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Browsing named entities in a specific section of John G. Nicolay, A Short Life of Abraham Lincoln, condensed from Nicolay and Hayes' Abraham Lincoln: A History. Search the whole document.

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Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 22
's visit to Scott Pope assigned to command Lee's attack on McClellan retreat to Harrison's Lit turned out, also, to be the day on which General Lee began his attack on the Army of the Potomacretreat with skill and bravery, was attacked by Lee's army, and fought the second battle of Bull Rth the capital in possible danger of capture by Lee, and with a distracted and half-mutinous cabineher attack nor demonstration. Instead of this, Lee entered upon a campaign into Maryland, hoping tance in watching the movements of the enemy, as Lee gradually moved his forces northwestward towardat month McClellan had reached Frederick, while Lee was by that time across the Catoctin range at Bllan's hands the copy of an order issued by General Lee three days before, which, as McClellan himsotal moving force of more than eighty thousand; Lee, a total moving force of forty thousand. The Con forces, and during the four days succeeding, Lee had captured Harper's Ferry with eleven thousan[1 more...]
Stonewall Jackson (search for this): chapter 22
all Jackson's valley campaign, in which that eccentric and daring Confederate commander made a rapid and victorious march up the Shenandoah valley nearly to Harper's Ferry. Its principal effect upon the Richmond campaign was to turn back McDowell, who had been started on a land march to unite with the right wing of McClellan's army, under instructions, however, always to be in readiness to interpose his force against any attempt of the enemy to march upon Washington. This campaign of Stonewall Jackson's has been much lauded by military writers; but its temporary success resulted from good luck rather than military ability. Rationally considered, it was an imprudent and even reckless adventure that courted and would have resulted in destruction or capture had the junction of forces under McDowell, Shields, and Fremont, ordered by President Lincoln, not been thwarted by the mistake and delay of Fremont. It was an episode that signally demonstrated the wisdom of the President in hav
Montgomery Blair (search for this): chapter 22
net, which drew a gloomy picture of present and apprehended dangers, and recommended the immediate removal of Mc-Clellan from command. Chase and Stanton signed the paper, as also did Bates, whom they immediately consulted, and somewhat later Smith added his signature. But when they presented it to Welles, he firmly refused, stating that though he concurred with them in judgment, it would be discourteous and unfriendly to the President to adopt such a course. They did not go to Seward and Blair, apparently believing them to be friendly to McClellan, and therefore probably unwilling to give their assent. The refusal of Mr. Welles to sign had evidently caused a more serious discussion among them about the form and language of the protest; for on Monday, September I, it was entirely rewritten by Bates, cut down to less than half its original length as drafted by Stanton, and once more signed by the same four members of the cabinet. Presented for the second time to Mr. Welles, he
Mc-Clellan (search for this): chapter 22
nable or unwilling to act with prompt direction and command equal to the emergency, though still willing to give his advice and suggestion. Under such conditions, Mr. Lincoln saw that it was necessary for him personally to exercise at the moment his military functions and authority as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. On the morning of September 2, therefore, he gave a verbal order, which during the day was issued in regular form as coming from the general-in-chief, that Major-General Mc-Clellan be placed in command of the fortifications around Washington and the troops for the defense of the capital. Mr. Lincoln made no concealment of his belief that McClellan had acted badly toward Pope and really wanted him to fail; but there is no one in the army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he can, he said. We must use the tools we have; if he cannot fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight. It turned ou
Clellan (search for this): chapter 22
New York Lincoln's letter to Seward Lincoln's letter to McClellan-.Lincoln's visit to McClellan Halleck made General-in chief Halleck's visit to Mc Clellan withdrawal from Harrison's Landing Pope assumes command second battle of Bull Run the cabinet protest McClellan ordered to defend Washington-the Maryland campaign battle of Antietam Lincoln visits Antietam Lincoln's letter to Mc Clellan McClellan removed from command During the month of May, while General McClellan was slowly working his way across the Chickahominy by bridge-building and intrenching, there occurred the episode of Stonewall Jackson's valley campaign, d. On Monday, September I, repressing every feeling of indignation, and solicitous only to make every expedient contribute to the public safety, he called Mc- Clellan from Alexandria to Washington and asked him to use his personal influence with the officers who had been under his command to give a hearty and loyal support to P
Gideon Welles (search for this): chapter 22
did Bates, whom they immediately consulted, and somewhat later Smith added his signature. But when they presented it to Welles, he firmly refused, stating that though he concurred with them in judgment, it would be discourteous and unfriendly to tntly believing them to be friendly to McClellan, and therefore probably unwilling to give their assent. The refusal of Mr. Welles to sign had evidently caused a more serious discussion among them about the form and language of the protest; for on Mo drafted by Stanton, and once more signed by the same four members of the cabinet. Presented for the second time to Mr. Welles, he reiterated his objection, and again refused his signature. Though in the new form it bore the signatures of a majority of the cabinet, the paper was never presented to Mr. Lincoln. The signers may have adopted the feeling of Mr. Welles that it was discourteous; or they may have thought that with only four members of the cabinet for it and three against it, it w
John C. Fremont (search for this): chapter 22
e that courted and would have resulted in destruction or capture had the junction of forces under McDowell, Shields, and Fremont, ordered by President Lincoln, not been thwarted by the mistake and delay of Fremont. It was an episode that signally dFremont. It was an episode that signally demonstrated the wisdom of the President in having retained McDowell's corps for the protection of the national capital. That, however, was not the only precaution to which the President had devoted his serious attention. During the whole of McCl Pope from the West, and, by an order dated June 26, specially assigned him to the command of the combined forces under Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, to be called the Army of Virginia, whose duty it should be to guard the Shenandoah valley and Washe studied the military situation, and on July 14 assumed command of the Army of Virginia, consisting of the corps of General Fremont, eleven thousand five hundred strong, and that of General Banks, eight thousand strong, in the Shenandoah valley, an
James Shields (search for this): chapter 22
f McClellan's army, under instructions, however, always to be in readiness to interpose his force against any attempt of the enemy to march upon Washington. This campaign of Stonewall Jackson's has been much lauded by military writers; but its temporary success resulted from good luck rather than military ability. Rationally considered, it was an imprudent and even reckless adventure that courted and would have resulted in destruction or capture had the junction of forces under McDowell, Shields, and Fremont, ordered by President Lincoln, not been thwarted by the mistake and delay of Fremont. It was an episode that signally demonstrated the wisdom of the President in having retained McDowell's corps for the protection of the national capital. That, however, was not the only precaution to which the President had devoted his serious attention. During the whole of McClellan's Richmond campaign he had continually borne in mind the possibility of his defeat, and the eventualities
August 3rd (search for this): chapter 22
is operations against Richmond. To do this he wanted fifty thousand more men, which number it was impossible to give him, as he had already been pointedly informed by the President. On Halleck's return to Washington, it was, on further consultation, resolved to bring the Army of the Potomac back to Acquia Creek and unite it with the army of Pope. On July 30, McClellan received a preliminary order to send away his sick, and the withdrawal of his entire force was ordered by telegraph on August 3. With the obstinacy and persistence that characterized his course from first to last, McClellan still protested against the change, and when Halleck in a calm letter answered his objections with both the advantages and the necessity of the order, McClellan's movement of withdrawal was so delayed that fully eleven days of inestimable time were unnecessarily lost, and the army of Pope was thereby put in serious peril. Meanwhile, under President Lincoln's order of June 26, General Pope h
September 13th (search for this): chapter 22
by General Lee three days before, which, as McClellan himself states in his report, fully disclosed Lee's plans. The situation was therefore, as follows: It was splendid September weather, with the roads in fine condition. McClellan commanded a total moving force of more than eighty thousand; Lee, a total moving force of forty thousand. The Confederate army was divided. Each of the separate portions was within twenty miles of the Union columns; and before half-past 6 on the evening of September 13, McClellan had full knowledge of the enemy's plans. General Palfrey, an intelligent critic friendly to McClellan, distinctly admits that the Union army, properly commanded, could have absolutely annihilated the Confederate forces. But the result proved quite different. Even such advantages in McClellan's hands failed to rouse him to vigorous and decisive action. As usual, hesitation and tardiness characterized the orders and movements of the Union forces, and during the four days s
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