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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 11. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
s before cooler occasions exposed the error and the utter worthlessness of the projectiles. They never took the grooves, and consequently their range was less than that of the smooth-bores, their inaccuracy was excessive; and in addition to this not one shell in twenty exploded. Their manufacture was discontinued early in 1862, and a new projectile, having a saucer-shaped copper sabot attached by bolts after the shell was cast, was substituted for it. This shell, called the Mullane or Tennessee shell, was the invention of Dr. Read of Tuscaloosa, Ala., the well-known inventor of what are usually but improperly called Parrott shell. Parrott made the best guns adapted to these shell, and the gun properly goes by his name, but Dr. Read's invention of the shell cannot be questioned. His first patent was granted Oct. 28, 1856, and specifies cupped cylinders fastened on to the shell by screws, rivets, &c. A patent was refused the Mullane shell by the Confederate Patent Office, on the
Jackson (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
enemy's rear-guard at White Oak Swamp about 9.30 A. M., and decided to force the crossing with artillery. It was 1.45 P. M. before twenty-eight guns could be concentrated and opened. Official Report of Colonel Crutchfield. Reports of Army of Northern Virginia, p. 525. The only battery of the enemy in sight was at once driven off, but in a short while eighteen guns were opened in reply from behind a wood, and a brisk contest was maintained until dark, when the enemy withdrew, having kept Jackson's whole force out of the critical action fought by Longstreet and A. P. Hill late in the afternoon at Frazier's Farm. The superior ammunition and guns of the enemy made this contest about an equal one; but even had the Confederate equipment fully equalled the Federal, the odds were by no means sufficient to warrant the expectation of any very speedy and decisive result. At one thousand yards' range, a well-manned artillery can hold its ground for a long time against double its force of o
Sharpsburg (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
often charged with the additional duties of chief of ordnance. Under the influence of this order and the experience of the battles, the brigade-batteries, though not abolished by order, were during the summer gradually absorbed into division-battalions, numbering from three to six batteries each, and commanded by the division Chief. These battalions first appeared on the field as such at Second Manassas, and the service rendered by them there is notorious. They were no less efficient at Sharpsburg and Fredericksburg, and the utility of the organization being now proven, it was no longer left to division-commanders to effect, (in some divisions it had even yet been but partially done, owing to a lack of field-officers of artillery,) but it was formally adopted by order, and general orders from the War Department directed a similar organization in all the armies of the Confederacy. This was the intent of ¶ 2, General Order No. 7, Adjutant-General's Office, Richmond, January 19, 186
Richmond (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
ar a very great inconvenience, and materially affected the efficiency of the ordnance-service both in the quantity of ammunition carried and the facility with which it was supplied. At the commencement of the war this variety was often almost ludicrously illustrated by single batteries of four guns, of four different calibres, and it was only after the battalions were well organized in the winter of 1862 that anything was done to simplify this matter. The heavy guns which defended the James river against the enemy's fleet were principally the ordinary eight-inch and ten-inch columbiads, and Brooke's rifles of six and four-tenths and seven inches calibre. These rifles only needed telescopic sights (which could not be made in the Confederacy) to be perfect arms of their class, their trajectories being more uniform than the sighting of the guns could be made by the eye. In addition to these rifles Captain Brooke also furnished some heavily banded smooth-bores of ten and eleven inch
Fredericksburg, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
h the additional duties of chief of ordnance. Under the influence of this order and the experience of the battles, the brigade-batteries, though not abolished by order, were during the summer gradually absorbed into division-battalions, numbering from three to six batteries each, and commanded by the division Chief. These battalions first appeared on the field as such at Second Manassas, and the service rendered by them there is notorious. They were no less efficient at Sharpsburg and Fredericksburg, and the utility of the organization being now proven, it was no longer left to division-commanders to effect, (in some divisions it had even yet been but partially done, owing to a lack of field-officers of artillery,) but it was formally adopted by order, and general orders from the War Department directed a similar organization in all the armies of the Confederacy. This was the intent of ¶ 2, General Order No. 7, Adjutant-General's Office, Richmond, January 19, 1863, though the lan
Charles City (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
n the Federal battery exposed to view at the commencement of the affair. If it was deemed impossible to use the infantry to force a crossing, at least seventy-five guns (that number might have easily been had) should have been crowded in the Confederate line to hope to accomplish anything by such a random fire. At the same time that this affair was going on, General Huger's division, numbering about eleven thousand muskets, and accompanied by thirty-seven guns, while pressing down the Charles City road was checked about two miles from Frazier's Farm, where Longstreet and Hill were already engaged, by a powerful battery of rifled guns posted on high open ground. General Huger says, General Mahone advanced a battery of artillery (Moorman's), and a sharp artillery fire was kept up for some time. The enemy's fire was very severe, and we had many men killed and wounded. General Mahone says, Two pieces of Moorman's battery were put in position and opened fire on his position, which wa
United States (United States) (search for this): chapter 15
by filing notches in the copper sabot to allow the flame of the discharge to pass, but they did not succeed. This was the condition of the three-inch rifled guns during the whole of 1862, and these projectiles were used also in the beautiful United States three-inch Ordnance Rifles, of which about forty were captured during the year. In 1863 several improvements were attempted in the method of attaching the copper to the shell, and the saucer-shaped sabot was finally exchanged for a band or rarts, but all were repaired again and kept in service. As a general field-piece its efficiency was impaired by its weight and the very cumbrous English carriage on which it was mounted, and while a few with an army may often be valuable, the United States three-inch rifle is much more generally serviceable with good ammunition. The Blakely guns were twelve-pounder rifles, muzzle-loaders, and fired very well with English ammunition (built-up shells with leaden bases), but with the Confederate
White Oak Swamp (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
hat scattered, and either uncommanded or too much commanded, as it was, there was an entire absence of that ensemble of action necessary to the efficiency of all arms, but peculiarly so to the artillery; and that when fought at all, it was put in only in inefficient driblets. I select two or three examples where the most important consequences were involved. On the morning of the 30th of June, 1862, General Jackson, leading four divisions in pursuit, struck the enemy's rear-guard at White Oak Swamp about 9.30 A. M., and decided to force the crossing with artillery. It was 1.45 P. M. before twenty-eight guns could be concentrated and opened. Official Report of Colonel Crutchfield. Reports of Army of Northern Virginia, p. 525. The only battery of the enemy in sight was at once driven off, but in a short while eighteen guns were opened in reply from behind a wood, and a brisk contest was maintained until dark, when the enemy withdrew, having kept Jackson's whole force out of the
Petersburg, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
, about the same distance towards the left, checked every effort of the enemy to advance upon Cemetery Hill according to his programme, or to move down the lines on either side of the Crater for some hours, and until an infantry force was collected to retake it. Each battery took in flank any advance upon the other, and the enemy was kept under shelter of the earth thrown up by the explosion. A somewhat similar position of batteries first checked the Yankee advance after the capture of Fort Harrison, Sept. 29th, 1864, and the Confederate assault on Fort Steadman on the 25th of March 1865 was discomfitted in the same way. Indeed the Federal intrenchments very frequently comprised a second line of redoubts, if not of infantry parapet, in rear of the first, and its very moral effect often prevented attempts upon the first which promised well. Lest some of the statements of this article should be misunderstood to reflect in any way upon the Ordnance Bureau of the War Department, it i
Knoxville (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 15
ion would have condemned were better than none. The causes of the premature explosions were never fully understood. They were generally attributed to defects in the casting, which either allowed the flame of the discharge to enter the shell, or by weakening the shell caused it to crush under the shock of the discharge and the twist given by the grooves of the gun. As a single illustration of the extent to which these defects of the Parrott projectiles sometimes went: at the siege of Knoxville, Captain Parker's battery of four captured Parrott rifles fired one hundred and twenty shell at the enemy's batteries and pontoon-bridge, of which only two failed to tumble, or to burst prematurely. Of the most valuable kind of rifle ammunition, shrapnel, the Confederates made none, on account of the scarcity of lead. Of the next most useful kind, percussion shell, (invaluable for getting the range,) few were to be had until the last year of the war. The fuse then used, Girardey's, was e
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