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Jubal A. Early (search for this): chapter 45
h the failure of the troops ordered to co-operate to do so; that there was no order ever issued for a sunrise attack; that no such order could have been issued, and that the First Corps could not possibly have attacked at that time; that when it did attack its movement was weakened by the derangement of the directing brigade of support under General Wilcox, and was rendered hopeless by the failure of Ewell's Corps to co-operate, its line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early, and that in this attack Hood's and McLaws' Divisions did the best fighting ever done on any field, and encountered and drove back virtually the whole of the Army of the Potomac. I held that the mistakes of the Gettysburg campaign were: First, the change of the original plan of the campaign, which was to so maneuvre as to force the Federals to attack us; second, that if the plan was to have been changed at all it — should have been done at Brandy Station, near Culpepper Court-House
C. M. Wilcox (search for this): chapter 45
livered a battle under ominous circumstances. I declared that the battle of the 2d was not lost through the tardiness of the First Corps, but through the failure of the troops ordered to co-operate to do so; that there was no order ever issued for a sunrise attack; that no such order could have been issued, and that the First Corps could not possibly have attacked at that time; that when it did attack its movement was weakened by the derangement of the directing brigade of support under General Wilcox, and was rendered hopeless by the failure of Ewell's Corps to co-operate, its line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early, and that in this attack Hood's and McLaws' Divisions did the best fighting ever done on any field, and encountered and drove back virtually the whole of the Army of the Potomac. I held that the mistakes of the Gettysburg campaign were: First, the change of the original plan of the campaign, which was to so maneuvre as to force the Feder
Sedgwick (search for this): chapter 45
enemy making desperate but unsuccessful attempts to secure it. Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the Third Corps, under Major General Birney (Major General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), superiority of number of corps of the enemy enabling him to outflank its advanced position, General Birney was compelled to fall back and re-form behind the line originally desired to be held. In the meantime, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, the Sixth Corps (Major General Sedgwick) and part of the First Corps, to which I had assigned Major General Newton, particularly Lockwood's Maryland Brigade, together with detachments from the Second Corps, were brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with the gallant resistance of the Fifth Corps, in checking, and, finally repulsing, the assault of the enemy. During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of the Twelfth Corps were sent as reinforcements. To make this specific and positive
Daniel E. Sickles (search for this): chapter 45
resistance of the Third Corps, under Major General Birney (Major General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), superiority of nuuation on the morning of the 2d. During the night of the 1st, General Sickles rested with the Third Corps upon the ground lying between Geneorps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were practicable; and in reply to his question as to what sort of position it was, General General Sickles had answered: There is no position there. At the first signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d, General Sickles became apprehensive that we were about to attack him, and so reported to General Meade. time to see the battle open. It will be seen, therefore, that General Sickles' move, and all the movements of the Federal left, were simply this position until the battle had finally opened. He had ordered Sickles to occupy it if practicable; but it was not occupied in force when
McLaws (search for this): chapter 45
ate to do so; that there was no order ever issued for a sunrise attack; that no such order could have been issued, and that the First Corps could not possibly have attacked at that time; that when it did attack its movement was weakened by the derangement of the directing brigade of support under General Wilcox, and was rendered hopeless by the failure of Ewell's Corps to co-operate, its line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early, and that in this attack Hood's and McLaws' Divisions did the best fighting ever done on any field, and encountered and drove back virtually the whole of the Army of the Potomac. I held that the mistakes of the Gettysburg campaign were: First, the change of the original plan of the campaign, which was to so maneuvre as to force the Federals to attack us; second, that if the plan was to have been changed at all it — should have been done at Brandy Station, near Culpepper Court-House, when we could have caught Hooker in detail, a
Ewell (search for this): chapter 45
e directing brigade of support under General Wilcox, and was rendered hopeless by the failure of Ewell's Corps to co-operate, its line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Earlyto attack us, as he certainly intended doing; sixth, when I attacked the enemy's left on the 2d, Ewell should have moved at once against his right, and Hill should have threatened his centre, and thuo have won the day. The only amendment that would have ensued, or even promised victory, was for Ewell to have marched in upon the enemy's right when it was guarded by a single brigade, run over theidvanced to battle, or made to even threaten battle. The work was left entirely with my men. General Ewell dates his co-operative move at dusk. General Meade says it was at eight o'clock. In any evedifferent battle. It is equally out of sense to say that if my attack had been made at sunrise, Ewell would have given me the co-operation that he failed to give in the afternoon when the attack rea
James Longstreet (search for this): chapter 45
The mistakes of Gettysburg. General James Longstreet. [Second article.] In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed sf May, 1863, was precisely sixty-eight thousand three hundred and fifty-two. I learn from General Longstreet that, when the three corps were concentrated at Chambersburg, the morning report showed si the reunion of a family. Truly and respectfully yours, W. H. Taylor, A. A. G. To General Longstreet. Lexington, Va., March 9th, 1866. My Dear General:--Your son Garland handed me, a few so. It is the only way in which we can hope that fragments of truth will reach posterity. Mrs. Longstreet will act as your amanuensis. I am very sorry that your arm improves so slowly. I trust that it will, eventually, be restored to you. You must present my kindest regards to Mrs. Longstreet. I hope your home in New Orleans will be happy, and that your life, which is dear to me, will be lo
Alexander H. Evans (search for this): chapter 45
to prepare for the forced reconnoissance. The reconnoissance was successfully made at nightfall. During the night several of my brigadiers came in and they all agreed in reporting the position very strong. At about midnight Generals I-Hood and Evans, and possibly one or two others, came to my headquarters and made similar reports, expressing apprehensions as to the result of the attack. Everything developed by this closer reconnoissance went to confirm the impression made upon me by my recoin very heavy force. They soon made the battle so severe for him that he was obliged to call for reinforcements. At about three P. M., while the battle was raging fiercely, I was riding to my front, when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the field where they were standing. I changed my course and hurried to the point indicated. I found them standing upon a high piece of ground, from which they had full view of the battle made against Jackson We c
Birney (search for this): chapter 45
nding, immediately sending a force to occupy Round Top Ridge, where a most furious contest was maintained, the enemy making desperate but unsuccessful attempts to secure it. Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the Third Corps, under Major General Birney (Major General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), superiority of number of corps of the enemy enabling him to outflank its advanced position, General Birney was compelled to fall back and re-form behind the line originally dGeneral Birney was compelled to fall back and re-form behind the line originally desired to be held. In the meantime, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, the Sixth Corps (Major General Sedgwick) and part of the First Corps, to which I had assigned Major General Newton, particularly Lockwood's Maryland Brigade, together with detachments from the Second Corps, were brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with the gallant resistance of the Fifth Corps, in checking, and, finally repulsing, the assault of the enemy. During the heavy assault upon our ex
Geary (search for this): chapter 45
changed the result for the better. Let us briefly review the situation on the morning of the 2d. During the night of the 1st, General Sickles rested with the Third Corps upon the ground lying between General Hancock's left and Round Top, General Geary's Division of the Twelfth Corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were practicable; and in reply to his question as to what sort of position it was, General General Sicklowed my movements inevitably, no matter when they had been made. Had the attack been made earlier or later we should have seen the Federals move just as they did, and with the same results-except that if I had attacked earlier I should have had Geary's Division of the Twelfth Corps in my immediate front in addition to the Third Corps. This would certainly have been the effect of a sunrise attack. Colonel Taylor, in referring to the hour of my battle on the 2d, says: Round Top, the key of
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