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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2. Search the whole document.

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25th (search for this): chapter 8
d to the Boydton road, Grant concluded that the rebel lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated, if his estimate of Lee's forces was correct. Wright and Parke reported favorably to an assault, and Grant determined, therefore, to extend his line no further, but to reinforce Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and enable him to turn the rebel flank, while the other corps assaulted the enemy's works in front. The picket line captured from Lee, after the attack on Fort Steadman, on the 25th, especially favored this design, for it threw the belligerents, at some points, so close to each other that it was but a moment's run between the lines. Preparations were accordingly made for an assault. To Sheridan he said at the same time: If your situation is such as to justify the belief that you can turn the enemy's right with the assistance of a corps of infantry entirely detached from the balance of the army, I will so detach the Fifth corps, and place the whole under your command
27th (search for this): chapter 8
und Petersburg, and to ensure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, . . . in its effort to reach and destroy the Southside and Danville roads. See Appendix for this entire order. First of all, Ord was to proceed on the night of the 27th, to the left of the army of the Potomac, and relieve the Second corps, now under the command of Humphreys. Humphreys had succeeded Hancock in command of the Second corps in November, 1864. On the morning of the 29th, Warren and Humphreys were td. To this condition had the strategy and persistency of Grant reduced his opponents. This battle made no difference whatever in Grant's plans. The army was to move on the 29th of March, and the orders remained unchanged. On the night of the 27th, Ord left the trenches north of the James, and, by daylight on the 29th, he had reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's run. On the 28th, Grant instructed Sheridan: The Fifth corps will move by the Vaughan road at three A. M. to-morrow mo
28th (search for this): chapter 8
felt that the fates were against them, and it mattered little what they did—their doom was close at hand. To this condition had the strategy and persistency of Grant reduced his opponents. This battle made no difference whatever in Grant's plans. The army was to move on the 29th of March, and the orders remained unchanged. On the night of the 27th, Ord left the trenches north of the James, and, by daylight on the 29th, he had reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's run. On the 28th, Grant instructed Sheridan: The Fifth corps will move by the Vaughan road at three A. M. to-morrow morning. The Second moves at about nine A. M., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the Fifth corps. . . . Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth corps, pass by its left, and, passing near to or through Di
29th (search for this): chapter 8
unced to the principal commanders in identical language. On the 29th instant, said Grant, the armies operating against Richmond will be movedcommand of the Second corps in November, 1864. On the morning of the 29th, Warren and Humphreys were to move in two columns, taking the roads h, Ord left the trenches north of the James, and, by daylight on the 29th, he had reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's run. On thegle impulse between their will and his own. On the morning of the 29th, the operations began. The Fifth corps started according to orders r roads, a little south of Burgess's mill. Thus on the night of the 29th, the national line was uninterrupted from the Appomattox to the Boyd were separated by an interval of five miles. On the night of the 29th, Grant sent word to Sheridan: Our line is now unbroken from the Appot us see what can be done with the enemy. During the night of the 29th, the rain fell in torrents, and before morning it became impossible
30th (search for this): chapter 8
l. On the morning of the 31st of March, Warren was on the extreme left of the infantry, in the angle between the White Oak and the Boydton roads. On account of the rains and the consequent condition of the ground, it was not intended to make any movement this day; but it was understood that the Second corps would be withdrawn from the line and sent to Sheridan at night. Warren had been notified that the enemy was in force on his left, and that an attack on him was not improbable. On the 30th, Grant said to Meade: From what General Sheridan reports of the enemy on White Oak road, and the position of his cavalry to-night, I do not think an attack on Warren's left in the morning improbable. I have notified Sheridan of this, and directed him to be prepared to push on to his assistance if he is attacked. Warren, I suppose, will put himself in the best possible position to defend himself, with the notice he has already received; but, in addition to that, I think it will be well to no
31st (search for this): chapter 8
ight, where Pickett and Bushrod Johnson had already been found in force. On the morning of the 31st, Sheridan replied to Grant's offer: My scouts report the enemy busy all, night in constructing brelon; placing Ayres on the left, then Crawford, and Griffin in the rear. On the morning of the 31st, as Grant had anticipated, the Fifth corps was heavily attacked from the north and west. The assthstanding the orders to suspend operations.—Webb to Warren, 10.30 A. M. On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak road, and was directed . He had been expressly ordered to be on the alert for the attack which had driven him in on the 31st, and had been directed to concentrate his force in anticipation of it; but he thought it wiser to left. On the afternoon of March 30th, Pickett arrived at Five Forks, and, on the morning of the 31st, he advanced towards Dinwiddie, his principal column moving by the western road, and one division
February 20th (search for this): chapter 8
y and all the cavalry of the rebel army, to destroy the command of Sheridan. The rebel force thus accumulated was nearly eighteen thousand strong, On the 20th of February, Lee reported: Effective. Pickett5,065 Johnson6,936 W. H. F. Lee4,120 Fitz Hugh Lee 1,921 —— Total 18,042 In addition to these commands, Rosser' of March; but a portion of Heth and Wilcox's troops stood ready to support him, and his own absent brigade returned to him late on the 1st of April. On the 20th of February the extra-duty men in Pickett and Johnson's divisions were 1,418 in number. and the attack on Warren was doubtless intended to support the movement, and doubWilcox, W. H. F. and Fitz Hugh Lee, and Rosser were all in front of Warren or Sheridan on the 30th of March. These amounted to 27,500 men. See Lee's return of February 20th. But Pickett's Report, published in Pickett's Men, puts them at 8,000! of his army to the threatened point, and throwing a heavy force against Warren, suffic
March (search for this): chapter 8
kets available. But, in order to make this showing, he excludes from his computation not only the sick, the extra-duty men, and those in arrest, 13,728 in number, but all officers, all artillery, all cavalry, all detached commands, all of Early's force in the Valley, which joined Lee for his last campaign, and all the troops, regular and local, in Richmond. He calculates that, in the attack on Fort Steadman on the 25th of March, Lee lost from 2,500 to 3,000 men, and that during the month of March about 3,000 rebels deserted. Thus, on the 31st of March, says Taylor, Lee had only 33,000 muskets with which to defend his lines. This number he contrasts with an effective total, which he ascribes to Grant, of 162,239. But this total of Grant's includes the sick, the extra-duty men, those in arrest, the officers, the cavalry, the artillery, and the troops in Ord's department at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, and other places a hundred miles from Richmond, as well as the cavalry of Sheridan left i
March 1st (search for this): chapter 8
, reported, on the same day, 4,391 effective, and 5,084 aggregate present, making 63,485 effective regular soldiers, and 78,433 aggregate. In addition to the extra-duty men, nearly all of whom the rebels habitually put into battle, there were the local reserves and the crews of the gunboats, who were all at the front in the last engagements, and who took good care to count themselves as soldiers when the time came to be paroled. Lee had not less than 75,000 available fighting men on the 1st of March. He probably lost 2,500 after that time by desertion, and 2,500 or 3,000 in the attack on Fort Steadman; so that on the 29th of March he had an army of 70,000 as good soldiers as ever fought. The field returns of Meade, Ord, and Sheridan for the 30th of March, precisely similar in character to those of Lee, show, in the Present for duty, equipped. Army of the Potomac69, 751 Army of the James27,701 Army of Sheridan13,595 —— Total111,047 See Appendix for the returns of rebel and n
March 5th (search for this): chapter 8
f General Humphreys, and in sight of the enemy across the open ground, that I do not think it advisable to attempt anything more northward until General Humphreys gets into position on my right. My left, on the plank road, cannot be extended with propriety till I can get some idea of General Sheridan's movements, and now rests on Gravelly run, and, if I move, will be in the air. . . I can not move forward, and it does not appear a favorable place in front of Griffin.—Warren to Webb, March 30, 5.50 A. M. I do not think it best to advance any further till General Miles gets into position on my right.—Warren to Humphreys, March 30. Major-General Meade directs you to move up the Quaker road to Gravelly run crossing.—Webb to Warren, March 29, 10.20 A. M. I think my skirmishers are out on the Quaker road as far as Gravelly run.—Warren to Webb. From your last dispatch the major-general commanding would infer that you did not understand the last order.—Webb to Warren, March 29, 12 M
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