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Sykes (search for this): chapter 3.25
f the ground, would have fallen into the possession of Hood's men with little or no contest; for Sykes' troops, that saved that point from capture, had not then started from the enemy's right. Even left until the afternoon, when it was reported impracticable. He then ordered the Fifth corps (Sykes') over to the left about 2 o'clock P. M. In his testimony he says: About half-past 3 o'cloMeade that that point would have to be occupied very strongly. Meade then ordered a division of Sykes' corps, which was coming up, to the position, and Warren says: The troops under General SyGeneral Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it. The assumption, under these circumstances, that, had the attack been made earlier or later, we set's columns that he was enabled to make in the afternoon, after he had gone to that flank, and Sykes had had two hours for his movement from the right to the left, before Longstreet's advance began
J. E. B. Stuart (search for this): chapter 3.25
know when he was ready or had actually begun, and the complaint therefore comes from him with a very bad grace. He who is at fault is very generally apt to lay the blame on others for what is due to his own shortcomings. There is again in this second article an allusion to our line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early. By this is meant the posting of two of my brigades in a position to protect our left flank, which was very much exposed before the arrival of Stuart's cavalry. This has been fully explained heretofore, and the fact shown that these two brigades never constituted any part of our line; so that it was not broken by their being assigned the position they occupied. If General Longstreet found it necessary to take two of his divisions, which were intended to support the attacking column on the 3d, in order to protect his right flank against two brigades of Pleasanton's cavalry, it was certainly not unreasonable to take two brigades to prote
Sickles (search for this): chapter 3.25
g of the 2d. During the night of the 1st General Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the grouf the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were prastion as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, There is no position there.signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d, General Sickles became apprehensive that we were about toe open. It will be seen, therefore, that General Sickles' move, and all the movements of the Federf a sunrise attack. In his testimony, General Sickles says: At a very early hour on Thurson was removed very early in the morning, and Sickles' corps remained on that flank, alone, until lansferring troops to meet such an attack, and Sickles did not go into position until near 4 o'clockre four o'clock in the afternoon, I found General Sickles had taken a position very much in advancede to examine the left of our line, where General Sickles was. His troops could hardly be said to b
Rodes (search for this): chapter 3.25
ossible that any one acquainted with General Lee's exalted character will accept such statements as true. It is evident that allusion is here made to the language used by General Lee, as given by me, in the conference had with Generals Ewell, Rodes, and myself, after the close of the first day's fight, when he said: Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in position and gets everything ready, but he is so slow. It will be seen, from a letter given by General Fitz Lee, in his articlances, and that he reiterated it at daylight next morning. All the presumptions from these statements and circumstances are in favor of the correctness of General Pendleton's statement, and when connected with General Lee's declaration to Ewell, Rodes, and myself, at the close of the first, it becomes absurd for General Longstreet to say that he has sustained all his facts and opinions by the most particular proofs. It is very evident, beyond all reasonable doubt, that General Lee indicated t
E. W. Robertson (search for this): chapter 3.25
after the disastrous repulse of the day before; nor did he dare attack us, afterwards, in the vicinity of Hagerstown, when he had been reinforced by 8,000 men under French, and a considerable part of Couch's force from Harrisonburg, besides having at hand (at Harper's Ferry) a portion of the troops from North Carolina and the Peninsula, with all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the battle, be counted as reinforcements. These facts should satisfy General Longstreet and his adherents that Meade would not have been in a hurry to attack us, if we had awaited his attack on Seminary Ridge, or had moved past his left and assumed another position; and they should equally convince those who think the taking possession of the Gettysburg heights, on the afternoon of the 1st, would i
Prior (search for this): chapter 3.25
which was then going on, at the same time offering me Major-General Anderson's division. The Commanding General soon joined me, and, a few minutes after, Major-General Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from, the rear, Kemper's three brigades and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Prior became detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking columns moved steadily forward, driving the enemy from his' different positions as rapidly as he took them. The claims here made are exorbitant enough in all conscience, but there is a little room left for a suspicion that Jackson's men had something to do with the repulse of the enemy from their front, and that it was not all the work of Longstreet's two batteries, and that they also took some part
Fitz John Porter (search for this): chapter 3.25
e attack, but Longstreet insisted on taking time to make a reconnoissance, which was delayed for a time by a report of an advance on his right, and the reconnoissance was not made until about nightfall. This is according to his own showing, and in the meantime General Jackson's command had sustained and repulsed seven different attacks in heavy force during the afternoon. So little evidence had General Longstreet given to the enemy of the presence of his command on the field, that General Fitz John Porter, of the Federal army, was afterwards court-martialed and cashiered for failing to carry out an order sent to him by Pope, at half-past 4 o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack Jackson's right flank — the very one on which Longstreet was. It was not until after sunset that any part of Longstreet's command became engaged, when there was a conflict between Hood's. division and King's division of McDowell's corps, which was moving along the Warrenton Pike to cut off Jackson's troops,
Pope (search for this): chapter 3.25
and on the field, that General Fitz John Porter, of the Federal army, was afterwards court-martialed and cashiered for failing to carry out an order sent to him by Pope, at half-past 4 o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack Jackson's right flank — the very one on which Longstreet was. It was not until after sunset that any part to reconnoitre. It was twenty-seven hours after his arrival on the field before he was ready to begin, and if the troops of McClellan, the junction of which with Pope's Army Jackson's movement had been intended to prevent, had been hurried to the front, what a different result might have taken place! Is it to be credited thatt interminable period before they were brought into action, and often was uttered the anxious enquiry, by those who for four days had been confronting and fighting Pope's accumulating columns, Will Longstreet never begin ? Is it to be wondered that General Lee had come to the conclusion that Longstreet was very slow, however well
Pleasanton (search for this): chapter 3.25
to protect our left flank, which was very much exposed before the arrival of Stuart's cavalry. This has been fully explained heretofore, and the fact shown that these two brigades never constituted any part of our line; so that it was not broken by their being assigned the position they occupied. If General Longstreet found it necessary to take two of his divisions, which were intended to support the attacking column on the 3d, in order to protect his right flank against two brigades of Pleasanton's cavalry, it was certainly not unreasonable to take two brigades to protect a flank that was very much more exposed. This objection is really too insignificant to discuss. In the second article there is this passage: In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive in tactics, while of course it was offensive in strategy. I have italicized the words his council to fix attention upon th
Pickett (search for this): chapter 3.25
n the night of the first, that he had given the order for Longstreet to attack at sunrise next morning. General Lee also said to the gentleman referred to by General Fitz Lee, that the battle would have been gained if General Longstreet had obeyed the orders given him, and had made the attack early instead of late. General Hood says that Longstreet said to him on the morning of the second: The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off. Hood got up before sunrise, and he gives several circumstances tending to show that General Lee was anxious to make the attack at once. General Longstreet, in his first article, has stated that General Lee, at 5 P. M. of the 1st, announced his purpose of attacking the enemy the next day, that he persisted in that purpose late at night against his own repeated remonstrances, and that he reiterated it at daylight next morning. All the pre
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