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Browsing named entities in James Russell Soley, Professor U. S. Navy, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 7.1, The blockade and the cruisers (ed. Clement Anselm Evans).

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Port Royal (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
tions on the Mississippi as brilliant and successful as any in the war. In the construction of the new ships-of-war, no attempt was made to reproduce the fine screw-frigates of 1855, as they failed to show their usefulness, except perhaps at Port Royal and at Fort Fisher. The Colorado could not be got over the bar, when Farragut went up to New Orleans, and the Roanoke and Minnesota were helpless at Hampton Roads. In the latter half of the war, however, the Department undertook the constructithout a hard struggle; but there was no possibility, except perhaps for a time on the Mississippi, of sustained or concerted action. The naval force that opposed Goldsborough in the Sounds was pitifully weak, as was that which Dupont found at Port Royal. Little more could be said of the squadron at New Orleans, though the ironclad Mississippi, if accident and mismanagement had not delayed her commission, might have given Farragut's fleet some annoyance. At Mobile the Tennessee, under the gal
Parrott (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
fully tested, and the prescribed service-charge was smaller than it was afterward found that the gun would bear. The latest development of the smooth-bore gun was the Xv-inch, one of which was generally mounted in each monitor turret. Rifled guns were gradually introduced during the war. These were chiefly Parrott guns, 20-, 30-, and 100-pounders. They were cast-iron guns, strengthened by a wrought-iron band around the breech. Later, 60-pounders and 150-pounders were manufactured. The Parrott gun of the smaller calibres was serviceable, but as a heavy gun it was dangerous, and occasionally burst. Besides the Parrott guns, a few light cast-iron Dahlgren rifles were made; and in the Western flotilla, when it was transferred to the navy, there were several army rifled 42-pounders, which were so dangerous as to be nearly useless. The demands of the new service were many and various. There was the river service, where the navy acted largely in co-operation with the army, in the
Hampton Roads (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
crew-frigates of 1855, as they failed to show their usefulness, except perhaps at Port Royal and at Fort Fisher. The Colorado could not be got over the bar, when Farragut went up to New Orleans, and the Roanoke and Minnesota were helpless at Hampton Roads. In the latter half of the war, however, the Department undertook the construction of a class of vessels of considerable size, but very different in character. These were large, wooden steamers, with fine lines, excessively long and sharp aix months in the waters of North Carolina, but she was blockaded in the Roanoke River, and was finally destroyed by the daring of Cushing. Finally the Merrimao, which was lost through our own shortcomings, had a brilliant but brief career in Hampton Roads. These isolated attempts comprised, together with the exploits of the cruisers, the sum of the naval operations on the Southern side; Viewed in the light of the difficulties to be met by the Confederate navy, they were little less than phe
Iroquois, Wyoming (West Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2
steamers, whose disposition on the 4th of March was as follows: *** Class.Name.Station. One screw-frigateNiagaraReturning from Japan. Five screw-sloops (1st class).San JacintoCoast of Africa. LancasterPacific. BrooklynHome Squadron (Pensacola). HartfordEast Indies. RichmondMediterranean. Three side-wheel steamersSusquehanna.Mediterranean. PowhatanHome Squadron (returning from VeraCruz). SaranacPacific. Eight screw-sloops (2d class).MohicanCoast of Africa. NarragansettPacific. IroquoisMediterranean. PawneeWashington. WyomingPacific. DacotahEast Indies. PocahontasHome Squadron (returning from. VeraCruz). SeminoleCoast of Brazil. Five screw steamers (3d class)WyandotteHome Squadron (Pensacola). MohawkNew York. CrusaderNew York. SumterCoast of Africa. MysticCoast of Africa. Two side-wheel steamersPulaskiBrazil. SaginawEast Indies. It will be observed that of the twelve vessels composing the Home Squadron, seven were steamers; and of these only three, the Paw
notwithstanding. The time when warning should cease does not appear to have been fixed; and in one instance at least, on the coast of Texas, it was given as late as July, 1862. The fact of warning was commonly endorsed on the neutral's register. In some cases the warnings had the same fault as Pendergrast's proclamation, in being a little too comprehensive, and including ports where an adequate force had not yet been stationed. The boarding officers of the Niagara, when off Charleston, in May, warned vessels off the whole Southern coast, as being in a state of blockade, though no ship-of-war had as yet appeared off Savannah; and the Government paid a round sum to their owners in damages for the loss of a market, which was caused by the official warning. The concession of warning to neutrals at the port, if it had continued through the war, would have rendered the blockade to a great extent inoperative. Vessels would have been able to approach the coast without risk of capture
ned by the adoption of the rules of blockade. A government has the right to close its own ports, and to impose heavy penalties upon all who attempt to enter; but it cannot by virtue of any such measure search and seize foreign vessels on the high seas, even though bound for the embargoed port. To do this it must establish a blockade. In other words, it must wage war, and the two parties in the contest must become belligerents. Although it may have been the intention of the Executive in July to regard the blockade as a domestic embargo, it soon gave up the idea in practice. Neutral vessels were searched and captured at sea. Prizes were sent in for adjudication, and condemned for breach of blockade and for carrying contraband, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the Law of Nations in such case provided, and not in pursuance of any law imposing civil forfeitures or penalties for violation of a domestic embargo. The forms of examination and procedure were those of be
traband trade. The Rio Grande could not be blockaded. Cargoes shipped for Matamoras were transferred to lighters at the mouth of the river. On their arrival at Matamoras they were readily transported to the insurgent territory. Accordingly, in 1862, the place became the seat of a flourishing trade. The sudden growth of the city was a notorious fact, as was also the cause that led to it. Yet the Government was unable to put a stop to the traffic, unless evidence could be brought to show thatn. These points then became the headquarters of the different squadrons–ports for rendezvous, refitment, and supply, for the repairs and coal that were forever drawing away the blockaders from their stations at critical moments. By the spring of 1862 all the squadrons were well provided in this respect, though some of the centres of occupation were occasionally recovered by the enemy. Especially on the coast of Texas, blockade and occupation alternated at the different Passes throughout the w
esident's two proclamations did not therefore constitute actual notice, because at the date of their issue there was not even a pretence that the blockade existed. Nor do they appear to have been so intended. The idea was rather to publish a manifesto declaring in a general way the intentions of the Government, and then to carry them out as promptly as circumstances would permit. The blockade therefore began as a blockade de facto, not as a blockade by notification. During the summer of 1861 vessels were stationed at different points, one after another, by which the blockade at those points was separately established. Notices, of a more or less informal character, were given in some cases by the commanding officer of the blockading force; but no general practice was observed. When Captain Poor, in the Brooklyn, took his station off the Mississippi, he merely informed the officer commanding the forts that New Orleans was blockaded. Pendergrast, the commanding officer at Hampton
this fact, and suggested that a new blockade required a new notification, with the usual allowance of time for the departure of vessels; but the State Department did not regard the blockade as having been interrupted. Savannah was blockaded on the 28th of May. In the Gulf, Mobile and New Orleans received notice on the 26th from the Powhatan and the Brooklyn; and a month later the South Carolina was at Galveston. At the principal points, therefore, there was no blockade at all during the first month, and after that time the chain of investment was far from being complete. Indeed it could hardly be called a chain at all, when so many links were wanting. Even Wilmington, which later became the most important point on the coast in the operations of the blockade-runners, was still open, and the intermediate points were not under any effective observation. As liability for breach of blockade begins with the mere act of sailing for the blockaded port, the distance of this port from
Abraham Lincoln (search for this): chapter 3
with the northern colonies in South America, and as a matter of form, kept a brig cruising in the Caribbean Sea. No time was lost in announcing the intentions of the Government. On the 19th of April, six days after the fall of Sumter, the President issued a proclamation declaring the blockade of the Southern States from South Carolina to Texas. On the 27th the blockade was extended to Virginia and North Carolina. The terms of the proclamation were as follows Now therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States . . have further deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and of the Law of Nations in such case provided. For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach or shall attempt to leave any of the said ports, she will
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