hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity (current method)
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in descending order. Sort in ascending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Jonesboro (Georgia, United States) 18 0 Browse Search
Hood 17 5 Browse Search
F. T. Sherman 15 1 Browse Search
Patrick H. Hoy 15 1 Browse Search
United States (United States) 14 0 Browse Search
R. E. Lee 12 0 Browse Search
Atlanta (Georgia, United States) 12 0 Browse Search
Fort Gaines (Georgia, United States) 12 0 Browse Search
William B. Cook 10 0 Browse Search
Tildsley Graham 10 0 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of The Daily Dispatch: October 1, 1864., [Electronic resource]. Search the whole document.

Found 86 total hits in 14 results.

1 2
Atlanta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): article 4
Late operations around Atlanta. An able correspondent in Hood's army, in his last letter to the Mobile Advertiser, gives what he was informed was General Hood's plan. This is interesting as a part of the history of the operations around Jackson and the evacuation of Atlanta. We have not seen if elsewhere from any other source.--As the correspondent says, "the plan was certainly bold and have done this by throwing all of his army upon a part of Sherman's — the nearest part of it to Atlanta. If, indeed, Sherman did divided his army and scatter it over a line of twenty-eight miles, Hoke had been fatal, He fell into the opposite extreme of distrust, and ordered the evacuation of Atlanta, which he had not, until then, contemplated. He still had the Augusta railroad, which the enemy could not reach, and which would have enabled him to hold Atlanta. His army was still but little hurt, and might still have fought a general battle on the next day, but he had lost confidence in h
West Point (Virginia, United States) (search for this): article 4
if elsewhere from any other source.--As the correspondent says, "the plan was certainly bold and ambitious enough in its scope." Hood, it seems, was deceived by false information from his scouts, and the Yankees state as much on him. We copy from the correspondence as follows: I have been informed that the following was General Hood's plan of operations on the 30th of August, Yankee Howard's grand corps of eighteen thousand, made a forced march of sixteen miles from Fairburn, on the West Point road, to Jonesboro', on the Macon road. They arrived at Jonesboro' on the Macon road. They arrived at Jonesboro' on the evening of the 30th, crossed Flint river, and took position between the river and the town. This is the head of Flint river, and here it is a mere creek, about knee deep. Hood sent, Hardee's corps, which was only twelve miles from Jonesboro', and Lee's which was fifteen, to meet this movement. I do not know when Hardee moved, but presume that he moved during the day
Jonesboro (Georgia, United States) (search for this): article 4
en miles from Fairburn, on the West Point road, to Jonesboro', on the Macon road. They arrived at Jonesboro' oJonesboro' on the Macon road. They arrived at Jonesboro' on the evening of the 30th, crossed Flint river, and took positioJonesboro' on the evening of the 30th, crossed Flint river, and took position between the river and the town. This is the head of Flint river, and here it is a mere creek, about knee dee, Hardee's corps, which was only twelve miles from Jonesboro', and Lee's which was fifteen, to meet this movemevement. Thus it happened that the Yankees reached Jonesboro' from twelve to twenty hours in advance of us. TheHis own dispatches state that his army was between Jonesboro' and Rough and Ready, not over twelve miles from ring information of Howard's march from Fairburn to Jonesboro'. It must have been about night on the 30th when General Hood was informed of Howard's movement upon Jonesboro', and before night toward was there. On the ne informed Hood that our assault upon the enemy at Jonesboro' had failed, he was greatly astonished. He threw
Fairburn (Georgia, United States) (search for this): article 4
m. We copy from the correspondence as follows: I have been informed that the following was General Hood's plan of operations on the 30th of August, Yankee Howard's grand corps of eighteen thousand, made a forced march of sixteen miles from Fairburn, on the West Point road, to Jonesboro', on the Macon road. They arrived at Jonesboro' on the Macon road. They arrived at Jonesboro' on the evening of the 30th, crossed Flint river, and took position between the river and the town. This is thetwelve miles from right to left. I believe this was his position; and it follows that General Hood was deceived by false information from his cavalry and scouts, And they must have been very tardy in conveying information of Howard's march from Fairburn to Jonesboro'. It must have been about night on the 30th when General Hood was informed of Howard's movement upon Jonesboro', and before night toward was there. On the night of the 31st, when Hardee informed Hood that our assault upon the e
Flint (Georgia, United States) (search for this): article 4
of eighteen thousand, made a forced march of sixteen miles from Fairburn, on the West Point road, to Jonesboro', on the Macon road. They arrived at Jonesboro' on the Macon road. They arrived at Jonesboro' on the evening of the 30th, crossed Flint river, and took position between the river and the town. This is the head of Flint river, and here it is a mere creek, about knee deep. Hood sent, Hardee's corps, which was only twelve miles from Jonesboro', and Lee's which was fifteen, to meet thFlint river, and here it is a mere creek, about knee deep. Hood sent, Hardee's corps, which was only twelve miles from Jonesboro', and Lee's which was fifteen, to meet this movement. I do not know when Hardee moved, but presume that he moved during the day of the 30th. Lee never moved until ten that night, and did not straighten out and get fairly in motion until daylight. Some Yankees has struck his road and impeded his movement. Thus it happened that the Yankees reached Jonesboro' from twelve to twenty hours in advance of us. They had time to get position, to entrench, and to rest before we got there. How it happened that they thus. "stole a march." on u
Stewart (search for this): article 4
e of a railroad to transport troops, and yet they beat us by at least twelve hours in the race. The object was to attack them while in motion and unprepared. Our two corps had an effective strength of more than twenty thousand men — an excess over the enemy. General Hood had entire confidence in the result, thinking surely that, with a majority in numbers, we would beat the Yankees. He was informed that Sherman's line was twenty-eight miles long. While we beat back Sherman's right, Stewart, with over twenty thousand men, was to fall on his left centre, cut it, and drive them down the river, thus cutting off escape and capturing two- thirds of Sherman's army. The plan was certainly bold and ambitions enough in its scope. In attempting too much, he accomplished nothing. It would have been better had he been satisfied merely to drive Sherman back and defeat his campaign. I believe he could have done this by throwing all of his army upon a part of Sherman's — the nearest part
F. T. Sherman (search for this): article 4
ority in numbers, we would beat the Yankees. He was informed that Sherman's line was twenty-eight miles long. While we beat back Sherman's Sherman's right, Stewart, with over twenty thousand men, was to fall on his left centre, cut it, and drive them down the river, thus cutting off escape and capturing two- thirds of Sherman's army. The plan was certainly bold and ambitions enough in its scope. In attempting too much, he acc. It would have been better had he been satisfied merely to drive Sherman back and defeat his campaign. I believe he could have done this by throwing all of his army upon a part of Sherman's — the nearest part of it to Atlanta. If, indeed, Sherman did divided his army and scatteSherman did divided his army and scatter it over a line of twenty-eight miles, Hood followed suit by dividing his own, with twenty miles between the fragments. But I do not believe that Sherman did commit this blunder. His own dispatches state that his army was between Jonesboro' and Rough and Ready, not over twelve m
R. E. Lee (search for this): article 4
vening of the 30th, crossed Flint river, and took position between the river and the town. This is the head of Flint river, and here it is a mere creek, about knee deep. Hood sent, Hardee's corps, which was only twelve miles from Jonesboro', and Lee's which was fifteen, to meet this movement. I do not know when Hardee moved, but presume that he moved during the day of the 30th. Lee never moved until ten that night, and did not straighten out and get fairly in motion until daylight. Some YaLee never moved until ten that night, and did not straighten out and get fairly in motion until daylight. Some Yankees has struck his road and impeded his movement. Thus it happened that the Yankees reached Jonesboro' from twelve to twenty hours in advance of us. They had time to get position, to entrench, and to rest before we got there. How it happened that they thus. "stole a march." on us, and moved over a longer distance in a less time, I cannot explain. We had the shortest line and the use of a railroad to transport troops, and yet they beat us by at least twelve hours in the race. The objec
Yankee Howard (search for this): article 4
on him. We copy from the correspondence as follows: I have been informed that the following was General Hood's plan of operations on the 30th of August, Yankee Howard's grand corps of eighteen thousand, made a forced march of sixteen miles from Fairburn, on the West Point road, to Jonesboro', on the Macon road. They arrivedon; and it follows that General Hood was deceived by false information from his cavalry and scouts, And they must have been very tardy in conveying information of Howard's march from Fairburn to Jonesboro'. It must have been about night on the 30th when General Hood was informed of Howard's movement upon Jonesboro', and before nigHoward's movement upon Jonesboro', and before night toward was there. On the night of the 31st, when Hardee informed Hood that our assault upon the enemy at Jonesboro' had failed, he was greatly astonished. He threw up his hands, it is said, exclaiming, "My God !" He had overestimated the courage of his army; and the mistake had been fatal, He fell into the opposite extrem
Hood (search for this): article 4
ns around Atlanta. An able correspondent in Hood's army, in his last letter to the Mobile Advertiser, gives what he was informed was General Hood's plan. This is interesting as a part of the histtainly bold and ambitious enough in its scope." Hood, it seems, was deceived by false information frI have been informed that the following was General Hood's plan of operations on the 30th of August, and here it is a mere creek, about knee deep. Hood sent, Hardee's corps, which was only twelve mily thousand men — an excess over the enemy. General Hood had entire confidence in the result, thinkid scatter it over a line of twenty-eight miles, Hood followed suit by dividing his own, with twenty this was his position; and it follows that General Hood was deceived by false information from his must have been about night on the 30th when General Hood was informed of Howard's movement upon Jone On the night of the 31st, when Hardee informed Hood that our assault upon the enemy at Jonesboro' h
1 2