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Charles P. Stone (search for this): chapter 3.25
hese believed that Mr. Lincoln had committed a grave, error in his selection. The army, from its former reverses, had become quite disheartened and almost sulky; but the quick, vigorous measures now adopted and carried out with a firm hand had a magical effect in toning up where there had been demoralization and inspiring confidence where there had been mistrust. Few changes were made in the heads of the general staff departments, but for his chief-of-staff Hooker applied for Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone, who, through some untoward influence at Washington, was not given to him. This was a mistake of the war dignitaries, although the officer finally appointed to the office, Major-General Daniel Butterfield, proved himself very efficient. Burnside's system of dividing the army into three grand divisions was set aside, and the novelty was introduced of giving to each army corps a distinct badge, an idea which was very popular with officers and men. This idea originated with Ge
John Sedgwick (search for this): chapter 3.25
cksburg. Stonewall Jackson, who was watching Sedgwick, received instructions to withdraw his corps,n of it between the Plank road and turnpike. Sedgwick, the previous night, had been ordered to sendy of the commanding general at daylight. But Sedgwick was already across the river and three miles rtified heights to assault, the problem which Sedgwick had to solve will be pronounced impossible ofs was about the middle of the afternoon, when Sedgwick in force attacked the enemy. Though at firsterward stated, strained to catch the sound of Sedgwick's guns, it could not have heard them in the cuproar that filled the air around him; but as Sedgwick, who was known as a fighting officer, had notmy having been sent to Salem Church to resist Sedgwick. Sedgwick had difficulty in maintaining his Sedgwick had difficulty in maintaining his ground, but held his own by hard fighting until after midnight, May 4th-5th, when he recrossed at Bao a place where it could not be hurt, leaving Sedgwick to take care of himself. At 12 o'clock on [5 more...]
Alfred Pleasonton (search for this): chapter 3.25
running for their lives. Gathering up such troops as were nearest to the scene of action, Berry's division from the Third Corps, some from the Twelfth, Hays's brigade of the Second, and a portion of the Eleventh, an effectual stand was made. Pleasonton, who was returning from the front, where he had been operating with Sickles (at the time Jackson attacked), taking in the state of things, rapidly moved his two regiments of cavalry and a battery to the head and right flank of the enemy's advanf the Eleventh Corps on the Plank road. his right flank perpendicular to the old one and barely half a mile to the right of Chancellorsville. Sickles was retired, with the two columns, from his advanced position in the afternoon to near where Pleasonton had had his encounter, before mentioned, some distance to the left of the new line of our right flank and close up to the enemy. The situation was thought to be a very critical one by General Hooker, who had simply a strong body in front of th
Joseph Hooker (search for this): chapter 3.25
er. For some days there had been a rumor that Hooker had been fixed upon for the place, and on the general staff departments, but for his chief-of-staff Hooker applied for Brigadier-General Charles , but devised them in detail. As organized by Hooker the First Corps was commanded by Reynolds; thestrations on the left, entirely unconscious of Hooker's successful crossing of the right wing, until corps, march to the left, across the front of Hooker's intrenched position, until its right flank w off their guard by adopting the conjecture of Hooker, Lee's army is in full retreat to Gordonsvilleput an end to the fighting of both combatants, Hooker was obliged to form a new line for Stampedensurmountable obstacle. It only required that Hooker should brace himself up to take a reasonable, use. Upon the south porch of that mansion General Hooker stood leaning against one of its pillars, ce, Sickles and myself squarely no; upon which Hooker informed the council that he should take upon [40 more...]
John W. Geary (search for this): chapter 3.25
e on the porch, with nothing between him and Lee's army but Geary's division of the Twelfth and Hancock's division and a battery of the Second Corps. But Geary's right was now turned, and that flank was steadily being pressed back along his intrenchs battery that The 29th Pennsylvania (of Kane's Brigade, Geary's division, Twelfth Corps) in the trenches under artillery e men to train a gun on the flank of the force then pushing Geary's division. The enemy, having 30 pieces in position on ourt to bear on us. Still everything was firmly held excepting Geary's right, which was slowly falling to pieces, for the enemy had his flank and there was no help for it. Riding to Geary's left, I found him there dismounted, with sword swinging over hihave driven the enemy out of the thicket, then forcing back Geary's right, and would have neutralized the thirty guns to the want of ammunition. A few minutes after my interview with Geary a staff-officer from General Hooker rode up and requested m
Oliver O. Howard (search for this): chapter 3.25
the Fifth by Meade; the Sixth by Sedgwick; the Eleventh by Howard; the Twelfth by Slocum, and the cavalry corps by Stoneman. left over the Banks's Ford and turnpike roads, Slocum and Howard on the right along the Plank road, the left to be near Bansitions could be held; at least so said Couch, Slocum, and Howard. Until after-dark on May 1st the enemy confined his dem At 9:30 A. M. a circular directed to Generals Slocum and Howard called attention to this movement and to the weakness of tto punish them severely. Pickets had been thrown out on Howard's flank, but not well to the right and rear. I suspect thssembled his corps commanders in council. Meade, Sickles, Howard, Reynolds, and myself were present; General Slocum, on accng, stating that he doubted if we could get off our guns. Howard was in favor of fighting, qualifying his views by the rematack. Upon collecting the suffrages, Meade, Reynolds, and Howard voted squarely for an advance, Sickles and myself squarely
Ambrose E. Burnside (search for this): chapter 3.25
rmission from the Philadelphia times.--editors. by Darius N. Couch, Major-General, U. S. V. In the latter part of January, 1863, the Army of the Potomac under Burnside was still occupying its old camps on the left bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg. After the failures under Burnside it was evident that the army Burnside it was evident that the army must have a new commander. For some days there had been a rumor that Hooker had been fixed upon for the place, and on the 26th of January it was confirmed. This appointment, undoubtedly, gave very general satisfaction to the army, except perhaps to a few, mostly superior officers, who had grown up with it, and had had abundant ohis was a mistake of the war dignitaries, although the officer finally appointed to the office, Major-General Daniel Butterfield, proved himself very efficient. Burnside's system of dividing the army into three grand divisions was set aside, and the novelty was introduced of giving to each army corps a distinct badge, an idea whi
U. S. Ford (search for this): chapter 3.25
tents, as they were in full view of the enemy, who would readily observe their withdrawal. On the 29th the two divisions of the Second Corps reached United States Ford, held by the enemy; but the advance of the right wing down the river uncovered it, whereupon a bridge of pontoons was thrown across and the corps reached Chancelload divided his army into two wings, and the enemy, no ordinary enemy, lay between them. The line of communication connecting the wings was by way of United States Ford and twenty miles long. It was of vital importance that the line be shortened in order to place the wings within easy support of each other. The possession of Banretreat anyhow? On the morning of May 5th, corps commanders were ordered to cut roads, where it was necessary, leading from their positions to the United States Ford. During the afternoon there was a very heavy rainfall. In the meantime Hooker had in person crossed the river, but, as he gave orders for the various corps to ma
N. H. Davis (search for this): chapter 3.25
but possessed of his mental faculties. I do not think that one of those officers outside of the tent knew what orders I was to receive, for on stepping out, which I did immediately on getting my instructions, I met Meade close by, looking inquiringly as if he expected that Second line of Union defense at the junction of the roads to Ely's and United States fords. From a War-time sketch. finally he would receive the order for which he had waited all that long morning, to go in. Colonel N. H. Davis broke out: We shall have some fighting now. These incidents are mentioned to show the temper of that knot of officers. No time was to be lost, as only Hancock's division now held Lee's army. Dispatching Major John B. Burt with orders for the front to retire, I rode back to the thicket, accompanied by Meade, and was soon joined by Sickles, and after a little while by Hooker, but he did not interfere with my dispositions. Hancock had a close shave to withdraw in safety, his line bei
Frank H. Peck (search for this): chapter 3.25
r's seven corps at about 113,000 men ready for duty, although the data from which the conclusion is arrived at are not strictly official. This estimate does not include the cavalry corps of not less than 11,000 duty men, nor the reserve artillery, the whole number of guns in the army being 400. Lee's strength in and around Fredericksburg was placed at between 55,000 and 60,000, not including cavalry. It is not known if Hooker's information concerning the Confederate force was reliable, but Peck, operating in front of Norfolk, notified him that two of Lee's divisions under Longstreet were on the south side of the James. The hour was, therefore, auspicious for Hooker to assume the offensive, and he seized it with a boldness which argued well for his fitness to command. The aim was to transfer his army to the south side of the river, where it would have a manoeuvring footing not confronted by intrenched positions. On the 27th of April the Eleventh and Twelfth corps were set in motio
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