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Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2.

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May (search for this): chapter 1
Hunter retreated entirely away from the Valley, leaving the route to Washington absolutely open to the enemy. Nevertheless, the invasion of Early had failed, for the very reason which Grant had foreseen. Lee had been so crippled by his losses in the Wilderness that he could not detach a force large enough to endanger Washington without risking his position at Richmond; and when Early reached the capital he found troops assembled there sufficient to repel him. But had Grant moved his army in May by way of the James instead of from Culpeper, the rebels would doubtless at that time have threatened Washington far more seriously than in July. The very danger which was now averted was a justification of the strategy which had prevented its occurrence at a time when relief might have been more difficult to secure. At this juncture, however, Lee could have had but little hope of capturing Washington, though he doubtless believed that Grant might be compelled to weaken himself in front o
July (search for this): chapter 1
ly had failed, for the very reason which Grant had foreseen. Lee had been so crippled by his losses in the Wilderness that he could not detach a force large enough to endanger Washington without risking his position at Richmond; and when Early reached the capital he found troops assembled there sufficient to repel him. But had Grant moved his army in May by way of the James instead of from Culpeper, the rebels would doubtless at that time have threatened Washington far more seriously than in July. The very danger which was now averted was a justification of the strategy which had prevented its occurrence at a time when relief might have been more difficult to secure. At this juncture, however, Lee could have had but little hope of capturing Washington, though he doubtless believed that Grant might be compelled to weaken himself in front of Richmond, and perhaps to raise the siege. McCabe's Life and Campaigns of General Lee; a work containing more trustworthy information from re
1865 AD (search for this): chapter 1
hese was a continuous line completely encircling the town, at a distance of three miles. It consisted of epaulements, arranged generally for field artillery, sometimes in embrasure, sometimes in barbette, and connected by rifletrench. These works were not extended to the southern bank until after Butler's attack on Drury's Bluff in May, 1864, when the rebels, fearing another advance from the same direction, completed the line. It was never attacked except by reconnoitring forces in 1864 and 1865. The third line, starting from the river above the town, and crossing the country at a general distance of six miles from Richmond, reached to the bluffs overlooking the valley of the Chickahominy, the crests of which it followed for a while, and then took an easterly course, striking the James again, at the strong entrenched position on Chapin's Farm, opposite Drury's Bluff. This was the line occupied by the rebel armies during the last year of the war, and attained a high stage of devel
September (search for this): chapter 1
he Democratic party are doing all in their power to bring about this result. The evidence of this has increased very much within the last few days. It is probably thought that such a thing will have its effect upon the next election by showing the inability of the present administration to carry on the war with an armed opposition in the loyal states.—Halleck to Grant, August, 1864. and, naturally enough, was dreaded by the government. Grant, however, remained urgent, and on the l3th of September, he wrote to Stanton: We ought to have the whole number of men called for by the President, in the shortest possible time. Prompt action in filling up our armies will have more effect upon the enemy than a victory. They profess to believe, and make their men believe, there is such a party in favor of recognizing Southern independence that the draft cannot be enforced. Let them be undeceived. Deserters come into our lines daily, who tell us that the men are nearly universally tired of t
June (search for this): chapter 1
s could arrive; but south and east of Petersburg, Lee kept his main army, and here he relied for defence on men rather than works, though here also the fortifications were elaborate and formidable. When the national forces crossed the James, in June, and Smith advanced against Petersburg, although Beauregard came up in time to save the town, the defences on the south and east were captured. Breastworks were thrown up in the night, in rear of the former position, and these were held until Leeortant one, as any line nearer Richmond would not enable Lee to keep open his communications by the Southside railroad. The whole series of works around Petersburg thus became a part of the defences of Richmond; and, confronted from the middle of June by the entire army of the Potomac and a part of Butler's force, it acquired that character which the presence of a large body of defenders alone made practicable. Forts with very strong relief; a connecting parapet assuming the profile of regular
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 1
could arrive; but south and east of Petersburg, Lee kept his main army, and here he relied for defehe Wilderness campaign, the constant retreat of Lee and the advance of Grant after every battle, ha for the very reason which Grant had foreseen. Lee had been so crippled by his losses in the Wildehe siege. McCabe's Life and Campaigns of General Lee; a work containing more trustworthy informaice, and entreaties, and almost commands. Thus Lee's plan of obliging him to give up Richmond for now was their opportunity. Once more, however, Lee's plans entirely failed. There was some questiand, was watching his opportunity, and whenever Lee recalled any force from the Valley, he meant toCrook's command or the cavalry. Early wrote to Lee on October 9th: The loss in the infantry and arelf described his condition very graphically to Lee: My troops are very much shattered, the men verebuke, but more direct censure was not spared. Lee added words which coming from him were signifi[13 more...]
Jefferson Davis (search for this): chapter 1
shed him in the confidence of the President and the Secretary of War, as a commander to be trusted with the fullest discretion in the management of all the troops under him. Before that, while they highly appreciated him as a commander to execute, they felt a little nervous about giving him too much discretion.—General Grant to Author, June, 1878. As for his soldiers, they declared, referring to the Democratic desire for compromise, that Sheridan was the bearer of Peace propositions to Jefferson Davis from the North. Grant had returned to City Point on the 19th of September, and on the 20th, at two P. M., he telegraphed to Sheridan: I have just received the news of your great victory, and ordered each of the armies here to fire a salute of one hundred guns in honor of it. . . If practicable, push your success and make all you can of it. He was anxious that the full effect of the victory should be reaped at the West as well as the East, and inquired of Halleck: Has the news of Gen
Abraham Lincoln (search for this): chapter 1
ear while the soldiers were fighting at the front; and the enemies of the nation at home did it nearly as much harm as Lee. They stimulated the South in its resistance, they invited foreign sympathizers to active interference, and did their best to hinder recruiting, to withhold supplies, to damage the financial credit of the country, and to discourage the armies in the field. The near approach of the Presidential elections reminded this party that it had still another chance; and, when Lincoln was renominated by the Republicans, General McClellan became the candidate of the Democrats, who openly declared the war for the Union a failure, and demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities. See resolutions passed by Democratic Nominating Convention, September 1, 1864. The success of the Peace party indeed would secure all that the rebels were fighting for; a fact very well understood by the Richmond government and its generals. It was worth while to hold out a little longer in t
William T. Sherman (search for this): chapter 1
ce, and lost no time in adapting his plans to the actual emergencies. On the 8th of September, Sherman had entered Atlanta in person, and on the 10th, he was instructed: As soon as your men are suffetired, and Early had followed him; so that on the Potomac also, the prospect was gloomy. Even Sherman's success, gratifying as it was, seemed isolated; the country had no idea that it had been facirsonal one, as close and as unselfish on both sides, as that already existing between Grant and Sherman. The rebel government was not long in learning that a new commander had superseded the crowds the East, and inquired of Halleck: Has the news of General Sheridan's battle been sent to General Sherman? If not, please telegraph him. Neither did he forget that his forces on the Shenandoah wee to Staunton was abundantly supplied with forage and grain. On the 26th, Grant telegraphed to Sherman: I have evidence that Sheridan's victory has created the greatest consternation and alarm for t
1864 AD (search for this): chapter 1
works were not extended to the southern bank until after Butler's attack on Drury's Bluff in May, 1864, when the rebels, fearing another advance from the same direction, completed the line. It was never attacked except by reconnoitring forces in 1864 and 1865. The third line, starting from the river above the town, and crossing the country at a general distance of six miles from Richmond, reached to the bluffs overlooking the valley of the Chickahominy, the crests of which it followed for ad exert an influence directly favorable to McClellan. We have already referred to the great consideration which attached to the Presidential contest in the North which was now to take place; we have stated that it gave a new hope for the South in 1864; and we have indicated that the political campaign of this year was, in the minds of the Confederate leaders, scarcely less important than the military. Indeed, the two were indissolubly connected; and the calculation in Richmond was, that if mili
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