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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 33. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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China (China) (search for this): chapter 1.18
e very mixed up, or altogether lost. There is no time for book-keeping. In examing monthly and tri-monthly reports of the Army of the Potomac, these facts will often be found confessed on the record. On the other hand, it was, of course, the cue of the Confederate army to make the best possible showing of strength by figures, and if you believed the accounts of Confederate prisoners, you would have come to the conclusion that the South had a population to recruit from as large as that of China. Capt. Battine is a cavalry officer, and thinks that mounted charges —shock-tactics, such as Cromwell made use of with splendid results, when fire-arms were comparatively harmless—should have been practiced on a large scale on many occasions against discomfited infantry, thus effecting a complete rout. The war was fought on both sides, as far as infantry was concerned, with the muzzleloader rifle musket and minie ball, which the author thinks had an accurate range of only one hundred yar
Japan (Japan) (search for this): chapter 1.18
convert to the pessimistic theory, because the population and material resources of the South were less than those of the North, therefore the success of the Confederacy was from the outset hopeless, but on the contrary, believes that it was on the point of final attainment on several battlefields through the superiority of Southern generals over their opponents. Well may he hold these views, for the magnificent resistance so long sustained by a handful of Boers and the recent successes of Japan furnish convincing proof—if more were needed, for history is full of it—that brains, education and pluck are of more avail in war than mere numbers. Studying the subject only in his closet, necessarily without practical experience in war—for England has had none of any consequence since the Crimean—it is but natural that the author should have fallen into some errors. His opinion that Grant was great in strategy, but not strong in tactics, is exactly the reverse of the view taken in Am
Charleston (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.18
The crisis of the Confederacy [The following brief comment on The Crisis of the Confederacy—A History of Gettysburg and the Wilderness—Captain Cecil Battine, of the British Army—Longman's (a work which has been favorably reviewed by the press), appeared in the News, Charleston, S. C., of May 24th, 1905. It is by the accomplished author of Hampton and His Cavalry, Edward C. Wells, Esq., and by personal experience and study, is well qualified to duly estimate the causes of defeat in the sublime contest of the South for Constitutional rights.—Ed.] To the Editor of the Sunday News. The writer has not sufficiently studied the above book to warrant his attempting an exhaustive review, even if he were competent for the work, and space admitted of it, but still he would like to call attention to some points. Great wars come seldom, perhaps to nations, but when they do come they make or mar the welfare of countless generations, and, whether coming sooner or later, they do come t
Cecil Battine (search for this): chapter 1.18
rief comment on The Crisis of the Confederacy—A History of Gettysburg and the Wilderness—Captain Cecil Battine, of the British Army—Longman's (a work which has been favorably reviewed by the press), In estimating the numerical strength of the opposed armies, and their losses in battle, Captain Battine certainly often errs, making the odds against the Confederates less than they in fact were,the conclusion that the South had a population to recruit from as large as that of China. Capt. Battine is a cavalry officer, and thinks that mounted charges —shock-tactics, such as Cromwell made That the three days fighting was more like three separate battle than one is quite true, as Captain Battine says, and also that there were mistakes made by Confederate corps commanders, and lack of non a large scale bayonets ever crossed, minie bullets doing the business. The remarks of Captain Battine on the importance of the army compared to sea power are worthy of deep consideration—Cap
Forrest (search for this): chapter 1.18
nd the killing power infinitely more fearful than that of modern rifles, because of the size and shape of the bullet. Moreover the rough nature of the ground where fighting took place invariably forbade mounted charges in mass, and rifle fire in the open would usually render them impossible, or suicidal. All that could be accomplished by shock-tactics was effected against cavalry and small bodies of infantry, but the magnificent fighting qualities of the cavalry (developed by Hampton, and Forrest, and not by Stuart, as the author supposes), were displayed as dismounted riflemen, where they equalled infantry in deadly work and staying-power and were enabled to excel them in mobility and dash by means of their horses. Gettysburg, the author considers the turning point of the war, and that if Lee had there completely defeated Meade it would have ended the contest victoriously for the South. His account of the battle is good—though he errs in numbers—but the main causes to which is
James Longstreet (search for this): chapter 1.18
munication to the rear. Meanwhile Lee, deprived of the eyes and ears of the army, was compelled to grope in the dark to feel for his enemy, which was a terrible handicap and spoiled his programme. Yet all would have turned out well at last if Longstreet had executed Lee's orders, and attacked vigorously early in the morning of July 2. Also if Longstreet had earnestly attacked and vigorously supported, as Lee ordered, on July 3, it is clear that the blow would have demolished Meade. The autLongstreet had earnestly attacked and vigorously supported, as Lee ordered, on July 3, it is clear that the blow would have demolished Meade. The author speaks in several places of divisions coming out of charges with dripping bayonets. This must be considered only a figure of speech, for it is doubtful if on a large scale bayonets ever crossed, minie bullets doing the business. The remarks of Captain Battine on the importance of the army compared to sea power are worthy of deep consideration—Captain Mahan to the contrary notwithstanding. We must confess to thinking sea power and world-power twin fads, which will have run their course a
Cromwell (search for this): chapter 1.18
nthly reports of the Army of the Potomac, these facts will often be found confessed on the record. On the other hand, it was, of course, the cue of the Confederate army to make the best possible showing of strength by figures, and if you believed the accounts of Confederate prisoners, you would have come to the conclusion that the South had a population to recruit from as large as that of China. Capt. Battine is a cavalry officer, and thinks that mounted charges —shock-tactics, such as Cromwell made use of with splendid results, when fire-arms were comparatively harmless—should have been practiced on a large scale on many occasions against discomfited infantry, thus effecting a complete rout. The war was fought on both sides, as far as infantry was concerned, with the muzzleloader rifle musket and minie ball, which the author thinks had an accurate range of only one hundred yards, and was not effective at over four hundred yards, but, as a matter of fact, the range was nearly fou
Mahan (search for this): chapter 1.18
r his enemy, which was a terrible handicap and spoiled his programme. Yet all would have turned out well at last if Longstreet had executed Lee's orders, and attacked vigorously early in the morning of July 2. Also if Longstreet had earnestly attacked and vigorously supported, as Lee ordered, on July 3, it is clear that the blow would have demolished Meade. The author speaks in several places of divisions coming out of charges with dripping bayonets. This must be considered only a figure of speech, for it is doubtful if on a large scale bayonets ever crossed, minie bullets doing the business. The remarks of Captain Battine on the importance of the army compared to sea power are worthy of deep consideration—Captain Mahan to the contrary notwithstanding. We must confess to thinking sea power and world-power twin fads, which will have run their course after a time, and yield place to sensible military defence to protect our own homes, not to shell the over-sea homes of others
George Meade (search for this): chapter 1.18
they equalled infantry in deadly work and staying-power and were enabled to excel them in mobility and dash by means of their horses. Gettysburg, the author considers the turning point of the war, and that if Lee had there completely defeated Meade it would have ended the contest victoriously for the South. His account of the battle is good—though he errs in numbers—but the main causes to which is attributed the failure to rout the Federal army are not given sufficient prominence. That th last if Longstreet had executed Lee's orders, and attacked vigorously early in the morning of July 2. Also if Longstreet had earnestly attacked and vigorously supported, as Lee ordered, on July 3, it is clear that the blow would have demolished Meade. The author speaks in several places of divisions coming out of charges with dripping bayonets. This must be considered only a figure of speech, for it is doubtful if on a large scale bayonets ever crossed, minie bullets doing the business.
Ulysses Grant (search for this): chapter 1.18
ience in war—for England has had none of any consequence since the Crimean—it is but natural that the author should have fallen into some errors. His opinion that Grant was great in strategy, but not strong in tactics, is exactly the reverse of the view taken in America. I think Swinton, the historian of the Army of the Potomac, characterizes Grant's repeated frontal attacks during the Overland campaign—notably at Cold Harbor—as a reductio ad absurdum in hammering. The recoil of the hammer was vastly more destructive than the blow. In estimating the numerical strength of the opposed armies, and their losses in battle, Captain Battine certainly often er. For instance, at Cold Harbor in June, 1864, he puts down the Federal losses at seven thousand and the Confederate at four to five thousand, but in point of fact Grant's casualties reached to about fourteen thousand and Lee's did not exceed fourteen hundred. Thus ended in bloody defeat for the Federals the thirty days Overland
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