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Browsing named entities in James Russell Soley, Professor U. S. Navy, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, The blockade and the cruisers (ed. Clement Anselm Evans).

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s accompanied, or rather induced, by improvements in ordnance, especially by the introduction of rifled guns in Europe and of the heavy cast-iron smooth-bores of Dahlgren in America. Both these improvements, however, were of recent date. The first successful employment of rifled cannon in actual war was made by the French in the Italian campaign of 1859; while the heavy Dahlgren guns had hardly been ten years in use, and were still undergoing development. In regard to the ram, though seemingly a paradox, it may be said that its employment in naval warfare was so ancient that in 1861 it was really a new weapon. Its revival was a direct consequence ofels, the 32 pounder, which was simply a development of the 18s and 24s of 1812, and the Viii-inch shell-gun were still the usual guns. Since 1850, the powerful Dahlgren smooth-bore shell-guns had been introduced, and the new steam-frigates and sloops were armed with them. The Ix-inch guns of this description were mounted in bro
material that injures a service, as its elevation by an iron rule of promotion, and the enforced subordination of more capable men. As the Secretary of the Navy in 1855 tersely put it, It is neither more nor less than elevating the incompetent, and then ordering the unpromoted competent to do their work. It became evident, shoratan and Susquehanna, at the time they were launched, in 1850, were the most efficient naval vessels afloat. Next came the six screw-frigates, which were built in 1855, and were regarded all the world over as the model men-of-war of the period. Of these the largest was the Niagara. The other five, the Roanoke, Colorado, Merrimasissippi as brilliant and successful as any in the war. In the construction of the new ships-of-war, no attempt was made to reproduce the fine screw-frigates of 1855, as they failed to show their usefulness, except perhaps at Port Royal and at Fort Fisher. The Colorado could not be got over the bar, when Farragut went up to Ne
unknown in the service; and iron armor was still an experiment. The modifications of the past fifteen years had accustomed men's minds to the idea that considerable changes would gradually take place; but none foresaw or were prepared for the tremendous development that was wrought in four years of actual fighting. Modern naval warfare was therefore almost a new art to the officers that were called in 1861 into active service. The long period of profound peace that followed the wars of Napoleon had been broken only by the war with Mexico in 1846, the Crimean War in 1854, and the Franco-Austrian War in 1859. None of these was marked by naval operations on any important scale, and such operations as there were indicated but faintly the coming development. In the contest with Mexico, steamers were used in war for the first time; but the enemy was so destitute of naval resources that their overwhelming importance was not fully recognized. The operations of the navy were confined to
July, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 2
hips on the Atlantic coast. It was a striking illustration of the improvidence of naval legislation and administration, that in a country of thirty millions of people only a couple of hundred were at the disposal of the Navy Department. Seamen could not be had either to man the slips that might be commissioned, or to protect the exposed stations at Annapolis and Norfolk. Prompt measures were taken during the first year to increase the force; and later, a great expansion took place. In July, 1863, there were 34,000 men in the service. But at all times there was a difficulty in obtaining trained seamen. Large bounties were offered by State and local authorities for enlistment in the army, and transfers between the two services were not authorized by law. When the draft was established, mariners were subjected to it like other citizens, without any regard to the service which they would prefer, or for which they might be specially fitted. In assigning the quotas to each locality,
ullest capacity. Worst of all, there were no raw materials, except the timber that was standing in the forests. The cost of iron was enormous, and toward the end of the war it was hardly to be had at any price. Under these circumstances, no general plan of naval policy on a large scale could be carried out; and the conflict on the Southern side became a species of partisan, desultory warfare. A Navy Department had been established by an act of the Provisional Congress on February 21. Mallory, who had been Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs in the United States Senate, was appointed Secretary of the Navy. In matters relating to ordnance and armor, the leading spirit at the Department was Commander Brooke, who was afterward Chief of Bureau. As early as the 15th of March an appropriation of one million dollars was made for the construction or purchase of ten steam-gunboats. The Administration made tremendous efforts to create a navy; but in spite of the greatest persev
a motive power had become established, the early side-wheelers were built,—first the Mississippi and Missouri, and later the Powhatan, Susquehanna, and Saranac. The Powhatan and Susquehanna, at the time they were launched, in 1850, were the most efficient naval vessels afloat. Next came the six screw-frigates, which were built in 1855, and were regarded all the world over as the model men-of-war of the period. Of these the largest was the Niagara. The other five, the Roanoke, Colorado, Merrimac, Minnesota, and Wabash, were vessels of a little over three thousand tons, and they carried, for their day, a powerful battery. Again, in 1858, twelve screw-sloops of two classes were built, most of which were admirable vessels, though they were wanting, with a few exceptions, in the important quality of speed. The first class, vessels of about two thousand tons, included the Lancaster, Hartford, Richmond, Brooklyn, and Pensacola. The second class, of which the Pawnee and Iroquois were t
n and repair of machinery. There were not more than eight of these of any considerable size; and, in the sudden demand for locomotives and transports for the army and for marine engines for the navy, they were strained to the utmost. Five distinct measures were immediately adopted for the increase of the naval force. The first was to buy everything afloat that could be made of service. Purchases were made directly by the Department, or by officers acting under its direction. By the 1st of July, twelve steamers had been bought, and nine were employed under charter. Subsequently it appeared that the business of purchasing, being a purely mercantile matter, might be suitably placed in the hands of a business man, who should act as the responsible agent of the Department in conducting the transactions. This plan was adopted in July. Each purchase was inspected by a board of officers, and in this way the Department was enabled to secure, as far as any such were to be found, suita
William Smith (search for this): chapter 2
uelot News of the loss of the Ashuelot is received as this volume is going to press. and Monocacy still represent this class in the service The fifth and last measure for the increase of the naval force was the construction of ironclads. Congress had passed, at the extra session in August, an appropriation of a million and a half dollars for armored vessels, to be built upon plans approved by a board of officers. The board was composed of three of the ablest captains in the service, Smith, Paulding, and Davis. Out of a large number of plans proposed, three were selected by the board and ordered by the Department. Upon these plans were built the New Ironsides, the Galena, and the Monitor. Most of the measures, as outlined above, refer to the first year of the war; but these five types of vessels, converted merchantmen, sloops, gunboats, double-enders, and ironclads, represent the additions to the sea-going navy during the four years. There was also an immense liver fleet,
February 21st (search for this): chapter 2
yed to its fullest capacity. Worst of all, there were no raw materials, except the timber that was standing in the forests. The cost of iron was enormous, and toward the end of the war it was hardly to be had at any price. Under these circumstances, no general plan of naval policy on a large scale could be carried out; and the conflict on the Southern side became a species of partisan, desultory warfare. A Navy Department had been established by an act of the Provisional Congress on February 21. Mallory, who had been Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs in the United States Senate, was appointed Secretary of the Navy. In matters relating to ordnance and armor, the leading spirit at the Department was Commander Brooke, who was afterward Chief of Bureau. As early as the 15th of March an appropriation of one million dollars was made for the construction or purchase of ten steam-gunboats. The Administration made tremendous efforts to create a navy; but in spite of the gre
March 4th (search for this): chapter 2
he fleet had been intentional, it could not have been more effectual. Of the forty steamers included in the general list, five were unserviceable, two of them being still on the stocks, and the others useless except as receiving-ships. Two more were mere tugs, and, together with the Michigan, stationed on the lakes, may be thrown out of the calculation. Eight others, including the five frigates, were laid up in ordinary. There remained twenty-four steamers, whose disposition on the 4th of March was as follows: *** Class.Name.Station. One screw-frigateNiagaraReturning from Japan. Five screw-sloops (1st class).San JacintoCoast of Africa. LancasterPacific. BrooklynHome Squadron (Pensacola). HartfordEast Indies. RichmondMediterranean. Three side-wheel steamersSusquehanna.Mediterranean. PowhatanHome Squadron (returning from VeraCruz). SaranacPacific. Eight screw-sloops (2d class).MohicanCoast of Africa. NarragansettPacific. IroquoisMediterranean. PawneeWashington. Wy
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