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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 37. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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Cashtown (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
visions of the 3rd Corps began their march to Cashtown, then the probability of its correctness becommanding to join the main body of the army at Cashtown. Again, it appears that Johnson's reserve 30th to order Hill and Longstreet to march to Cashtown. There is the improbability that an order offter that officer received orders to march to Cashtown, or certainly before day break of the 30th. in front of Lee's army, then concentrated at Cashtown. And he adds that in that case Lee's army wold have occupied some strong position between Cashtown and Gettysburg, and the onus of attack would have been available in the march from York to Cashtown on the 30th, and in the operations on the fathe orders Lee had issued for concentration at Cashtown, and he would have marched that day with Early towards Cashtown. his cavalry would in all probability have prevented the rash advance of General ange of plan and the orders to concentrate at Cashtown were not the consequence of the intelligence [1 more...]
Hagerstown (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
other by Chambersburg. [Observe that when General Lee gave General Stuart this order to take position on General Ewell's right, that officer was just leaving Hagerstown. In his report (Rebellion Records, Vol. XXVII, part 2, p. 443,) he says that on June 22nd, he received orders from the Commanding General to take Harrisburg, ed it practicable. Now, at the time of this correspondence, Ewell's corps, whose right flank Stuart was to guard, was just beginning its march northward from Hagerstown, and General Hooker's army was in Virginia. General Stuart's plan, then, contemplated passing round General Hooker's rear, while his army was still south of ths of the Commander-in-Chief with the strictest fidelity and exactness. As a matter of fact, Ewell made his march to the Susquehanna (starting on June 23rd from Hagerstown) without receiving any aid from General Stuart. That officer was not able to accomplish any of the things he was charged to do in connection with Ewell's advan
Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
or General Geo. H. Stewart 50 miles by daylight on June 23rd, in Pennsylvania. But on the supposition that Ewell received that famous letter g, and next morning Rodes and Johnson commenced their march into Pennsylvania.] This order was repeated in a letter to General Stuart datedrepresents that General Lee instructed General Stuart to move to Pennsylvania and join Ewell on the Susquehanna, (p. 88.) Throughout the wholeed to proceed with all dispatch to join the right of the army in Pennsylvania. In his zeal to justify General Stuart, Colonel Mosby has misg, to proceed with all dispatch to join the right of the army in Pennsylvania. Colonel Mosby himself says: The object was to go the most dict of his expedition, which was to join the right of the army in Pennsylvania on its march towards the Susquehanna. These observations receanner? In so critical and fateful a movement as the invasion of Pennsylvania, it was supremely important that every officer should carry out
Heidlersburg (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
s he might and ought to have been, on the night of the 29th, or the morning of the 30th, Col. Mosby says, p. 191, if Stuart had arrived on the 30th at York he could not have communicated with Lee. No, but he would have received the orders Lee had issued for concentration at Cashtown, and he would have marched that day with Early towards Cashtown. his cavalry would in all probability have prevented the rash advance of General Hill. Marching from York to Cashtown on the 30th, by way of Heidlersburg, he would have felt the enemy, ascertained his position and his strength and left no excuse for that reconnaisance which prematurely brought on the battle on a field Lee had not selected. * * * Colonel Mosby's book involves very serious strictures on General Lee, which his soldiers are loath to accept save on the most incontrovertible evidence. He asks us to believe, as I have said, that the Report of the Gettysburg Campaign which General Lee signed in January, 1864, not only reflects g
Hopewell (Missouri, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
the records. Such carelessness in a crucial point like this is inexcusable. Here, let it be noted that, in order to interpret correctly the meaning and intent of General Lee's communications to General Stuart in those critical days, June 22-24, it is essential to place before the mind's eye the situation of the two armies at the time. General Stuart in his report says: I submitted to the Commanding General the plan of leaving a brigade or so in my present front, and passing through Hopewell or some other gap in the Bull Run Mountains, attain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington, and cross into Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac. The Commanding General wrote me authorizing this move if I deemed it practicable. Now, at the time of this correspondence, Ewell's corps, whose right flank Stuart was to guard, was just beginning its march northward from Hagerstown, and General Hooker's army was in Virginia. General Stuart's plan, then, cont
North Carolina (North Carolina, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
neral Beauregard should be sent to Culpepper Courthouse with an army, however small, to threaten Washington, Colonel Mosby dismisses the subject lightly with the remark that if it had been practicable to raise such an army, as the campaign closed the next week at Gettysburg, it could not have been assembled in time to render any assistance to General Lee in the Pennsylvania campaign, p. 84. Yet there were five brigades at Petersburg, Richmond and Guinea Station, besides three brigades in North Carolina, and if General Beauregard and even two of these brigades had been at once sent forward to Culpepper, they could have reached there by rail in a few days, and the moral effect would have been such as probably to turn back some of Hooker's army for the defence of Washington—greatly to Lee's advantage in the approaching battle. Capt. Battine, a military critic of ability, remarks that it would have been worth incurring great risks to have drawn four of these brigades—to comply with this s
Chambersburg, Pa. (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
and Longstreet to that place after reaching Chambersburg; 4. That the absence of the Cavalry rendere artillery and trains were passing through Chambersburg after midnight of the 29th. Mr. Jacob Hoke,the train have covered 30 miles and reached Chambersburg by one or two hours after midnight? Thirty corps was turned eastward on its arrival at Chambersburg and camped near Fayetteville. This, he thihird corps —— was encamped on the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, near the village of Fayettevehanna by the Emmittsburg route, another by Chambersburg. [Observe that when General Lee gave Genmarching to Ewell. By that time Lee was at Chambersburg and Ewell had already been one day at Carliis of opinion that the scout who came in at Chambersburg late on June 28th was as unreal as Caesar's ghost at Philippi. No spy came in at Chambersburg, he says. Yet General Longstreet positively affews so soon from Frederick to Longstreet at Chambersburg. But if by some chance the said scout lear[5 more...]<
Carlisle, Pa. (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
. Then the first order to Ewell to march back from Carlisle written last night, would be dated June 28th, not sby reminds us, only 30 miles from Chambersburg to Carlisle. Now, if it was written on the 27th, and receivon not receive orders to march back southward from Carlisle till 9 A. M., on the 29th, as my diary proves? (Iwden Andrews, that was camped five miles south of Carlisle, so that it had only twenty-five miles to march to prevent Captain Elliott Johnson from riding from Carlisle to York, a distance of 36 miles, as Col. Mosby poiy would move through Gettysburg, the other through Carlisle. What General Lee wrote was that one column wouldChambersburg and Ewell had already been one day at Carlisle. Was it not Stuart's duty to make all speed to ovcase he would not have made the fruitless march to Carlisle on July the 1st, but would have marched with Earlyr: He is sure that Lee had ordered Ewell back from Carlisle on the 27th, and he is satisfied by this by the le
Wrightsville (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
corps —— was encamped on the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, near the village of Fayetteville. I was directed to move on this road in the direction of York, and to cross the Susquehanna, menacing the communications of Harrisburg with Philadelphia, and to cooperate with General Ewell. These doubtless were the orders written by Colonel Marshall the night of the 28th of June. General Early also in his report says it had been his intention to cross the Susquehanna by the bridge at Wrightsville and move up the left bank of that river against Harrisburg. Thus General Early, General Hill and General Ewell all testify that they had been ordered to move against Harrisburg; yet Colonel Mosby asserts that Lee had no such plan, though it is stated in both his Reports, as well as by his staff officers. It may be granted that there are certain inaccuracies in the Reports of the battle signed by General Lee, but it is asking too much of our credulity to have us suppose that General
Frederick (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.17
n of the movements and position of the Federal Army. This serious impeachment of Gen. Lee's accuracy in regard to the particulars of his own campaign, is largely based on a letter taken from Gen. Lee's Official Letter Book, and dated at Chambersburg, June 28th, 7:30 A. M., in which Gen. Lee says to Gen. Ewell: I wrote you last night stating that Gen. Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac and is advancing by way of Middletown, the head of his column being at that point in Frederick county. I directed you in my letter to move your forces to this point. Col. Mosby declares that this letter refutes every word of the statements of Gen. Longstreet, Col. Marshall, Gen. Long, Col. Waiter Taylor, Gen. Fitz Lee and Gen. Lee's own report in regard to the compaign in the particulars above named. He further says that Gen. Well's and Gen. Early's reports show that the movement against Harrisburg was arrested on June 27th, and thus agree with the statements of the letter of June
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