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ea of retreating from Gettysburg, he replied that he did not remember. What is the degree of probability that a chief of cavalry, who had, on so important an occasion as this, been engaged from 5 until 12 o'clock in bringing up and disposing his troops to cover the retreat of his army, should, first, have omitted to mention it in his official report, and, secondly, have failed to remember it nine months later, in reply to a specific and highly suggestive inquiry? That on the evening of the 2d, after the battle, General Meade was disinclined to await further attacks in his position, is an imputation which rests upon much higher authority, for it has the word of General Slocum, an officer of honor, dignity of character, and firmness of purpose. Referring to the council of war, General Slocum, in a letter dated February 19th, 1883, makes the following statement: When each officer had expressed his views General Meade said: Well, gentlemen, the question is settled; we will remain her
their purposes. Both perfectly understand what I meant by my ante-battle order, referring to Pipe Creek, also my instructions to Butterfield on the morning of the 2d, which he persists in calling an order for retreat, in the face of all my other acts, and of the fact that I did not retreat when I could have done so with perfect before been sent by Hancock to hold the left, and who in doing so had seen the great importance of Round Top, and posted a brigade on it, that on the morning of the 2d, when he received my order that he would be relieved by the Third Corps and on being relieved would rejoin his own corps (Twelfth) on the right, after waiting for s my right toward the Emmitsburg road. General Tremain, my aide-de-camp, in compliance with my instructions, pointed out to General Meade, during the morning of the 2d, the importance of Round Top and the need of troops to occupy it; likewise the importance of the Emmitsburg road and the intersecting roads leading to our left, all
possible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance. We started from Bruinsburg with an average of about two days rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the meantime. A delay would give the enemy time to reenforce and fortify. McClernand's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies to give them three days rations in haversacks. Beef, mutton, poultry, and forage were found in abundance. Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be secured in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mulepower, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves. All these were kept running while we were stopping day and night, and when we were marching, dur
batteries. From time to time the gun-boats joined in the bombardment, notably on May 27th and June 20th. On the first of these occasions, the Cincinnati, Lieutenant George M. Bache, engaged alone the battery on Fort Hill, the principal work above Vicksburg, while the other iron-clads, under Commander Woodworth, were similarly occupied below. The fire from the upper battery was too much for the Cincinnati, which sank not far from the shore, losing a considerable number of her crew. On the second occasion three heavy guns mounted on scows were placed in position on the point opposite Vicksburg, where they did good execution under Lieutenant-Commander F. M. Ramsay, enfilading the rifle-pits in front of Sherman's position and rendering them untenable. The lower squadron also took part in this bombardment. In addition to the work of the squadron afloat, when the army called for siege-guns thirteen heavy cannon were landed from the gun-boats and placed in position in the rear of Vicksb
General Rosecrans would retire from his front had led him to suffer the 1st to pass without advancing his right to cover the rising ground, thus giving ample leisure to Rosecrans to intrench and to restore order to his army after the fight of the 31st, when all the advantages of battle had remained with us. But on Friday, the 2d of January, he was convinced that Rosecrans was not going to retreat and that fighting must soon be resumed. After riding over the ground early on the morning of the 2d, at 11 o'clock he had adopted the following plan: To seize and carry by a vigorous assault that rising ground now occupied by the Federal forces, allowing only one hour to intervene between the time of the attack and dark, so that night should stop the fighting and give us opportunity to fortify at once. It was for that reason the hour of 4 P. M. was selected for the operation. The failure of Friday to secure the heights on our right necessitated an entire change of our lines, and Saturday h
to my flank.) Rousseau's men were driven out of the woods, a regular dense thicket, and Shepherd's regu lars suffered fearfully in there. They moved in by the head of column. There was no fighting of consequence on the 1st of January. The last attack made by the enemy was upon my extreme left, on the 2d of January, and it was disastrous to them. Van Cleve's division, under Colonel Samuel Beatty, had crossed the river on the 1st, and Grose and Hazen had followed with their brigades on the 2d. The fight opened on Colonel Beatty's line and lasted about twenty minutes. Before this battle I had been inclined to underrate the importance of artillery in our war, but I never knew that arm to render such important service as at this point. The sound judgment, bravery, and skill of Major John Mendenhall, who was my chief-of-artillery, enabled me to open 58 guns almost simultaneously on Breckinridge's men and to turn a dashing charge into a sudden retreat and rout, in which the enemy lost
lle, where he halted the second night in a position which pointed to either flank. The other two corps moved respectively through Shepherdsville and Mt. Washington, to converge upon Bardstown, and halted the second night at Salt River. The enemy's pickets were encountered on all of the roads within a few miles of the city, increasing in strength as the movement progressed, and opposing a sharp opposition at Bardstown and Shelbyville. Polk withdrew his army from Bardstown on the night of the 3d, going through Springfield, and Sill, against a considerable resistance, pushed back the force in front of him toward Frankfort. These measures brought to a hurried completion the inauguration of Provisional Governor Hawes at Frankfort on the 4th, under the supervision of General Bragg. Polk, on his part, was pressed so closely that Hardee, who was bringing up his rear, was compelled to make a stand at Perryville and call for assistance. Assuming that Smith was the object of my attack, and
under General Gregg, was to follow down the South Anna River, destroy all the road bridges thereon, and, if possible, the two railroad bridges across that river. Another party, the 5th U. S. Cavalry, under Captain Drummond, was to follow this last and see that the destruction was complete. Captain Merritt, with a flying party of the 1st Maryland, was sent out to do what he thought he could accomplish in the way of destroying bridges, etc. These different parties all got off by 3 A. M. on the 3d. . . . Colonels Wyndham, Kilpatrick, and Davis were directed either to return or to push on and bring up at either Yorktown or Gloucester Point. The rest were ordered to return to the reserve with myself. Colonel Wyndham and Captain Lord returned the same day. General Gregg and Captains Merritt and Drummond the next day. Colonels Kilpatrick and Davis pushed on through to Gloucester Point. . .. We remained at Shannon's Cross-roads during the 4th, and on the morning of the 5th moved to Yan
, a part of his army having been sent to Salem Church to resist Sedgwick. Sedgwick had difficulty in maintaining his ground, but held his own by hard fighting until after midnight, May 4th-5th, when he recrossed at Banks's Ford. Some of the most anomalous occurrences of the war took place in this campaign. On the night of May 2d the commanding general, with 80,000 men in his wing of the army, directed Sedgwick, with 22,000, to march to his relief. While that officer was doing this on the 3d, and when it would be expected that every effort would be made by the right wing to do its part, only one-half of it was fought (or rather half-fought, for its ammunition was not replenished), and then the whole wing was withdrawn to a place where it could not be hurt, leaving Sedgwick to take care of himself. At 12 o'clock on the night of the 4th-5th General Hooker assembled his corps commanders in council. Meade, Sickles, Howard, Reynolds, and myself were present; General Slocum, on acco
he was carried off the field in a litter. This information I immediately reported to General Hooker, when he directed me to withdraw my command from that position and go into camp on the north side of the Rappahannock River. It was 4 A. M. of the 3d of May when I moved from Hazel Grove. Sickles, with the two divisions of the Third Corps, reached Hazel Grove from the Furnace between half-past 9 and ten on the night of the 2d of May. Some of his troops had fighting in the woods before I left, e to the north and some distance from Chancellorsville. This line presented a front to the enemy that could not be enfiladed or turned. Desultory fighting, especially with artillery, was kept up on the 4th of May; but Hooker's battle ended on the 3d, after the army had gained its new position. It is useless to speculate what General Hooker would have done if he had not been disabled. Up to the evening of the 2d of May the enemy had suffered severely, while the Army of the Potomac had compa
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