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Browsing named entities in a specific section of The Daily Dispatch: June 28, 1864., [Electronic resource]. Search the whole document.

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Bayonne (France) (search for this): article 2
participated. It was an attempt to make a flank march in the face of an enemy already in position. It was a gross blunder of his own, and resulted in an overwhelming defeat. Wellington saw the blunder, and attacked him while he was perpetrating it.--But for that blunder he would not have been attacked. Clausel saved the army, which his stupidity had nearly destroyed. One month before the battle Napoleon, at Dresden, on his way to Russia, having in his hand the map of the country and the last dispatch of Marmont, saw from the tenor of the latter that he must inevitably he beaten, and wrote to the Minister of War at Faris, directing, him to send 20,000 men to Bayonne, to remedy the disaster which he foresaw.--After his defeat he was removed, and then commenced his life-long hatred of his benefactor. Nevertheless, this book, apart from what personally concerns Marmont himself and Napoleon, the object of his hatred, is no doubt, as we have said, valuable to the military man.
Leipzig (Saxony, Germany) (search for this): article 2
an it ever had been. To his own criticism of the conduct of Napoleon on this occasion Marmont himself offers the best answer. He had just been speaking of Macdonald's defeat by Blucher at the Katsbach in 1813. It was a case directly in point. Macdonald, the day before the battle, detached a large force to turn Blucher's flank. Blucher took advantage of its absence, attacked Macdonald, annihilated his army, and thus completed the first act of the tragedy that found its denouement at Leipzig and its result in Napoleon's overthrow. This is what Marmont says of it: "Nothing is more dangerous than to make a large detachment before a battle has been fought, a victory achieved, and a decided advantage obtained over the enemy. "The execution of this hazardous requires that the army have a sufficient superiority to assure great probabilities of victory, and that concentrated forces be never weakened beyond the strength of the enemy." Now, Napoleon, according to his
Borodino (New York, United States) (search for this): article 2
indeed it was — but it is a very serious error. The translator tells us that the battle of Borodino was fought on the 6th September, 1812. It was fought on the 7th September, 1812. "On the day pradvance work" here alluded to was carried on the 5th September two days preceding the battle of Borodino. These are but small blemishes, it is true; but in as much as they indicate baste and careher means than by brave force, that Segur, the renegade, gave the best account of the battle of Borodino in a book evidently written to curry favor with the Russians, &c. In this spirit he blames Napoleon for not giving his Guard at Borodino at a time when, Segur says, it would have insured the rout and destruction of the whole Russian army, overlooking entirely the overwhelming reply of Gourgaud ed beyond the strength of the enemy." Now, Napoleon, according to his own account, had at Borodino 120,000 men. The Russians had, according to the book of one of their Generals, (we forget his n
Normandy (France) (search for this): article 2
Castile, and several hundred miles distant from Boulogne, which was the starting point of the army, to say nothing of its being in a country not belonging to France. Marmont, no doubt, wrote La Mancha.--"Manche," in French, means "a sleeve." The French call the English Channel "La Manche," "the sleeve," from its fancled resemblance, on the map, to that part of a lady's gown. The province of La Manche is on the channel, and is called after it. It is a province of what was formerly called Normandy, and is really the country from which the French army began its march in 1865. This might have been a type graphical error,--we suppose indeed it was — but it is a very serious error. The translator tells us that the battle of Borodino was fought on the 6th September, 1812. It was fought on the 7th September, 1812. "On the day preceding the battle a strong advanced work had been carried by the French with considerable daughter." The redoubt of Schwardino — which we presume is the "adv
Salmantica (Spain) (search for this): article 2
men. The Russians had, according to the book of one of their Generals, (we forget his name,) published a few years ago, and said to be the best Russian account, 132,000. So that here is the very case in which, according to Marmont, Napoleon would not have been excusable had he weakened his concentrated forces. Was ever man more fully convicted out of his own month? We place no confidence in what Marmont says about his own operations, especially those in Spain. As for the battle of Salamanca, for the loss of which he attempts to excuse himself by a wound which he received an hour before it commenced, the manœuvre which lost it was ordered by him before he received his wound, and he was superintending it at the time. That manœuvre brought on the battle, as well as decided it against him. It was the very same which had lost Frederick the battle of Colin, and the Russians and Austrians the battle of Austerlitz, in which last Marmont himself participated. It was an attempt to ma
English Channel (search for this): article 2
m lost." There are a few other little errors to which we would call the attention of the translator "in 1805 the French army, after the fine march from the shores of La Mancha to Germany," &c. La Mancha is a province of Old Castile, and several hundred miles distant from Boulogne, which was the starting point of the army, to say nothing of its being in a country not belonging to France. Marmont, no doubt, wrote La Mancha.--"Manche," in French, means "a sleeve." The French call the English Channel "La Manche," "the sleeve," from its fancled resemblance, on the map, to that part of a lady's gown. The province of La Manche is on the channel, and is called after it. It is a province of what was formerly called Normandy, and is really the country from which the French army began its march in 1865. This might have been a type graphical error,--we suppose indeed it was — but it is a very serious error. The translator tells us that the battle of Borodino was fought on the 6th Se
Faris (Missouri, United States) (search for this): article 2
participated. It was an attempt to make a flank march in the face of an enemy already in position. It was a gross blunder of his own, and resulted in an overwhelming defeat. Wellington saw the blunder, and attacked him while he was perpetrating it.--But for that blunder he would not have been attacked. Clausel saved the army, which his stupidity had nearly destroyed. One month before the battle Napoleon, at Dresden, on his way to Russia, having in his hand the map of the country and the last dispatch of Marmont, saw from the tenor of the latter that he must inevitably he beaten, and wrote to the Minister of War at Faris, directing, him to send 20,000 men to Bayonne, to remedy the disaster which he foresaw.--After his defeat he was removed, and then commenced his life-long hatred of his benefactor. Nevertheless, this book, apart from what personally concerns Marmont himself and Napoleon, the object of his hatred, is no doubt, as we have said, valuable to the military man.
Russian River (Alaska, United States) (search for this): article 2
e battle of Borodino in a book evidently written to curry favor with the Russians, &c. In this spirit he blames Napoleon for not giving his Guard at Borodino at a time when, Segur says, it would have insured the rout and destruction of the whole Russian army, overlooking entirely the overwhelming reply of Gourgaud upon that subject, and the answer of Napoleon himself, who did not think that the critical time had arrived. "Suppose I have to fight another battle to-morrow, what shall I do if my rhe strength of the enemy." Now, Napoleon, according to his own account, had at Borodino 120,000 men. The Russians had, according to the book of one of their Generals, (we forget his name,) published a few years ago, and said to be the best Russian account, 132,000. So that here is the very case in which, according to Marmont, Napoleon would not have been excusable had he weakened his concentrated forces. Was ever man more fully convicted out of his own month? We place no confidence
Napoleon (Ohio, United States) (search for this): article 2
To his own criticism of the conduct of Napoleon on this occasion Marmont himself offers the best answer. He had just been speaking of Macdonald's defeat by Blucher at the Katsbach in 1813. It was a case directly in point. Macdonald, the day before the battle, detached a large force to turn Blucher's flank. Blucher took advantage of its absence, attacked Macdonald, annihilated his army, and thus completed the first act of the tragedy that found its denouement at Leipzig and its result in Napoleon's overthrow. This is what Marmont says of it: "Nothing is more dangerous than to make a large detachment before a battle has been fought, a victory achieved, and a decided advantage obtained over the enemy. "The execution of this hazardous requires that the army have a sufficient superiority to assure great probabilities of victory, and that concentrated forces be never weakened beyond the strength of the enemy." Now, Napoleon, according to his own account, had at Borodin
Russia (Russia) (search for this): article 2
the battle of Austerlitz, in which last Marmont himself participated. It was an attempt to make a flank march in the face of an enemy already in position. It was a gross blunder of his own, and resulted in an overwhelming defeat. Wellington saw the blunder, and attacked him while he was perpetrating it.--But for that blunder he would not have been attacked. Clausel saved the army, which his stupidity had nearly destroyed. One month before the battle Napoleon, at Dresden, on his way to Russia, having in his hand the map of the country and the last dispatch of Marmont, saw from the tenor of the latter that he must inevitably he beaten, and wrote to the Minister of War at Faris, directing, him to send 20,000 men to Bayonne, to remedy the disaster which he foresaw.--After his defeat he was removed, and then commenced his life-long hatred of his benefactor. Nevertheless, this book, apart from what personally concerns Marmont himself and Napoleon, the object of his hatred, is no
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