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Sharpsburg (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
, and division commander, under the orders of Generals Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, I was never required to throw up even temporary breastworks for the protection of my troops. The battles of Gaines's Mills, Second lyIanassas, Fredericksburg, Sharpsburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg, were all fought by the Confederates without the aid of such defences. The officers and soldiers, who served in the Virginia Army, know of the great self-reliance and spirit of invincibility which pervaded its attack in any army. To attack entrenchments, give me troops who have never served behind them. Good troops, in line of battle, before using entrenchments, feel as secure without works as with them. As an instance, recall your division, at Sharpsburg, when attacked by more than five times its number in an open field, or again your brigade at Gaines's Mills, when it carried the works of the enemy. I would not be understood as arguing against the use of entrenchments when the occasion is
Cassville (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
. It is hereby evident that as long as General Johnston endeavored to obtain the transfer, to his own command, of Longstreet's Corps in Virginia, and of Polk's Army in Mississippi, he spoke continually of fighting at Dalton; when, however, Sherman appeared at Tunnel Hill, in front of Rockyfaced Ridge, and he was given an Army of over seventy thousand (70,000) available troops — as I have demonstrated — he decided to retreat. What followed at Resaca? Retreat. New Hope Church? Retreat. Cassville? Retreat. Kennesaw Mountain? Retreat. Would we have fought at Atlanta after our inglorious campaign, the abandonment of the mountain fastnesses, and the foreshadowed intention of our commander to fall back to Macon? I shall now glance at his two plans for the defence of Atlanta, one of which was to insure the security of that city forever. By his first plan, he hoped to attack the enemy as they crossed Peach Tree creek. Within thirty-six hours, almost before he had time to select quar
Marietta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
y to engage the enemy on terms of advantage while they were divided in crossing Peach Tree creek, trusting to General Wheeler's vigilance for the necessary information. If successful, the great divergence of the Federal line of retreat from the direct route available to us would enable us to secure decisive results; if unsuccessful, we had a safe place of refuge in our entrenched lines close at hand. Holding it, we could certainly keep back the enemy, as at New Hope Church and in front of Marietta, until the State troops promised by Governor Brown were assembled. Then, I intended to man the works of Atlanta on the side toward Peach Tree creek with those troops, and leisurely fall back with the Confederate troops into the town, and, when the Federal Army approached, march out with the three corps against one of its flanks. If we were successful, the enemy would be driven against the Chattahoochee where there are no fords, or to the east, away from their communications, as the attack
Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
ntioned, and in such as I shall hereafter specify. The result of training soldiers to rely upon their own courage, we behold in the achievements of Lee's troops. Long will live the memory of their heroic attempt to scale the rugged heights of Gettysburg; of their gallant charge over the breastworks at Gaines's Mills, and again over the abatis and strong entrenchments at Chancellorsville; of the many deeds of equal daring, which history will immortalize. I shall consider, for a moment, the me orders of Generals Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, I was never required to throw up even temporary breastworks for the protection of my troops. The battles of Gaines's Mills, Second lyIanassas, Fredericksburg, Sharpsburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg, were all fought by the Confederates without the aid of such defences. The officers and soldiers, who served in the Virginia Army, know of the great self-reliance and spirit of invincibility which pervaded its ranks, and how correct the apprec
Winchester, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
r forces to become demoralized by the natural effect of this gross error, in lieu of holding their troops well in hand, taking some general line upon which to retard and cripple the enemy as much as possible, and, finally, beat him, if not in a general pitched battle, in detail; the only chance of success for the weaker power grappling with its strong enemy. Had General Lee pursued the plan of the French or of the Turks, he would have entrenched himself at an early day of the war — say at Winchester; have allowed the Federals to surround him with five times his numbers; to constr.uct breastworks, finally, to compel him to surrender, and thus bring demoralization to his countrymen, in addition to the loss of their cause. The reckless attacks around Atlanta — so designated by General Johnston--enabled us to hold that city forty-six days, whereas, he abandoned in sixty-six days one hundred miles of territory, and demoralized the Army. It is a significant fact that General Sherman d
Fredericksburg, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
ould find, from Maryland to the Rapidan, for the purpose of skirmishing, and delaying the enemy — which work he properly left to the cavalry — he threw his colors to the breeze, and, with martial music, marched to the line of Gordonsville and Fredericksburg. A few months later, when the Federals appeared in his front, he marshaled his forces, which, refreshed by their long rest, were anxious for battle; he at once attacked, defeated the enemy, and pursued him to the Potomac. He thus drove backental, brigade, and division commander, under the orders of Generals Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, I was never required to throw up even temporary breastworks for the protection of my troops. The battles of Gaines's Mills, Second lyIanassas, Fredericksburg, Sharpsburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg, were all fought by the Confederates without the aid of such defences. The officers and soldiers, who served in the Virginia Army, know of the great self-reliance and spirit of invincibility whic
Tennessee (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
eral J. B. Hood. General:--In your favor of the 17th inst., you ask my opinion of the general effect of entrenchments upon an Army. My experience during the recent war was nearly equally divided in serving with and without entrenchments. My service with the Army of North Virginia ended after the battle of Sharpsburg--then in the campaigns in Mississippi, involving the fall of Vicksburg--again in the campaign in Georgia, involving the fall of Atlanta, and also the last campaign into Tennessee. Entrenchments were generally used in my service in the West. They were not used in Virginia up to the time I was transferred West. I am free to say that I consider it a great misfortune to any army to have to resort to entrenchments; its morale is necessarily impaired from their constant use. Troops once sheltered from fire behind works, never feel comfortable unless in them. The security of entrenchments is a constant subject of discussion by troops who use them. It is a matter o
Tunnel Hill (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
r successful resistance as soon as possible by assembling here the troops you enumerate. Again, Johnston's Narrative, page 296. I would have the troops assemble here without delay, to repel Grant's attack and then make our own. It is hereby evident that as long as General Johnston endeavored to obtain the transfer, to his own command, of Longstreet's Corps in Virginia, and of Polk's Army in Mississippi, he spoke continually of fighting at Dalton; when, however, Sherman appeared at Tunnel Hill, in front of Rockyfaced Ridge, and he was given an Army of over seventy thousand (70,000) available troops — as I have demonstrated — he decided to retreat. What followed at Resaca? Retreat. New Hope Church? Retreat. Cassville? Retreat. Kennesaw Mountain? Retreat. Would we have fought at Atlanta after our inglorious campaign, the abandonment of the mountain fastnesses, and the foreshadowed intention of our commander to fall back to Macon? I shall now glance at his two plans for the d
Mississippi (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
ntrenchments upon an Army. My experience during the recent war was nearly equally divided in serving with and without entrenchments. My service with the Army of North Virginia ended after the battle of Sharpsburg--then in the campaigns in Mississippi, involving the fall of Vicksburg--again in the campaign in Georgia, involving the fall of Atlanta, and also the last campaign into Tennessee. Entrenchments were generally used in my service in the West. They were not used in Virginia up to tsemble here without delay, to repel Grant's attack and then make our own. It is hereby evident that as long as General Johnston endeavored to obtain the transfer, to his own command, of Longstreet's Corps in Virginia, and of Polk's Army in Mississippi, he spoke continually of fighting at Dalton; when, however, Sherman appeared at Tunnel Hill, in front of Rockyfaced Ridge, and he was given an Army of over seventy thousand (70,000) available troops — as I have demonstrated — he decided to ret
New Orleans (Louisiana, United States) (search for this): chapter 8
the account of this extraordinary project, and, forthwith, addressed the following letter to Major General Gustavus W. Smith, who commanded the Georgia State troops previous to General Johnston's removal, and during the siege of Atlanta: New Orleans, January 17th, 1874. General G. W. Smith, Frankfort, Ky. General:--Having occasion to refer to your official report of the operations of the Georgia Militia around Atlanta, I find you were assigned the command of these troops the 1st of Junuthwest to destroy the railroad to Macon. Your views upon this important subject, I should be pleased to have at your earliest convenience. Yours truly, J. B. Hood. Frankfort, Kentucky, January 23d, 1874. General John B. Hood, New Orleans, La. General:--Your letter of the 17th inst. is received. In answer to your first inquiry I have to say that, in my opinion, you were furnished with all the State forces that the Governor of Georgia, could by the use of extraordinary powers b
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