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him "at once all the regular troops, horse and foot, and the Rhode Island regiment and battery," and said that he was strong enough without the regulars, and to keep within limits until he could satisfy him that he ought to go beyond them. On the 17th, he was again telegraphed, "We are pressed here. Send the troops I have twice called for without delay." This was imperative, and the troops were sent, leaving him without a single piece of artillery, and, for the time, a single troop of cavalry.hat he would rather lose the chance of accomplishing something brilliant than, by hazarding his column, to destroy the fruits of the campaign by defeat, closing his telegram thus: "If wrong, let me be instructed." But no instructions came. On the 17th, Gen. Scott telegraphed: "McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-House. To morrow the Junction will probably be carried." With this information he was happy. Johnston had been detained the appointed time, and the w
ons, move all supplies to Frederick, occupy Maryland Heights with Major Doubleday's heavy guns, and a brigade of infantry to support them, and everything else — horse, foot, and artillery — to cross the Potomac at Point of Rocks, and unite with Col. Stone's forces at Leesburg, from which point he could operate as circumstances should demand and the General's orders should require. No reply was received; but on the 27th the General telegraphed to him that he supposed he was that day crossing theoth bore guns, and on the 30th gave the order to cross. On the 2d of July he crossed, met the enemy, and whipped them. On July 9 a council was held, at which all the commanders of divisions and brigades and chiefs of staff, were present. Col. Stone, the junior line officer, spoke twice and decidedly against an advance, advocating a direct movement to Shepherdstown and Charlestown.--All who spoke opposed an advance, and all voted against one. On the same day he informed the General-in-Chi
Doubleday (search for this): article 5
and the troops were sent, leaving him without a single piece of artillery, and, for the time, a single troop of cavalry. It was a gloomy night, but they were all brought over the river again without loss. On the 20th of June he was asked by the General-in-Chief to propose, without delay, a plan of operations. On the 21st he submitted to the General-in-Chief his plan, which was to abandon the present line of operations, move all supplies to Frederick, occupy Maryland Heights with Major Doubleday's heavy guns, and a brigade of infantry to support them, and everything else — horse, foot, and artillery — to cross the Potomac at Point of Rocks, and unite with Col. Stone's forces at Leesburg, from which point he could operate as circumstances should demand and the General's orders should require. No reply was received; but on the 27th the General telegraphed to him that he supposed he was that day crossing the river in pursuit of the enemy. On that day the enemy was in conditi
rmined that it should be done, and that before long all the documents referred to should be published, and spread before the American people, unless those whose duty it was to do so should, in the meantime, do him justice. He would state a few of the facts. On the third of June he took command at Chambersburg. On the fourth he was informed by the General in-Chief that he considered the addition to his force of a battery of artillery and some regular infantry indispensable. On the eighth of June, a letter of instructions was sent to him, in which he was told that here must be no reverse; a check or a drawn battle would be a victory to the enemy, filling his heart with joy, his ranks with men, and his magazines with voluntary contributions; and, therefore, to take his measures circumspectly, and attempt nothing without a clear prospect of success. This was good instruction and most sensible advice. Good or bad, he was to obey; and he did. On Friday, the 13th, he was inform
divisions and brigades and chiefs of staff, were present. Col. Stone, the junior line officer, spoke twice and decidedly against an advance, advocating a direct movement to Shepherdstown and Charlestown.--All who spoke opposed an advance, and all voted against one. On the same day he informed the General-in-Chief of the condition of affairs in the valley, and proposed that he should go to Charlestown and occupy Harper's Ferry, and asked to be informed when he would attack Manassas. On the 12th he was directed to go where he had proposed, and was informed that Manassas would be attacked on Tuesday, the 16th. On the 13th he was telegraphed: "If not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester." He made the demonstration, and on the 16th, the day General Scott said he would attack Manassas, he drove the enemy's pickets into his entrenchments at Winchester, and on the 17th marched to Charlestown. On the 13th
d be instructed to make a demonstration on Manassas Junction. He was surprised at the order, but promptly obeyed. On the 15th, he reached Hagerstown, and, on the 16th, two-thirds of his forces had crossed the Potomac. The promised demonstration by General McDowell, in the direction of Manassas Junction, was not made; and on the 16th, just three days after he had been told he was expected to cross, he was telegraphed by the General-in-Chief to send him "at once all the regular troops, horse and foot, and the Rhode Island regiment and battery," and said that he was strong enough without the regulars, and to keep within limits until he could satisfy him thIf not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester." He made the demonstration, and on the 16th, the day General Scott said he would attack Manassas, he drove the enemy's pickets into his entrenchments at Winchester, and on the 17th marched to Charlestown.
untary contributions; and, therefore, to take his measures circumspectly, and attempt nothing without a clear prospect of success. This was good instruction and most sensible advice. Good or bad, he was to obey; and he did. On Friday, the 13th, he was informed that, on the supposition that he would cross the river on the next Monday or Tuesday, General McDowell would be instructed to make a demonstration on Manassas Junction. He was surprised at the order, but promptly obeyed. On the 15th, he reached Hagerstown, and, on the 16th, two-thirds of his forces had crossed the Potomac. The promised demonstration by General McDowell, in the direction of Manassas Junction, was not made; and on the 16th, just three days after he had been told he was expected to cross, he was telegraphed by the General-in-Chief to send him "at once all the regular troops, horse and foot, and the Rhode Island regiment and battery," and said that he was strong enough without the regulars, and to keep with
f the strength of the enemy, and of his own force; that he would not, on his own responsibility, attack without artillery, but would do so cheerfully and promptly, if he would give him an explicit order to that effect. No order was gives. On the 20th he received the harness for his single battery of six smooth bore guns, and on the 30th gave the order to cross. On the 2d of July he crossed, met the enemy, and whipped them. On July 9 a council was held, at which all the commanders of divie attacked where he was, and if Manassas was not to be attacked on that day, as stated in Gen. Scott's dispatches of the day previous, he ought to have been ordered down forth with to join in the battle, and the attack delayed until he came. He could have been there on the day that the battle was fought, and his assistance might have produced a different result. On the 20th he heard that Johnston had marched with $5,000 Confederate troops, and a large or iller force, in a southeasterly
brilliant than, by hazarding his column, to destroy the fruits of the campaign by defeat, closing his telegram thus: "If wrong, let me be instructed." But no instructions came. On the 17th, Gen. Scott telegraphed: "McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court-House. To morrow the Junction will probably be carried." With this information he was happy. Johnston had been detained the appointed time, and the work of General Patterson's column had been done. On the 18th, at half-past 1 in the morning, he telegraphed Gen. Scott the condition of the enemy's force and his own, referring to the letter of the 10 h formula information, and closed the dispatch by asking. "Shall I attack?" This was plain English, and could not be misunderstood, but he received no reply. He expected to be attacked where he was, and if Manassas was not to be attacked on that day, as stated in Gen. Scott's dispatches of the day previous, he ought to have been ordered down forth with
mpt nothing without a clear prospect of success. This was good instruction and most sensible advice. Good or bad, he was to obey; and he did. On Friday, the 13th, he was informed that, on the supposition that he would cross the river on the next Monday or Tuesday, General McDowell would be instructed to make a demonstration he would attack Manassas. On the 12th he was directed to go where he had proposed, and was informed that Manassas would be attacked on Tuesday, the 16th. On the 13th he was telegraphed: "If not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester." He made the demoGeneral Scott said he would attack Manassas, he drove the enemy's pickets into his entrenchments at Winchester, and on the 17th marched to Charlestown. On the 13th he telegraphed the General-in-Chief that Johnston was in position to have his strong h doubled just as he could reach him, and that he would rather lose the chance
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