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d a bitter tirade of denunciation against General Fitz Lee, General William N. Pendleton, the Rev. JAt this late date the official relations of General Lee and myself are brought in question. He is lusion is here made to the language used by General Lee, as given by me, in the conference had witht is the real purport of the charge against General Lee, as the editor of the Times gives it, and io get ready? It must be borne in mind that General Lee wanted to make the attack on the enemy the ier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for him to hurry to the assistance of Jacks so, but presumed to question the wisdom of General Lee's decision, and oppose to it his own judgmenvasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive elf who was the self-constituted council of General Lee, and claimed the right to dictate and contrhe prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a [37 more...]
J. E. B. Stuart (search for this): chapter 3.25
know when he was ready or had actually begun, and the complaint therefore comes from him with a very bad grace. He who is at fault is very generally apt to lay the blame on others for what is due to his own shortcomings. There is again in this second article an allusion to our line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early. By this is meant the posting of two of my brigades in a position to protect our left flank, which was very much exposed before the arrival of Stuart's cavalry. This has been fully explained heretofore, and the fact shown that these two brigades never constituted any part of our line; so that it was not broken by their being assigned the position they occupied. If General Longstreet found it necessary to take two of his divisions, which were intended to support the attacking column on the 3d, in order to protect his right flank against two brigades of Pleasanton's cavalry, it was certainly not unreasonable to take two brigades to prote
Featherston (search for this): chapter 3.25
and ordering the move which was then going on, at the same time offering me Major-General Anderson's division. The Commanding General soon joined me, and, a few minutes after, Major-General Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from, the rear, Kemper's three brigades and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Prior became detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking columns moved steadily forward, driving the enemy from his' different positions as rapidly as he took them. The claims here made are exorbitant enough in all conscience, but there is a little room left for a suspicion that Jackson's men had something to do with the repulse of the enemy from their front, and that it was not all the work of Longstreet's two batteries, and that th
Abraham Lincoln (search for this): chapter 3.25
at he was wholly incompetent to the command of the large army under him, or that he was weak enough to yield to a senseless clamor in opposition to his own judgment. He would have had to wait but a very few days, if he had pursued his true policy, to vindicate its wisdom and put to shame the clamorers for immediate attack. French had 8,000 men at Frederick, with 4,000 more somewhere on the way between Harper's Ferry and Washington; Pennsylvania had put into the field, under a call of President Lincoln for the emergency, 32,104 well-equipped militia; and New York had sent forward 13,971 men, under the same call, as shown by the final report of the Provost-Marshal General, page 53, (Documents 1865-‘6). Other troops were on their way from North Carolina and the Virginia Peninsula. The greater part of all these troops, and probably a considerable portion of the troops still in the defenses of Washington, especially south of the Potomac, would have been added to Meade's army, before he
nd became engaged, when there was a conflict between Hood's. division and King's division of McDowell's corps,s riding to my front when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the fion arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were whole command against the Federal centre and left. Hood's two brigades, followed by Evans, led the attack. Anderson's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades of Wilcox moved forward on and had made the attack early instead of late. General Hood says that Longstreet said to him on the morning I never like to go into battle with one boot off. Hood got up before sunrise, and he gives several circumstd to his incompetency. It is pitiable to think that Hood's gallant men were doomed to slaughter in a desperatthe ground, would have fallen into the possession of Hood's men with little or no contest; for Sykes' troops,
gical. All the inferences from his telegram are that Meade would not have attacked us in our then position, unless he could do so to great advantage, and the fact is that, after a reconnoissance, he abandoned the only project of attack which he formed, to-wit: from his right against our left flank. If we had abandoned our position after the success of the first day, the moral effect upon our own men would have been that of a defeat. If we had moved to Meade's left to get between him and Washington, and he had made a corresponding movement to protect his supplies and his communications, it is impossible to conceive how that could have given us the moral effect of a victory. That he would not have followed us at once to attack us in any new position we may have taken to threaten his communications with Washington, is shown by his own declared purpose in this telegram. His policy, doubtless, would have been, after securing his depot and rendering his own supplies certain, to take and
Charles E. Hooker (search for this): chapter 3.25
al Longstreet has not the remotest conception of the importance of celerity in preparing for and conducting an attack. According to his own admission, he received at 11 o'clock in the forenoon the positive order to make the attack, and yet it took hin until 4 o'clock in the afternoon to get ready for that attack. Imagine Stonewall Jackson taking five hours to reconnoitre the enemy's position and get his own troops in position before beginning his advance, after making the circuit to get on Hooker's right flank at Chancellorsville, thus giving the latter time to be informed of the movent and to prepare for receiving the projected blow, and what, can it be supposed, would have been the result? Is it not manifest that instead of the brilliant victory which crowned the career of that immortal hero, there would have been a disastrous repulse? General Longstreet's repugnance to making the attack, and his foreboding of failure, were very potent causes of the want of success when the att
D. R. Jones (search for this): chapter 3.25
attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from, the rear, Kemper's three brigades and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Prior became detached, and operated with a por. H. Anderson's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades of Wilcox moved forward on his left, and those of Kemper on his right. D. R. Jones advanced on the extreme right, and the whole line swept steadily on, driving the enemy, with great carnage, from each successive position, until 10 P. M., when all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the battle, be counted as reinforcements. These facts should satisfy General Lon
James Longstreet (search for this): chapter 3.25
tion in the New Orleans Republican, from General Longstreet, which has been referred to. That communlose of the first day's fight, when he said: Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in posit time while under that generous spirit. General Longstreet and other officers made their official rof the battle-and the account from which General Longstreet's critics get all their points against h whole credit for that battle was due to General Longstreet, and General Lee had very little to do w merely withstood the enemy's attacks, while Longstreet was getting ready; and the question comes ins their numbers, for the long hours it took Longstreet to get ready? It must be borne in mind that It may be observed here, that, while General Longstreet has given a letter from General Lee to hhat the battle would have been gained if General Longstreet had obeyed the orders given him, and had which is marvellous. The idea is, that, if Longstreet's columns had gone to the attack at sunrise,[66 more...]
to attack us in position on the heights of Gettysburg, if we had gained that position on the 1st, than he showed himself to attack us in the position on Seminary Ridge, with our left extended in a curve through Gettysburg. He did not attack us on the 4th in our then position on Seminary Ridge, after the disastrous repulse of the day before; nor did he dare attack us, afterwards, in the vicinity of Hagerstown, when he had been reinforced by 8,000 men under French, and a considerable part of Couch's force from Harrisonburg, besides having at hand (at Harper's Ferry) a portion of the troops from North Carolina and the Peninsula, with all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the battle, be counted as reinforcements. These facts should satisfy General Longstreet and his adherents
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