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Browsing named entities in James Russell Soley, Professor U. S. Navy, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, The blockade and the cruisers (ed. Clement Anselm Evans).

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the failure of preparation during peace, when plans could be matured, and materials accumulated at leisure, compelled, when the time of action came, a hurried and lavish expenditure. Great as was the task before the United States Government in preparing for a naval war, it was as nothing to that of the enemy. The latter had at his disposal a small number of trained officers imbued with the same ideas, and brought up in the same school, as their opponents. Some of these, like Buchanan, Semmes, Brown, Maffitt, and Brooke, were men of extraordinary professional qualities; but except in its officers, the Confederate Government had nothing in the shape of a navy. It had not a single ship-of-war. It had no abundant fleet of merchant-vessels in its ports from which to draw reserves. It had no seamen, for its people were not given to seafaring pursuits. Its only shipyards were Norfolk and Pensacola. Norfolk, with its immense supplies of ordnance and equipments, was indeed invaluabl
ut's fleet some annoyance. At Mobile the Tennessee, under the gallant Buchanan, fought almost single-handed the whole fleet, only to be captured after a heroic defence. At Savannah, the Atlanta was captured almost as soon as she appeared. Charleston was never able to make more than a raid or two. on the blockading force. The Albemarle maintained herself for six months in the waters of North Carolina, but she was blockaded in the Roanoke River, and was finally destroyed by the daring of Cushing. Finally the Merrimao, which was lost through our own shortcomings, had a brilliant but brief career in Hampton Roads. These isolated attempts comprised, together with the exploits of the cruisers, the sum of the naval operations on the Southern side; Viewed in the light of the difficulties to be met by the Confederate navy, they were little less than phenomenal. But as forming a standard of comparison for future wars, or for the strength of future enemies, they are hardly to be consi
L. M. Goldsborough (search for this): chapter 2
r which only a few vessels were needed. For strictly naval warfare, where ships-of-war measured themselves against each other, the South was never able to accumulate a sufficient force. Old vessels were altered, new vessels were built at different points, and some of them were for a time successful, or at least did not yield without a hard struggle; but there was no possibility, except perhaps for a time on the Mississippi, of sustained or concerted action. The naval force that opposed Goldsborough in the Sounds was pitifully weak, as was that which Dupont found at Port Royal. Little more could be said of the squadron at New Orleans, though the ironclad Mississippi, if accident and mismanagement had not delayed her commission, might have given Farragut's fleet some annoyance. At Mobile the Tennessee, under the gallant Buchanan, fought almost single-handed the whole fleet, only to be captured after a heroic defence. At Savannah, the Atlanta was captured almost as soon as she appea
o, steamers were used in war for the first time; but the enemy was so destitute of naval resources that their overwhelming importance was not fully recognized. The operations of the navy were confined to the attack of imperfectly-fortified points on the seaboard, and to blockading a country that had no commercial importance. The Crimean War advanced a step farther. The destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, in 1853, showed the effectiveness of horizontal shell-firing, as invented by Paixhans, while the success of the French ironclads at Kinburn led the way to the practice of casing ships-of-war in armor. In 1858 experiments were made at Portsmouth with the Erebus and Meteor, two lightly-armored floating batteries; and these were followed, in France and in England, by the Gloire and the Warrior, veritable ironclad cruisers. But the new system was still in its experimental stage; and it was left to the war of 1861 to show clearly its practical value. The application of armor
he extra session in August, an appropriation of a million and a half dollars for armored vessels, to be built upon plans approved by a board of officers. The board was composed of three of the ablest captains in the service, Smith, Paulding, and Davis. Out of a large number of plans proposed, three were selected by the board and ordered by the Department. Upon these plans were built the New Ironsides, the Galena, and the Monitor. Most of the measures, as outlined above, refer to the firstion. The steam-battery Fulton was seized at Pensacola, and $25,000 were appropriated to complete and equip her. The Merrimac was presently raised at Norfolk, and found to have no serious injury. Encouragement was given to private enterprise, by Davis's immediate adoption of the plan of issuing letters-of-marque. It was recognized that one of the most vulnerable points on the Union side lay in its commerce; and it was against commerce alone that the insurgent navy throughout the war was able
Hiram Paulding (search for this): chapter 2
News of the loss of the Ashuelot is received as this volume is going to press. and Monocacy still represent this class in the service The fifth and last measure for the increase of the naval force was the construction of ironclads. Congress had passed, at the extra session in August, an appropriation of a million and a half dollars for armored vessels, to be built upon plans approved by a board of officers. The board was composed of three of the ablest captains in the service, Smith, Paulding, and Davis. Out of a large number of plans proposed, three were selected by the board and ordered by the Department. Upon these plans were built the New Ironsides, the Galena, and the Monitor. Most of the measures, as outlined above, refer to the first year of the war; but these five types of vessels, converted merchantmen, sloops, gunboats, double-enders, and ironclads, represent the additions to the sea-going navy during the four years. There was also an immense liver fleet, composed
preparation during peace, when plans could be matured, and materials accumulated at leisure, compelled, when the time of action came, a hurried and lavish expenditure. Great as was the task before the United States Government in preparing for a naval war, it was as nothing to that of the enemy. The latter had at his disposal a small number of trained officers imbued with the same ideas, and brought up in the same school, as their opponents. Some of these, like Buchanan, Semmes, Brown, Maffitt, and Brooke, were men of extraordinary professional qualities; but except in its officers, the Confederate Government had nothing in the shape of a navy. It had not a single ship-of-war. It had no abundant fleet of merchant-vessels in its ports from which to draw reserves. It had no seamen, for its people were not given to seafaring pursuits. Its only shipyards were Norfolk and Pensacola. Norfolk, with its immense supplies of ordnance and equipments, was indeed invaluable; but though t
March 10th, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 2
reflection upon their good qualities, it may be said that their efficiency would have been increased by a previous military training. But no attempt had ever been made to form a reserve for the navy; and the administration was fortunate when it secured any nautical experience, although military training might be wholly wanting. Great as was the want of officers, the want of trained seamen was equally great. The complement of the navy had been fixed at 7,600. Of these there were on March 10, 1861, only 207 in all the ports and receiving-ships on the Atlantic coast. It was a striking illustration of the improvidence of naval legislation and administration, that in a country of thirty millions of people only a couple of hundred were at the disposal of the Navy Department. Seamen could not be had either to man the slips that might be commissioned, or to protect the exposed stations at Annapolis and Norfolk. Prompt measures were taken during the first year to increase the force;
addition that steam had made to the number and variety of implements of destruction. Torpedoes, though of more recent introduction than rams, were not wholly new weapons. The idea of the torpedo, first discovered by Bushnell, and developed by Fulton, was rejected by the English Government in 1805, because it was recognized as giving an advantage to a weak navy over a powerful one, and its adoption could only impair the maritime supremacy of Great Britain. On account of this advantage which turn. By dint of using everything it could lay hands on, it got together in the beginning a small and scattered fleet, which had hardly the semblance of a naval force. Six of the revenuecutters came early into its possession. The steam-battery Fulton was seized at Pensacola, and $25,000 were appropriated to complete and equip her. The Merrimac was presently raised at Norfolk, and found to have no serious injury. Encouragement was given to private enterprise, by Davis's immediate adoption of
ring the whole war. For service in the rivers and in narrow sounds and channels, still another class of vessels was needed. To meet this want, a fourth measure was adopted, by building twelve paddle-wheel steamers, three or four hundred tons larger than the gunboats, but still small vessels, and of very light draft. To avoid the necessity of turning, they were provided with a double bow, and a rudder at each end. These were the famous double-enders. The first twelve were the so-called Octorara class. Twenty-seven larger vessels of the same type were afterwards built, composing the Sassacus class. The Wateree, a vessel of the same size and general design, was built of iron. Finally the Mohongo class, also of iron, consisted of seven double-enders of still larger size, and carrying a heavier armament. The Ashuelot News of the loss of the Ashuelot is received as this volume is going to press. and Monocacy still represent this class in the service The fifth and last measure
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