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Pope (search for this): chapter 3.25
and on the field, that General Fitz John Porter, of the Federal army, was afterwards court-martialed and cashiered for failing to carry out an order sent to him by Pope, at half-past 4 o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack Jackson's right flank — the very one on which Longstreet was. It was not until after sunset that any part to reconnoitre. It was twenty-seven hours after his arrival on the field before he was ready to begin, and if the troops of McClellan, the junction of which with Pope's Army Jackson's movement had been intended to prevent, had been hurried to the front, what a different result might have taken place! Is it to be credited thatt interminable period before they were brought into action, and often was uttered the anxious enquiry, by those who for four days had been confronting and fighting Pope's accumulating columns, Will Longstreet never begin ? Is it to be wondered that General Lee had come to the conclusion that Longstreet was very slow, however well
Sykes (search for this): chapter 3.25
f the ground, would have fallen into the possession of Hood's men with little or no contest; for Sykes' troops, that saved that point from capture, had not then started from the enemy's right. Even left until the afternoon, when it was reported impracticable. He then ordered the Fifth corps (Sykes') over to the left about 2 o'clock P. M. In his testimony he says: About half-past 3 o'cloMeade that that point would have to be occupied very strongly. Meade then ordered a division of Sykes' corps, which was coming up, to the position, and Warren says: The troops under General SyGeneral Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it. The assumption, under these circumstances, that, had the attack been made earlier or later, we set's columns that he was enabled to make in the afternoon, after he had gone to that flank, and Sykes had had two hours for his movement from the right to the left, before Longstreet's advance began
McDowell (search for this): chapter 3.25
et given to the enemy of the presence of his command on the field, that General Fitz John Porter, of the Federal army, was afterwards court-martialed and cashiered for failing to carry out an order sent to him by Pope, at half-past 4 o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack Jackson's right flank — the very one on which Longstreet was. It was not until after sunset that any part of Longstreet's command became engaged, when there was a conflict between Hood's. division and King's division of McDowell's corps, which was moving along the Warrenton Pike to cut off Jackson's troops, erroneously supposed to be retreating. On the next day, though there was skirmishing and fighting in Jackson's front all day, General Longstreet was not ready to go into action until after 3 P. M. What caused this delay he does not pretend to explain, but gives his operations on that day as follows: The next day the Federals advanced against General Jackson in very heavy force. They soon made the battle
Pickett (search for this): chapter 3.25
n the night of the first, that he had given the order for Longstreet to attack at sunrise next morning. General Lee also said to the gentleman referred to by General Fitz Lee, that the battle would have been gained if General Longstreet had obeyed the orders given him, and had made the attack early instead of late. General Hood says that Longstreet said to him on the morning of the second: The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off. Hood got up before sunrise, and he gives several circumstances tending to show that General Lee was anxious to make the attack at once. General Longstreet, in his first article, has stated that General Lee, at 5 P. M. of the 1st, announced his purpose of attacking the enemy the next day, that he persisted in that purpose late at night against his own repeated remonstrances, and that he reiterated it at daylight next morning. All the pre
John H. Evans (search for this): chapter 3.25
bliged to call for reinforcements. At about 3 P. Mi., while the battle was raging fiercely, I was riding to my front when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the field where they were standing. I changed my course and hurried to the point indicated. I found them standing upon a high ping General soon joined me, and, a few minutes after, Major-General Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from, the rear, Kemper's three brigades and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from eneral Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the Federal centre and left. Hood's two brigades, followed by Evans, led the attack. R. H. Anderson's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades of Wilcox moved forward on his left, and those of Kempe
Wilcox (search for this): chapter 3.25
al Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from, the rear, Kemper's three brigades and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Prior became detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking columns moved steadily forward, driving the enemy from his' different pose order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the Federal centre and left. Hood's two brigades, followed by Evans, led the attack. R. H. Anderson's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades of Wilcox moved forward on his left, and those of Kemper on his right. D. R. Jones advanced on the extreme right, and the whole line swept steadily on, driving the enemy, with great carnage, from each successive position, until 10 P. M., when darkness put
Ewell (search for this): chapter 3.25
is hardly possible that any one acquainted with General Lee's exalted character will accept such statements as true. It is evident that allusion is here made to the language used by General Lee, as given by me, in the conference had with Generals Ewell, Rodes, and myself, after the close of the first day's fight, when he said: Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in position and gets everything ready, but he is so slow. It will be seen, from a letter given by General Fitz Lee, inemonstrances, and that he reiterated it at daylight next morning. All the presumptions from these statements and circumstances are in favor of the correctness of General Pendleton's statement, and when connected with General Lee's declaration to Ewell, Rodes, and myself, at the close of the first, it becomes absurd for General Longstreet to say that he has sustained all his facts and opinions by the most particular proofs. It is very evident, beyond all reasonable doubt, that General Lee indi
Sickles (search for this): chapter 3.25
g of the 2d. During the night of the 1st General Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the grouf the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were prastion as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, There is no position there.signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d, General Sickles became apprehensive that we were about toe open. It will be seen, therefore, that General Sickles' move, and all the movements of the Federf a sunrise attack. In his testimony, General Sickles says: At a very early hour on Thurson was removed very early in the morning, and Sickles' corps remained on that flank, alone, until lansferring troops to meet such an attack, and Sickles did not go into position until near 4 o'clockre four o'clock in the afternoon, I found General Sickles had taken a position very much in advancede to examine the left of our line, where General Sickles was. His troops could hardly be said to b
Gederal Meade (search for this): chapter 3.25
th corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupyended to retreat from Gettysburg. I asked General Meade to go over the ground on the left and examon. It was in the morning that he reported to Meade his apprehension of an attack on that flank, as shown by Meade's testimony, and yet no arrangements were made for transferring troops to meet sucMeade's direction, and from there sent word to Meade that that point would have to be occupied very we would have had to make a wide circuit, and Meade, having the inner and shorter line, would haveThe consequence, therefore, must have been, if Meade had pursued what would have been his very obvirated General Longstreet's brain. He thinks Meade would certainly have attacked us at once, if w All the inferences from his telegram are that Meade would not have attacked us in our then positio ensued. There is no reason to suppose that Meade would have been more prompt to attack us in po[15 more...]
Round Top (search for this): chapter 3.25
nk that Hood's gallant men were doomed to slaughter in a desperate struggle for the heights of Round Top, against. troops that had been on the extreme right of the Federal army until 2 o'clock P. Ml Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the ground lying between General Hancock's left and Round Top, General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were practicable; and in reply to his question as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, There is no position thereckles was. His troops could hardly be said to be in position. He then says that he went to Round Top, by Meade's direction, and from there sent word to Meade that that point would have to be occu sunrise, or at any time in the morning, when Meade apprehended no attack in that quarter, and Round Top was not occupied and he knew nothing of the character of the ground, he would have been able t
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