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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 30. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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rs were based on sound principles. In the four years of the war the South produced 20,000,000 bales of cotton worth $600,000,000, and many million pounds of tobacco, worth also a great deal of money. It was proposed that the Confederate Government should purchase these products with bonds, and then ship them to the great European markets, where they would meet with the ready sale. This scheme, however, was defeated by the Federal blockade of Southern ports, which was begun in the summer of 1861. A belief was cherished in the South that the great manufacturing European nations would break the blockade in order to get cotton for their people to spin and wear, but this expectation proved wholly abortive, and the Southern Government was forced to imitate their adversaries in the North by issuing paper money. The value of this paper currency held up very well in the beginning, but it rapidly lost the confidence of the people, and this fact, more than anything else, hurt the Confedera
February 1st, 1903 AD (search for this): chapter 1.40
Why we failed to win. Inquiry into the causes of Confederate defeat. In its leading editorial article, February 1, 1903, the New Orleans Picayune answers the often-asked question—Why it was that the Southern States were defeated in their struggle for independence? It says the people of this generation know that the Southern soldiers were inferior in numbers, but they likewise know that our armies repeatedly gained victories over greater forces and that our generals were more than equal in skill to those of the enemy's. Then the Picayune proceeds to give a thoughtful answer to the question propounded, presenting some views that have not occurred to all writers on this subject. We quote: The army rolls show that from the first to the last the forces on the Northern side were two million, eight hundred and sixty thousand men, while on the Southern there were about six hundred thousand men, making an odds of more than four to one on the side of the North. But this enormous
etreated, never to revisit the positions which they had abandoned, and the people came to understand that this abandonment was final. This constant retreating was not always necessitated by attacks and defeat at the hands of a superior force of the enemy, but was in obedience to a fixed plan of strategy named from the Roman general, Fabius Maximus, who in his campaigns against Hannibal made it a rule to avoid battle and always to retreat. Hannibal defeated all the troops he ever met, but Fabius, by eluding battle with the great Carthaginian, succeeded in a campaign that lasted thirteen years in wearing out his enemy, which could get no recruits or reinforcements from Carthage across the Mediterranean. Whether the great Federal armies could have been worn out and eventually ruined by a systematic course of retreat and evasion on the part of the Confederate forces does not appear, as it was not carried out to a conclusion. They saw their homes given up to the possession of the e
This constant retreating was not always necessitated by attacks and defeat at the hands of a superior force of the enemy, but was in obedience to a fixed plan of strategy named from the Roman general, Fabius Maximus, who in his campaigns against Hannibal made it a rule to avoid battle and always to retreat. Hannibal defeated all the troops he ever met, but Fabius, by eluding battle with the great Carthaginian, succeeded in a campaign that lasted thirteen years in wearing out his enemy, which coHannibal defeated all the troops he ever met, but Fabius, by eluding battle with the great Carthaginian, succeeded in a campaign that lasted thirteen years in wearing out his enemy, which could get no recruits or reinforcements from Carthage across the Mediterranean. Whether the great Federal armies could have been worn out and eventually ruined by a systematic course of retreat and evasion on the part of the Confederate forces does not appear, as it was not carried out to a conclusion. They saw their homes given up to the possession of the enemy, with no hope that the country would ever be recovered. If the South had been abundantly supplied with all the necessaries for both
Thomas J. Jackson (search for this): chapter 1.40
hed by the authorities for the capture of Richmond, where the Confederate capital had been set up, and each of those armies in turn had been hurled back, broken, defeated and dreadfully punished. In the meantime the victorious forces of Lee and Jackson had swept the enemy time and again from the celebrated valley of the Shenandoah, the granary of Virginia, while thrice they had fought the foe on his own territory in Maryland and Pennsylvania. When the Confederate army which operated in Virginia retreated from the northern part of the State, it was only a strategic movement, for it always went back and occupied its old position. When the people saw Lee and Jackson leaving them for a southward march, they had full confidence that the troops would return as they always did. In some other parts of the Confederacy this was not the case. Some of the most noted commanders in the West retreated, never to revisit the positions which they had abandoned, and the people came to understand
as dispatched by the authorities for the capture of Richmond, where the Confederate capital had been set up, and each of those armies in turn had been hurled back, broken, defeated and dreadfully punished. In the meantime the victorious forces of Lee and Jackson had swept the enemy time and again from the celebrated valley of the Shenandoah, the granary of Virginia, while thrice they had fought the foe on his own territory in Maryland and Pennsylvania. When the Confederate army which operated in Virginia retreated from the northern part of the State, it was only a strategic movement, for it always went back and occupied its old position. When the people saw Lee and Jackson leaving them for a southward march, they had full confidence that the troops would return as they always did. In some other parts of the Confederacy this was not the case. Some of the most noted commanders in the West retreated, never to revisit the positions which they had abandoned, and the people came to u
Fabius Maximus (search for this): chapter 1.40
the troops would return as they always did. In some other parts of the Confederacy this was not the case. Some of the most noted commanders in the West retreated, never to revisit the positions which they had abandoned, and the people came to understand that this abandonment was final. This constant retreating was not always necessitated by attacks and defeat at the hands of a superior force of the enemy, but was in obedience to a fixed plan of strategy named from the Roman general, Fabius Maximus, who in his campaigns against Hannibal made it a rule to avoid battle and always to retreat. Hannibal defeated all the troops he ever met, but Fabius, by eluding battle with the great Carthaginian, succeeded in a campaign that lasted thirteen years in wearing out his enemy, which could get no recruits or reinforcements from Carthage across the Mediterranean. Whether the great Federal armies could have been worn out and eventually ruined by a systematic course of retreat and evasion
co, worth also a great deal of money. It was proposed that the Confederate Government should purchase these products with bonds, and then ship them to the great European markets, where they would meet with the ready sale. This scheme, however, was defeated by the Federal blockade of Southern ports, which was begun in the summer of 1861. A belief was cherished in the South that the great manufacturing European nations would break the blockade in order to get cotton for their people to spin and wear, but this expectation proved wholly abortive, and the Southern Government was forced to imitate their adversaries in the North by issuing paper money. The ause. It is true that the Confederate Government negotiated considerable loans in Europe, but the money was kept there to pay for warships built and equipped in European ports. From this brief statement of facts it is seen that the Confederate cause was placed at a disadvantage for the lack of material supplies which were neces
Cornfield Point (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.40
ich were necessary for the conduct of the war and the comfort of the people that was vastly more serious than was the disparity in numbers. Then there was a great disadvantage of geographical position and condition. The entire Southern section was divided from north to south by a great navigable river, the Mississippi. This enabled the Federal naval fleets to cut the Confederacy in two, and divorce its western from its eastern section. Its northern boundary was made by the Ohio and Potomac rivers, navigable for boats and largely used by war vessels and military transports. The Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the Southern country were beset by vessels of the blockading fleets. But so far as the fighting was concerned, it all went well in that part of the Confederacy east of the Alleghany mountain. Army after army, each time under a new commander, was dispatched by the authorities for the capture of Richmond, where the Confederate capital had been set up, and each of those armies
Shenandoah Valley (Ohio, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.40
far as the fighting was concerned, it all went well in that part of the Confederacy east of the Alleghany mountain. Army after army, each time under a new commander, was dispatched by the authorities for the capture of Richmond, where the Confederate capital had been set up, and each of those armies in turn had been hurled back, broken, defeated and dreadfully punished. In the meantime the victorious forces of Lee and Jackson had swept the enemy time and again from the celebrated valley of the Shenandoah, the granary of Virginia, while thrice they had fought the foe on his own territory in Maryland and Pennsylvania. When the Confederate army which operated in Virginia retreated from the northern part of the State, it was only a strategic movement, for it always went back and occupied its old position. When the people saw Lee and Jackson leaving them for a southward march, they had full confidence that the troops would return as they always did. In some other parts of the Confede
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