculiar and offensiv
field, pronouncing judgment in the great case of Somersett, is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons moral or political, but only by positive law. It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law. And a slaveholding tribunal,—the Supreme Court of Mississippi,—adopting the same principle, has said: Slavery is condemned by reason, and the laws of nature. It exists and can exist only through municipal regulations.—(Harry v. Decker, Walker R. 42.) And another slave-holding tribunal,—the Supreme Court of Kentucky,— has said: We view this as a right existing by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature or the unwritten and common law.—(Rankin v. Lydia, 2 Marshall, 470.) Of course every power to uphold Slavery must have an origin as distinct as that of Slavery itself. Every presumption must be as strong against such a power as against Slavery. A power so peculiar and
Thomas Browne (search for this): chapter 29
the power of Slavery. According to a curious tradition of the French language, Louis XIV., the grand monarch, by an accidental error of speech, among supple courtiers, changed the gender of a noun; but Slavery has done more. It has changed word for word. It has taught men to say national instead of sectional, and sectional instead of national. Slavery national! Sir, this is all a mistake and absurdity, fit to take a place in some new collection of Vulgar Errors, by some other Sir Thomas Browne, with the ancient but exploded stories, that the toad had a stone in its head, and that ostriches digest iron. According to the true spirit of the Constitution, and the sentiments of the Fathers, Slavery and not Freedom is sectional, while Freedom and not Slavery is national. On this unanswerable proposition I take my stand, and here commences my argument. The subject presents itself under two principal heads: first, the true relations of the National Government to Slavery, wherein i