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ing that he had made a reconnoissance to ascertain whether an attack could be made on our left, Warren on page 377, says: Soon afterwards I rode out with General Meade to examine the left. of our line, where Gen. Sickles was. His troops could hardly be said to be in position. On page 332, Meade.says he arrived on the ground where Sickles was, a few minutes before 4 o'clock in the afternoon. That Round Top was unoccupied until after Longstreet's attack began, is proved by the testimony of Warren, who says, on page 377: I then went, by General Meade's direction, to what is called Bald Top, and from that point I could see the enemy's lines of battle. I sent word to General Meade that we would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent as quickly as possible, a division of General Sykes' corps; but before they arrived the enemy's line of battle — I should think a mile and a half longbegan to advance, and the battle became very heavy at once. The troops under General Sy
Patton Anderson (search for this): chapter 36
e soldiers from North Carolina, especially, have taken exception to the remarks and statements of others, I will take occasion to say, that every infantry organization from that state belonging to the Army of Northern Virginia, prior to my departure from it on my Valley campaign, had at some time been under my command, and there was but a very brief interval when I did not have North Carolina soldiers under me. I can say in all sincerity, that there were no better troops from any state in all that grand army than the North Carolina soldiers, and of all that bright galaxy of heroes who yielded their lives for their country's cause while serving with that army, the names of Anderson, Branch, Pender, Daniel, Ramseur, and Gordon of the cavalry, will stand among the foremost. There was enough glory won by the Army of Northern Virginia for each state to have its full share and be content with it, and there is no occasion to wrangle over the distribution of the honors. J. A. Early.
Butterfield (search for this): chapter 36
to take part in the action on the enemy's left, Meade adding: The enemy having been repulsed before the rest of the force came up. It was then on the extreme right from which troops were taken, so as to leave only one brigade there. This was at Culp's Hill and on the right of it (the enemy's), where the sides of the hill were wooded and exceedingly rugged. This part of the line confronted Johnson's division, while Cemetery Hill itself was held by the First and Eleventh corps, which Butterfield sbows in his testimony numbered more than 10,000 men on the 4th of July, after all the fighting on the 2nd and 3rd. In addition, the Second corps, Hancock's, was on the left of the Eleventh corps, connecting with it. That corps had three divisions, only one of which was sent to the enemy's left during Longstreet's attack. The attack mentioned by Meade as having been made on the Eleventh corps, when troops from the Second and First corps came to its assistance, was the.attack made by my
Walter H. Taylor (search for this): chapter 36
e enemy had crossed the Potomac and was moving north. The statements of Colonel Taylor and Marshall, and of Gen- Long, as given by General Longstreet, that they kde with him on the question of veracity, just as I am disposed to side with Colonel Taylor on the direct issue of veracity raised by General Longstreet with him in reto make it with Longstreet's whole corps, and is therefore corroborative of Colonel Taylor's statement. It is to be observed here that General Longstreet has hereon of the testimony by General Longstreet or his compiler. In referring to Colonel Taylor's account of the delay in the attack from our right on the 2d, the article proceeds: He (Colonel Taylor) says: General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected; [it appears that he was delayed by apprehensistatement, and then follows an extract from Meade's testimony. The part of Colonel Taylor's statement, put in brackets above, was omitted in the article. Here is Ew
on that day, is simply ridiculous. Every one else was waiting for him to begin, as the orders required them to do. General Ewell, in his report, in speaking of a contemplated movement by Johnson on our extreme left, says: Day was now breaking, and it was too late for any change of plans. Meantime orders had come from the General Commanding for me to delay my attack until I heard General Longstreet's guns open on the right. He is here speaking of the morning of the 2d; and would Col. Enable have us believe that General Lee had not then made up his mind that Longstreet should open the attack, or communicated his intention to the latter? There is one thing very certain, and that is that either General Lee or General Longstreet was responsible for the remarkable .delay that took place in making the attack. I choose to believe that it was not General Lee, for if any one knew the value of promptness and celerity in military movements he did. It is equally certain that the de
John B. Hood (search for this): chapter 36
o persistently averse to the attack, and so loth to take the steps necessary to begin it, he again sent Col. Venable to Ewell to see whether, after viewing the position by daylight, he could not make the attack from his flank. Let us see what General Hood says in his letter to Longstreet. He says: I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an openfrom General Lee himself, and I am disposed to side with him on the question of veracity, just as I am disposed to side with Colonel Taylor on the direct issue of veracity raised by General Longstreet with him in regard to the order for the use of Hood's and McLaws' divisions in the attack made on the 3d. General Lee's statement of his orders in regard to this latter attack would imply that the orders originally given in regard to it were to make it with Longstreet's whole corps, and is ther
A. B. Howard (search for this): chapter 36
nd Top Hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it. During all the forenoon the bulk of Meade's troops which had arrived were massed on the right (enemy's), as Meade contemplated an attack from that flank-Hancock's corps connected with Howard's, and Sickles was on the left of Hancock, but he did not go into position until the afternoon. On page 405, Hancock says: I was placed on the line connecting Cemetery Hill with Little Round Top Mountain, my line, however, not extending to Round Top, probably only about half way. General Sickles was directed to connect with my left and the Round Top Mountain, thus forming a continuous line from Cemetery Hill (which was held by Gen. Howard) to Round Top Mountain. These arrangements were not made until the morning was considerably advanced. On page 331, Meade after stating his purpose to make an attack from his right says: Major-General Slocum, however, reported that the character of the ground in front was unfavorable to ma
3rd day, I said: On the next day, when the assault was made by Pickett's division in such gallant style, there was again a miscarriage inement. On page 358 there is this foot note: The absence of Pickett's division on the day before made General Longstreet very loth to efore Meade's army should all be up? Swinton says: The absence of Pickett's division on the day before made General Longstreet very loth to him he will whip us. You thought it best to await the arrival of Pickett's division-at that time still in the rear-in order to make the attis morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off. Thus passed the afternoon, about 3 o'clock, it was decided to no longer await Pickett's division, but to proceed to outr extreme right and attack up thel of artillery at Gettysburg. that the responsibility of ordering Pickett when to begin the charge on the third day was devolved on him, wit
e soldiers from North Carolina, especially, have taken exception to the remarks and statements of others, I will take occasion to say, that every infantry organization from that state belonging to the Army of Northern Virginia, prior to my departure from it on my Valley campaign, had at some time been under my command, and there was but a very brief interval when I did not have North Carolina soldiers under me. I can say in all sincerity, that there were no better troops from any state in all that grand army than the North Carolina soldiers, and of all that bright galaxy of heroes who yielded their lives for their country's cause while serving with that army, the names of Anderson, Branch, Pender, Daniel, Ramseur, and Gordon of the cavalry, will stand among the foremost. There was enough glory won by the Army of Northern Virginia for each state to have its full share and be content with it, and there is no occasion to wrangle over the distribution of the honors. J. A. Early.
d left flanks very early next morning, I gave orders to General Hays to move his brigade, under cover of the night, from theable opportunity should occur. This movement was made, and Hays formed his brigade on the right of Avery, and just behind t, a book I never heard of before, an absurd story about General Hays' having sent for me at the close of the fight on the 1sthe heights, in which it is said that, though I agreed with Hays, I refused to allow him to seize those heights, because ordashtown. General Longstreet says, in this connection. General Hays told me ten years after the battle that he could have s the heights without the loss of ten men. How mistaken General Hays was in making such a remark will abundantly appear fromof 4,000 men, occupied the heights immediately confronting Hays, whose brigade was considerably less than 1,400 strong at t 2nd, Stuart's cavalry having arrived, and got back just as Hays' and Hoke's brigades were moving to the assault of Cemetery
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