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to protect our left flank, which was very much exposed before the arrival of Stuart's cavalry. This has been fully explained heretofore, and the fact shown that these two brigades never constituted any part of our line; so that it was not broken by their being assigned the position they occupied. If General Longstreet found it necessary to take two of his divisions, which were intended to support the attacking column on the 3d, in order to protect his right flank against two brigades of Pleasanton's cavalry, it was certainly not unreasonable to take two brigades to protect a flank that was very much more exposed. This objection is really too insignificant to discuss. In the second article there is this passage: In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive in tactics, while of course it was offensive in strategy. I have italicized the words his council to fix attention upon th
ppeal. He knows very well that there are a number of officers and men who entirely lost their right arms in the war, and are yet able to write with great facility; and it is hardly to be presumed that he suggested that appeal of the old soldier for sympathy. My suggestion had no reference to the mere mechanical task of writing, or the employment of another as his amanuensis, for if he had but done the latter he would only have followed the example of many very able writers, and among them Homer and Milton, whose blindness rendered it necessary for them to use the services of others in transferring the grandest productions. of their brains to paper. So if General Longstreet had merely employed another to commit to paper his own ideas, or to correct and render more perspicuous their expression, there would have been no impropriety in that. The objection is that the views, speculations, and criticisms of a professional newspaper writer, without military experience, should be palmed
Will Longstreet never begin ? Is it to be wondered that General Lee had come to the conclusion that Longstreet was very slowe Times, says that General Jackson did not pursue, while General Lee says: Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, aecond Manassas, to show the official relations between. General Lee and himself, General Longstreet gives two letters, one from Colonel Taylor and the other from General Lee, to show the kindly personal relations that existed between himself and GenGeneral Lee and his staff, a matter which no one will pretend to controvert, but which all will say ought to have prevented Gene, that, while General Longstreet has given a letter from General Lee to him, written since the war, to show their kindly perse other side, we have General Pendleton's statement that General Lee told him, on the night of the first, that he had given torder for Longstreet to attack at sunrise next morning. General Lee also said to the gentleman referred to by General Fitz L
Stephen D. Lee (search for this): chapter 3.25
eral Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line pushed forward until engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was checked, and a fierce and bloody struggle ensued. A second and third line, of great strength, moved up to support the first, but, in doing so, came within easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left. He immediately ordered up two batteries, and two others being thrown forward about the same time by Colonel S. D. Lee, under their well-directed fire the supporting lines were broken and fell back in confusion. Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward, driving the enemy before them. He retreated in confusion, suffering severely from our artillery, which advanced as he retired. General Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command agains
ossible that any one acquainted with General Lee's exalted character will accept such statements as true. It is evident that allusion is here made to the language used by General Lee, as given by me, in the conference had with Generals Ewell, Rodes, and myself, after the close of the first day's fight, when he said: Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in position and gets everything ready, but he is so slow. It will be seen, from a letter given by General Fitz Lee, in his articlances, and that he reiterated it at daylight next morning. All the presumptions from these statements and circumstances are in favor of the correctness of General Pendleton's statement, and when connected with General Lee's declaration to Ewell, Rodes, and myself, at the close of the first, it becomes absurd for General Longstreet to say that he has sustained all his facts and opinions by the most particular proofs. It is very evident, beyond all reasonable doubt, that General Lee indicated t
Stonewall Jackson (search for this): chapter 3.25
g to his own showing, and in the meantime General Jackson's command had sustained and repulsed sevead full view of the battle being made against Jackson. We could see the solid masses of the Federa and check it. Instead of moving to reinforce Jackson, therefore, I sent dispatches for batteries tI had found anything better than reinforcing Jackson, to pursue it. I mention this incident simpleneral Lee had very little to do with it. General Jackson merely withstood the enemy's attacks, whiaturally: What would have been the result, if Jackson and his men had not been of the stuff to withhe had found anything better than reinforcing Jackson, to pursue it ? Let us see what General Longsm the Commanding General, informing me of General Jackson's condition and his wants. As it was evi detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking columns moved sn to get ready for that attack. Imagine Stonewall Jackson taking five hours to reconnoitre the ene[15 more...]
mmanding General soon joined me, and, a few minutes after, Major-General Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from, the rear, Kemper's three brigades and D. R. Jones' division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigades of Brigadier-Generals Featherston and Prior became detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's command. The attacking colole command against the Federal centre and left. Hood's two brigades, followed by Evans, led the attack. R. H. Anderson's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades of Wilcox moved forward on his left, and those of Kemper on his right. D. R. Jones advanced on the extreme right, and the whole line swept steadily on, driving the enemy, with great carnage, from each successive position, until 10 P. M., when darkness put an end to the battle and the pursuit. It w
had General Longstreet given to the enemy of the presence of his command on the field, that General Fitz John Porter, of the Federal army, was afterwards court-martialed and cashiered for failing to carry out an order sent to him by Pope, at half-past 4 o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack Jackson's right flank — the very one on which Longstreet was. It was not until after sunset that any part of Longstreet's command became engaged, when there was a conflict between Hood's. division and King's division of McDowell's corps, which was moving along the Warrenton Pike to cut off Jackson's troops, erroneously supposed to be retreating. On the next day, though there was skirmishing and fighting in Jackson's front all day, General Longstreet was not ready to go into action until after 3 P. M. What caused this delay he does not pretend to explain, but gives his operations on that day as follows: The next day the Federals advanced against General Jackson in very heavy force. They
E. W. Robertson (search for this): chapter 3.25
after the disastrous repulse of the day before; nor did he dare attack us, afterwards, in the vicinity of Hagerstown, when he had been reinforced by 8,000 men under French, and a considerable part of Couch's force from Harrisonburg, besides having at hand (at Harper's Ferry) a portion of the troops from North Carolina and the Peninsula, with all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the battle, be counted as reinforcements. These facts should satisfy General Longstreet and his adherents that Meade would not have been in a hurry to attack us, if we had awaited his attack on Seminary Ridge, or had moved past his left and assumed another position; and they should equally convince those who think the taking possession of the Gettysburg heights, on the afternoon of the 1st, would i
Meade would have been more prompt to attack us in position on the heights of Gettysburg, if we had gained that position on the 1st, than he showed himself to attack us in the position on Seminary Ridge, with our left extended in a curve through Gettysburg. He did not attack us on the 4th in our then position on Seminary Ridge, after the disastrous repulse of the day before; nor did he dare attack us, afterwards, in the vicinity of Hagerstown, when he had been reinforced by 8,000 men under French, and a considerable part of Couch's force from Harrisonburg, besides having at hand (at Harper's Ferry) a portion of the troops from North Carolina and the Peninsula, with all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the battle, be counted as reinforcements. These facts should satisfy Gen
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