hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Fitzhugh Lee 417 7 Browse Search
Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) 407 1 Browse Search
James Longstreet 400 4 Browse Search
Generell Ewell 398 0 Browse Search
Pickett 243 17 Browse Search
A. P. Hill 218 12 Browse Search
R. E. Lee 206 0 Browse Search
Meade 193 25 Browse Search
Edward Johnson 179 3 Browse Search
Rodes 160 10 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

Found 568 total hits in 93 results.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
made him such an invaluable executor of General Lee's plans. If Mr. Swinton has told the truth, in repeating in his book what is alleged to the Washington and Lee University from the fact that I had read Mr. Swinton's Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, and discovered that his everal respects, was based on information given by the latter to Mr. Swinton after the war. I here give some extracts from Swinton's book: Swinton's book: On page 340 he says: Indeed, in entering on the campaign, General Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that'he would not assume s again General Longstreet. These uncontradicted statements by Swinton, the genuineness of which is now verified by similar statements unrk then begun immediately after the war by his communications to Mr. Swinton, his complaint now of being rancorously assailed by those whose on the morning of the 2nd, before Meade's army should all be up? Swinton says: The absence of Pickett's division on the day before made Gen
J. A. Early (search for this): chapter 36
Supplement to General Early's Review.-reply to General Longstreet. [We had intended to have published in this No. of our Papers General without note or comment of our own, the following rejoinder of General Early.] After the foregoing review was in the hands of the printal Lee ordered me to attack the enemy at sunrise on the 2nd. General J. A. Early has, in positive terms, endorsed this charge, which I now pr Having thus disproved the assertions of Messrs. Pendleton. and Early in regard to this rumored order for a sunrise attack, it appears thed the plans of General Lee, General Longstreet is made to say: General Early broke up General Lee's line of battle on the 2d of July, by detof doing this to advantage, he was reinforced by Smith's brigade of Early's division, and Daniel's and Rodes' (old) brigades of Rodes' divisiate to have its full share and be content with it, and there is no occasion to wrangle over the distribution of the honors. J. A. Early.
A. P. Hill (search for this): chapter 36
seemed under a subdued excitement which occasionally took possession of him when the hunt was up, and threatened his superb equipoise. The sharp battle fought by Hill and Ewell on that day had given him a taste of victory. Is this Swinton, or Longstreet, or the writer for the Times? It is very clear to my mind that when rther orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of that same morning, we were both engaged, in company with Generals Lee and A. P. Hill, in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee--with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre-hilt buckled around the waist, and field-glasses. pending at re as the other troops. Ewell's corps had captured Winchester and cleared the valley on its advance into Pennsylvania, and two of its divisions, as well as two of Hill's, had been heavily engaged on the first. Can it be that General Longstreet apprehended that if the advantage gained on the first day was promptly and vigorous
lost us the victory. It was very natural that Longstreet's corps should be selected to assume the initiative on the 2nd day at Gettysburg. Neither of his divisions had been at the recent battles at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, except McLaws', and that division, with the exception of Barksdale's brigade, had not been as heavily engaged there as the other troops. Ewell's corps had captured Winchester and cleared the valley on its advance into Pennsylvania, and two of its divisions, a Lee himself, and I am disposed to side with him on the question of veracity, just as I am disposed to side with Colonel Taylor on the direct issue of veracity raised by General Longstreet with him in regard to the order for the use of Hood's and McLaws' divisions in the attack made on the 3d. General Lee's statement of his orders in regard to this latter attack would imply that the orders originally given in regard to it were to make it with Longstreet's whole corps, and is therefore corrob
Isaac E. Avery (search for this): chapter 36
the rest of our army would move up during the night, and that the enemy's position would be attacked on the right and left flanks very early next morning, I gave orders to General Hays to move his brigade, under cover of the night, from the town into the field on the left of it, where it would not be exposed to the enemy's fire, and would be in position to advance on Cemetery Hill when a favorable opportunity should occur. This movement was made, and Hays formed his brigade on the right of Avery, and just behind the extension of the low ridge on which a portion of the town is located. The attack did not begin in the morning of next day, as was expected, and in the course of the morning I rode with Gen. Ewell to examine and select a position for artillery. Here is a statement of a fact while its recollection was fresh in my memory, and it cannot surely be said that it was made for the purpose of attacking General Longstreet's war record because of political differences, or from
rt in the action, the enemy having been repulsed before the rest of the force came up. The absence of this large proportion of the Twelfth corps caused my extreme right flank to be held by one single brigade of the Twelfth corps, commanded by General Greene. The enemy perceiving this, made a vigorous attack upon General Greene, but were held at bay by him for some time, until he was reinforced by portions of the First and Eleventh corps, which were adjacent to him, when he succeeded in repulsinGeneral Greene, but were held at bay by him for some time, until he was reinforced by portions of the First and Eleventh corps, which were adjacent to him, when he succeeded in repulsing them. In his official report, Bates' Battle of Gettysburg, page 240, Meade says: An assault was, however, made about eight P. M. on the Eleventh corps, from the left of the town, which was repelled by the assistance of troops from the Second and First corps. During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of th.e Twelfth corps were sent as reinforcements. During their absence the line on the extreme right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of
A. Lincoln (search for this): chapter 36
fth corps (General Sykes') that rescued the Round Top from the grasp of our assaulting column. Does not this show how weak the left was in the morning, and how easy it would have then been for our troops on the right to have gotten possession of the key to the position? That General Lee's plans were thwarted by the delay on the right, can any man doubt? On the occasion of the dedication of the Cemetery for the Federal soldiers killed at Gettysburg, Edward Everett, in the presence of President Lincoln, some of his cabinet, many members of Congress and officers of the army, and an immense concours) of citizens, delivered an address, in which he thus graphically describes the effect of the delay that took place: And here I cannot but remark on the Providential inaction of the rebel army. Had the conflict been renewed by it at daylight on the 2nd of July, with the First and Eleventh corps exhausted by battle, the Third and Twelfth weary from their forced march, and the Second, Fi
Generell Ewell (search for this): chapter 36
of his army arrived. In a conference with General Ewell, General Rodes and myself, when he did rea. I merely state that he had announced to Generals Ewell, Rodes, and myself his purpose to attack be made. Now, General Lee had announced to Ewell, Rodes, and myself his purpose to attack at dahave caused the sending of Colonel Marshall to Ewell on the night of the first, after the conferenc? Doubtless, after sending Colonel Venable to Ewell, General Lee's impatience at Longstreet's oppo all their points against him. In speaking of Ewell's inaction, he says: Having failed to movey one brigade to hold the trenches in front of Ewell, there was a force fully equal to the entire suld be taken in reverse as they advanced]. General Ewell, who had orders to co-operate with Generalts above, was omitted in the article. Here is Ewell's whole statement as contained in his report: attack at all. General Longstreet complains of Ewell's inaction on the 2d. What must be thought of[29 more...]
Charles S. Venable (search for this): chapter 36
r of the Southern Historical Society Papers. The letter of Colonel Venable is as follows: University of Virginia, May 11, 1875. General unrise by any portion of the army. Yours, very truly, Chas. S. Venable. Can Colonel Venable or any one else believe that General LColonel Venable or any one else believe that General Lee had formed — no definite opinion as to how he should attack the enemy until after his return at 9 A. M. on the 2nd from Ewell's line? Thalay that occurred must rest on him, and on him alone. That Colonel Venable is sincere in his opinions I do not doubt, but I think his read so loth to take the steps necessary to begin it, he again sent Col. Venable to Ewell to see whether, after viewing the position by daylight,ter threw every obstacle in the way? Doubtless, after sending Colonel Venable to Ewell, General Lee's impatience at Longstreet's opposition though he did not begin the attack until about 4 P. M. If, as Colonel Venable supposes, General Lee had been undecided or vascillating as to
Freemantle (search for this): chapter 36
short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of that same morning, we were both engaged, in company with Generals Lee and A. P. Hill, in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee--with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre-hilt buckled around the waist, and field-glasses. pending at his side-walked up and down in the. shade of large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet at times buried in deep thought. Colonel Freemantle, of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree not far off, with glass in constant use, examining the lofty position of the Federal army. General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: The enemy is here, and if we don't whip him he will whip us. You thought it best to await the arrival of Pickett's division-at that time still in the rear-in order to make the attack; and you said to me subsequently, whilst we were seated together near
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10