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Cemetery Hill (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 36
t, where it would not be exposed to the enemy's fire, and would be in position to advance on Cemetery Hill when a favorable opportunity should occur. This movement was made, and Hays formed his brigosition until the afternoon. On page 405, Hancock says: I was placed on the line connecting Cemetery Hill with Little Round Top Mountain, my line, however, not extending to Round Top, probably only cted to connect with my left and the Round Top Mountain, thus forming a continuous line from Cemetery Hill (which was held by Gen. Howard) to Round Top Mountain. These arrangements were not made uhaving arrived, and got back just as Hays' and Hoke's brigades were moving to the assault of Cemetery Hill. The repetition of this statement is simply ridiculous, and shows how hard. General Longste wooded and exceedingly rugged. This part of the line confronted Johnson's division, while Cemetery Hill itself was held by the First and Eleventh corps, which Butterfield sbows in his testimony nu
t two of my brigades were placed, on the afternoon of the 1st, before General Lee came to our part of the line, on the York road, to guard against a flank movement apprehended in that direction. They never were in the line on the 2nd at all, but Gordon's brigade was sent for on the 2nd, Stuart's cavalry having arrived, and got back just as Hays' and Hoke's brigades were moving to the assault of Cemetery Hill. The repetition of this statement is simply ridiculous, and shows how hard. General Lany state in all that grand army than the North Carolina soldiers, and of all that bright galaxy of heroes who yielded their lives for their country's cause while serving with that army, the names of Anderson, Branch, Pender, Daniel, Ramseur, and Gordon of the cavalry, will stand among the foremost. There was enough glory won by the Army of Northern Virginia for each state to have its full share and be content with it, and there is no occasion to wrangle over the distribution of the honors.
Edward Everett (search for this): chapter 36
were thwarted by the delay on the right, can any man doubt? On the occasion of the dedication of the Cemetery for the Federal soldiers killed at Gettysburg, Edward Everett, in the presence of President Lincoln, some of his cabinet, many members of Congress and officers of the army, and an immense concours) of citizens, deliveredhe rest of the army enjoyed a much needed half-day's repose. It is to be presumed that before preparing an address that was to assume a historical character, Mr. Everett had obtained accurate knowledge of all that transpired within the Federal lines from the most authentic sources, and doubtless he presents a true picture of the actual condition of things. If General Lee was responsible for the delay the effects of which were so graphically described by Mr. Everett, if, in fact, his mind was undecided and vascillating as to when, where, and how he should begin, then his conduct on that occasion was at war with his whole character and history. Who ca
Stonewall Jackson (search for this): chapter 36
dence in carrying out the plans of the Commanding-General. A subordinate who undertakes to doubt the wisdom of his superior's plans, and enters upon their execution with reluctance and distrust, will not be likely to ensure success. It was General Jackson's unhesitating confidence and faith in the chances of success that caused it so often to perch on his banners, and made him such an invaluable executor of General Lee's plans. If Mr. Swinton has told the truth, in repeating in his book whation and boldness in action: There is another reason, which to me is a most potent One; and that is, because I know that the boldest man in his strategic movements and his tactics on the field of battle, in all the Army of Northern Virginia, Stonewall Jackson not excepted, was General Robert E. Lee. I cannot believe, therefore, that he omitted to do anything necessary to carry out his avowed purpose of attacking the enemy at a very early hour on the morning of the 2nd, which every consideration
was in making such a remark will abundantly appear from the facts I have already given in my Review, and the statement of Bates in regard to the precautions taken by Steinwehr, whose division, of 4,000 men, occupied the heights immediately confront The article now given under the sanction of his name quotes partly from the preliminary report given in the Appendix to Bates' History of the Battle of Gettysburg and partly from the detailed report; but it appears that he thinks the latter was wrhe First and Eleventh corps, which were adjacent to him, when he succeeded in repulsing them. In his official report, Bates' Battle of Gettysburg, page 240, Meade says: An assault was, however, made about eight P. M. on the Eleventh corps,ade by my two brigades described in my Review. That attack began sooner than Meade states. It began about sunset (see Bates), and my brigades were compelled to retire probably about or a little after 8 P. M. It will be seen that there is a very
's lines of battle. I sent word to General Meade that we would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent as quickly as possible, a division of General Sykes' corps; but before they arrived the enemy's line of battle — I should think a mile and a half longbegan to advance, and the battle became very heavy at once. The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top Hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it. During all the forenoon the bulk of Meade's troops which had arrived were massed on the right (enemy's), as Meade contemplated an attack from that flank-Hancock's corps connected with Howard's, and Sicklesh corps arrived, I directed the Fifth corps, then in reserve on the right, to move over and be in reserve on the left. It was a division of the Fifth corps (General Sykes') that rescued the Round Top from the grasp of our assaulting column. Does not this show how weak the left was in the morning, and how easy it would have then
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 36
er on that day from either General Ewell or General Lee until after the whole fighting was over, exeton, by his ignorance, marred the plans of General Lee, General Longstreet is made to say: General Early broke up General Lee's line of battle on the 2d of July, by detaching part of his division othe co-operative attack of Ewell ordered by General Lee. This statement must have been compiled al Longstreet has merely shown that four of General Lee's staff officers knew of no such order, butreet and General Pendleton. The latter was General Lee's chief of artillery, who had very importantained the information as to the order from General Lee himself, and I am disposed to side with himdivisions in the attack made on the 3d. General Lee's statement of his orders in regard to thist has heretofore denied the authenticity of General Lee's detailed report, first published in the Hantly apparent that the orders and plans of General Lee did not receive from him that hearty suppor[5 more...]
Fitzhugh Lee (search for this): chapter 36
of his present narrative. It is that while General Lee on the battlefield assumed all the responsied by the unreliability of his memory, that General Lee ordered me to attack the enemy at sunrise olse's assertion that the order was given by General Lee to General Longstreet to attack at sunrise eet: As my memory now serves me, it was General Lee's intention to attack the enemy on the seco such was the case from the instructions that Gen. Lee gave me on the evening of the first and very ut sunrise on the 2nd of July I was sent by General Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thoughtal Longstreet very loth to make the attack; but Lee thinking the Union force was not all up, would in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee--with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre-hi. Can there longer be any question that General Lee wanted LJongstreet to begin the attack verytreet's opinion that there is no doubt that General Lee during the crisis of that campaign lost the[50 more...]
press it as soon as the remainder of his army arrived. In a conference with General Ewell, General Rodes and myself, when he did reach us, after the enemy had been routed, he expressed his determinsunrise, or at any other specific time. I merely state that he had announced to Generals Ewell, Rodes, and myself his purpose to attack at dawn on the morning of the 2nd, and that he had left us foyet determined as to when the attack should be made. Now, General Lee had announced to Ewell, Rodes, and myself his purpose to attack at daylight or as soon thereafter as practicable, and asked whng this to advantage, he was reinforced by Smith's brigade of Early's division, and Daniel's and Rodes' (old) brigades of Rodes' division. Half an hour after Johnson attacked (on Friday morning),Rodes' division. Half an hour after Johnson attacked (on Friday morning), and when too late to recall him, I received notice that General Longstreet would not attack until 10 o'clock; but, as it turned out, his attack was delayed till after 2 o'clock. Just before the time
reet which has been mentioned, as follows: That General Lee was correct in selecting the enemy's left for his attack, there can be no question, for that was the weakest and most assailable part of the enemy's line. That the possession of Round Top by us would have rendered the position at Gettysburg untenable by the enemy, is proved by the testimony of Meade himself, contained in the same volume of Reports on the Conduct of the War from which 1 have already quoted, and to which I will reard's, and Sickles was on the left of Hancock, but he did not go into position until the afternoon. On page 405, Hancock says: I was placed on the line connecting Cemetery Hill with Little Round Top Mountain, my line, however, not extending to Round Top, probably only about half way. General Sickles was directed to connect with my left and the Round Top Mountain, thus forming a continuous line from Cemetery Hill (which was held by Gen. Howard) to Round Top Mountain. These arrangements were
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